Prof. Richard C. Taylor

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Translations (c) by Richard C. Taylor

Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences (selected articles)

(A) In 2 Sent., d.1, q.1, a. 1: Whether there are many first principles

(B) In 2 Sent., d.1, q.1, a.2: Whether anything can go forth from [God] by creation 

(C) In 2 Sent., d.1, q.1, a.3: Whether to create belongs to things other than God 

(D) In 2 Sent., d. 1, q.1, a.4: Whether something other than God makes another thing.

(E) In 2 Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 1: Whether there is one soul or intellect for all human beings

(F) In 1 Sent d. 8, q. 5, a. 2: Whether the soul is simple.

(G) In 2 Sent d. 3, q. 1, a. 6: Whether the angel and the [human] soul differ in species

(H) In 3 Sent. d. 5, q.3, a.2, response only: Whether the separated soul is a person.

(I) In 1 Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 Whether being (esse) is properly said of God. Tr. R. E. Houser, rev. R. Taylor

(K) In 1 Sent. d.8, q.4, q.2. Whether God is in the category of substance. Tr. Andrea Robiglio & Richard Taylor

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Unedited draft translations by © Richard C. Taylor made from the unpublished revised texts provided by Dr Adriano Oliva, Commissio Leonina, Paris, unless otherwise noted.

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(A) Aquinas on the First Principle

Commentary on the Sentences, Book 2, D.1, Q.1, A.1

Whether there are many first principles

We proceed to the first as follows.
[Objections]

1. (1) It seems that there are many first principles. because according to the Philosopher in De Caelo et mundo 2, if one of the contaries exists in nature, then the other .. But the greatest evil is contrary to the greatest good, as also evil to good. Therefore, since there is a greatest good which is the first principle of all good things, it seems that there is also one greatest evil which is the first principle of all evil things. In this way there will be two first principles.
2. (2) Furthermore, everything that comes to be either is itself a first principle or it is from some principle, as is said in Physics 3. But there is something evil in the world. If, therefore, it is not a first principle, because given that the issue would be settled, it is necessary that it be from another principle. But not from the good, because the good is destructive of evil and not cause of it, as warm not of cold. By the same reasoning, if it is not the first principle of that evil, there will be another principle of evil. However, we cannot proceed infinitely in principles and causes, as is proven in Metaphysics 2. Therefore, it seems to be necessary to reach a first evil which is the principle of all evil. And in this way what was proposed is attained.
3. (3) If it is said that evil does not have a principle but occurs outside the intention of some principle agent, [there is the following reason on the] contrary : Everything that happens outside the intention of an agent is by chance and rarely occurring. But evil is found in many things, as is said in the Topics. Therefore, it seems that evil is something intended and has a principle per se.
4. (4) Furthermore, those things which are from a first principle have a formal likeness to one another, because what has been caused by a principle imitates the principle. But a great deal of contrariety and diversity is found in things. Therefore, it is necessary to trace back to contrary principles.
5. (5) Furthermore, matter and agent never coincide in the same [genus], as is said in Physics 2,5 nor also [do] agent and form [coincide] in what is numerically the same. But things have principles formal, material and active, and in singular things one must reach to one first, as is proven in Metaphysics 2. Therefore, it is necessary to assert that there are many first principles.

But on the contrary,

1. (1) Unity precedes every multiplicity, because plurality arises from unity. If, therefore, many first principles are asserted , it is necessary that there be one first principle before them. But there is nothing prior to the first. Therefore, it is impossible to assert many first principles.
2. (2) Furthermore, whatever things coincide in one thing and differ in another must be composed. But if many first principles are asserted, it is necessary that these have something in common on the basis of which they have the nature (rationem) of principle and that they differ in some respect, since they are many. Therefore, it is necessary that they be composed. But nothing composed can be first. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be many first principles.
3. (3) Furthermore, if there were many first principles they would be either similar or contraries. If similar, either each one would be sufficient in its own right and so the other superfluous, or each one would be insufficient but they would be conjointly sufficient to act as principle of things. In this way there would not be many first principles, both because they would require conjoining with what is prior to them, and because they would act in virtue of something added to the essence, namely through the conjunction itself. But no first principle is such as that. However, if they were contraries, every contrary destroys and impedes its contrary. Therefore, if they are equals in power, one would impede the other, to the extent that no effect would follow. But if one were more powerful, it would completely destroy the other. Therefore it is impossible for there to be many first principles.

[Response]
I respond that it should be said that first is said in a twofold way, first absolutely and first in genus or in some order. If [taken] in the second way, according to the many genera of causes in this way there are many first principles, such as the first material [principle], which is prime matter, and the first formal [principle] which is being, and so forth for the rest. By descending further to the diverse kinds of things, diverse first principles are found in regard to diverse things even according to same genus of cause, as in liquids first matter is water and in arid things earth and in animals semen or menstrual.

But it is impossible for there is be but one first principle taken absolutely. This is evident in three ways. First, on the basis of the order of the universe the parts of which are found to be ordered to one another as the parts of an animal as a whole which serve one another. However, such coordination of many does not exist unless they tend toward some one thing. Therefore, it is necessary that there be one highest ultimate good which is desired by all. This will be the first principle. It is apparent in another way from the very nature of things. For the nature of being is found in all things, in some more noble and in some less, in such a way nevertheless that the natures of the things themselves are not that very being which they have. Otherwise being would belong to the concept of each quiddity. That is false since the quiddity of any given thing can be understood even without understanding about it whether it exists. Therefore it is necessary that they have being from another and it is necessary to reach something the nature of which is being itself, otherwise the argument would proceed into infinity. This is what gives being to all things. Nor can there be but one, since the nature of entity is of one notion (rationis) in all things according to analogy, for unity of what is caused requires unity per se in the cause. This is the way of Avicenna. A third way is from the immateriality of God Himself. For it is necessary that the cause moving the heavens be a power not existing in matter, as is proven in Physics 8.
However, in things which are without matter there can be no diversity except insofar as the nature of one is more complete and existing in act than the nature of the other. Therefore it is necessary that what comes to perfection of complement and purity of act be one alone, [for] from this all that is mixed with potency comes about, because act precedes potency and the complete the incomplete, as is proven in Metaphysics 9.

Nevertheless there is a threefold error regarding this. For some, such as the first natural philosophers, asserted there to be only a material cause. Hence, the one among them who asserted many first material principles said there are many first principles absolutely.9 But some others asserted with the material cause also an agent cause and said that there are two contrary agent principles such as friendship and strife, namely Empedocles. In accord with this is the opinion of Pythagoras who divided all beings into two orders and reduced one order to good as to a principle and the other to evil. From that sprouted the heresy of the Manichees who asserted there to be two gods, one the creator of invisibile incorporeal good things portrayed in the New Testament and another creator of evil visbile corporeal things portrayed in the Old Testament. The third error was of those who asserted there to be agent and matter, but the agent is not the principle of matter, although there is only one agent. This is the opinion of Anaxagoras and Plato except that Plato added a third principle, the forms separate from things, which he called exemplars — without one being the cause of the other — but through these three the world and the things from which the world is constituted are caused.

[Responses to Objections]

1. (1) To the first, therefore, it should be said that the highest evil is not contrary to the highest good in reality but only in speech. for two reasons. First, because there can be no highest evil, for there is nothing so evil that there is not something good in it, at least with regard to being. For this reason the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 that, if there were something completely evil, it would arise from the corruption of all conditions and it would not be able to sustain itself.
   Secondly, because nothing of privation or contrary is opposed to that good which can in no way be destroyed or diminished. Hence, neither is a particular evil directly opposed to the highest good but rather a particular good which suffers privation in virtue of itself. And I say that one thing is directly opposed to another thing when it is opposed to it insofar as it is of this sort. As blackness of a hand is opposed directly to whiteness of a hand, but is indirectly opposed also to whiteness of a wall, not insofar as it is the blackness of this or of the whiteness of this , but insofar as it is blackness and whiteness absolutely. In this way any evil is opposed to any good, not on the basis of the proper nature of this or that [as determinate particular], say in the case of what is desirable, but on the basis of the common notion (rationem) of the good and the evil. And if evil is opposed to the highest good in this way, this will be indirectly, because it is not opposed to it insofar as it is this particular good but insofar as it is good.
2. (2) To the second it should be said that evil does not have a cause except per accidens. Cause per accidens is said in two ways. In the first way insofar as the agent per accidens is said to be something with regard to what is outside the intention of the agent. In this way every evil is outside the intention of the agent because every agent acts for the sake of an end and intends a good which is an end; no privation is intended but it follows from the form brought about to which it is joined. For fire does not intend to take away the form of air from matter but to bring about its own form. Likewise, the sinner intends pleasure which is a good of some part of him, namely the concupiscible, and not the privation of grace. Agent is said per accidens in a second way as removing something that is an impediment, for what impedes a privation is a form or some thing. Hence, what removes that thing is said to cause privation, as one who extinguishes a candle or takes it out from a house is said to cause darkness. Therefore what is said, that everything which is is either a principle or from a principle, should be understood regarding those things which are something in a thing. But evil is a certain privation and does not name some nature in a positive way.
3. (3) To the third it should be said that, if we are speaking of an evil of nature, this can be considered either with regard to the whole of nature or with regard to some particular agent in nature. If with regard to the whole of nature, it is in this way that evil occurs in exceedingly fewer instances, because it can exist only in things generable and corruptible the accumulation of which is small in quantity with regard to the whole of the heavens in which no evil occurs.
   However, if it is considered with regard to some particular agent in nature, it is the case that its action is always according to something due to its nature unless at some time it is impeded. And this is rarely . From such an impediment there occurs an evil in its nature, as is apparent in the case of deformed bodily parts. If, however, we speak of evil in a blameworthy way, it is found in what is not determined to one action, as all the things which act from freedom of will, whether this belong to many natures or to one nature alone. If it belongs to one nature, as in the case of angels, in this way it is the case that in regard to many things the right operation has followed in accord with what befits the nature belonging to them, and their sin was among the fewer instances. If, however, it belongs to many natures, as is the case for human beings who are composed of a nature intellectual and sensual, it can be considered in two ways. Either (i) according to the whole nature of the species, and in this way it is necessary that in most cases his action proceeds according to that nature whose action is more multiple and concerned with goods more evident to us. The action of a sensitive nature is concerned with things desirable to sense, which are multiplied more than what is desirable to reason which is also more hidden from us who receive knowledge through sense. for this reason most follow those operations. And on the basis of this evil occurs for a human being itself insofar as it is a human being, because it is not a human being insofar as it has sense but insofar as it has reason.
   Or (ii) it can be considered as some individual of that species. In this way it happens that someone by will is determined to follow operations of reason itself through the habit of virtue, and then he acts well in most cases and fails in fewer. But when he adheres to another nature, it is brought about as if another , as it said in Ethics 9. Hence, then there is a judgment about him as about other animals in which there is only a sensitive nature. Because in most cases what is good for him will be carried out with respect to that which is done, as a lion by cruelty or a dog by anger, a pig by gluttony, and so forth regarding others, as Boetius says in the book On Consolation. Hence it is the case that evil occurs less frequently whether it be compared to the principle of the whole of nature or to some particular agent.
4. (4)To the fourth it should be said that things have contrariety to one another with respect to proximate effects, but nevertheless contraries agree in the ultimate end to which they are ordered according to the harmony which they constitute, as is clear also in what is mixed which is composed of contraries. From this it follows that proximate agents would be contraries but the first agent would be one, because the judgment of the agent and the end is the same since these two causes coincide in the same thing.

5. (5) To the fifth it should be said that, although God is in no way matter, still, nevertheless, the very being which matter has as imperfect so that it is called being in potency, it has from God. For this reason it is traced to Him as to a principle. Likewise form as well, which is a part of a thing, is a likeness of the first agent following from Him. Hence, all forms are traced to the first agent as to an exemplar principle. In this way it is evident that there is one first principle absolutely which is the first agent, the exemplar and the ultimate end.

(B) Aquinas on Creation

  In 2 Sent d.1, q.1, a.2 Whether anything can go forth from [God] by creation

Translated By R. C. Taylor from the uncorrected Latin text received from Dr. Adriano Oliva, O.P.

(c) Richard C. Taylor 25October2015

Whether anything can go forth from [God] by creation

To the second we proceed as follows. 

1. It  seems that in creation nothing can go forth from God into being. For everything that comes to be was possible before coming to be. <This is> because, if not, it was equally impossible for it to come to be and necessary that it not come to be, and so this would not be right.  But for whatever is possible to come to be or to be moved is possible through a passive potency.  Since this <potency> is not a being existing per se, it must be that it is in some being which is in potency.  But nothing is a being in potency in relation to something unless it is also something in act. Therefore, everything which comes to be, comes to be from some being preexisting in act.  But no such thing is created, because to create is to make something from nothing, as is said in the Text <of Lombard>.  Therefore, nothing can be created by God.

2. Furthermore, in every change there is something from which there is change per se, because every change is between two termini. But that from which something comes to be per se must remain in what comes to be, either wholly if it is from it as from matter, as the knife from iron; or according to some part of it, namely, according to matter, as if it is said that a whole comes to be from a whole, as flesh comes to be from food.  For from whiteness blackness is not said to come to be except per accidens, that is, after whiteness, as also it is said that the day comes to be from night. If, therefore, something is said to come to be from non-being, it is necessary that non-being — or some part of it, even though it nevertheless has no part — remain in being, and that it be at once being and non-being, which is impossible. Therefore, everything that comes to be comes from some being. Therefore, it seems impossible that something be created by God.

3. Furthermore, nothing permanent at once comes to be and has come to be. <This is> because, while it comes to be it is not, and while it has come to be it is, it is not the case that at once is and is not. If, therefore, some permanent thing comes to be from God, it is necessary that there be a coming-to-be be before its being. But, since becoming is an accident, it cannot be without a subject. Therefore, it is necessary that everything that comes to be come to be from something in which there is a coming-to-be as in a subject. But no such thing is created. Therefore, nothing can come to be through creation.

4. Furthermore, if creation is something, since it is not a substance, it must be an accident. However, every accident is in some subject. But it cannot be in the very thing created as in a subject, because this is its terminus.  For in this way the thing created by creation would be prior insofar as it is its subject and posterior insofar as it is the terminus.  Therefore, it is necessary that it be in some matter from which the created thing comes to be. And this is contrary to the very notion (ratio) of creation.  Therefore, creation is nothing.

5. Furthermore, if creation is something, it is either the creator or the creature. But it is not the creator, because in that way it would be from eternity and in this way creatures <would exist> from eternity. Therefore, it is the creature. But every creature is created by some creation, and in this way there would be creation of creation into infinity. That is impossible, as is evident from Physics 5, where it is shown that there is no action of action into infinity. Therefore, it is impossible that there be creation.

1. But on the contrary is what is said in Genesis 1, « In the beginning God created, etc. »

2. Furthermore, every agent acts insofar as it is in act. But that which is partially in act and partially in potency, brings about a thing according to something of itself, namely by introducing the form into matter. Therefore, since the first being — namely God — is act without admixture of potency, it seems that He can bring about the entire thing according to its entire substance. This is to create. Therefore, it seems that God is able to create. Nevertheless, it should be known that, since creation of its own notion implies a precedent negation because what is created which is such that nothing preexists its production, then that precedence can be taken according to nature alone so that it is understood that what is created <is such that> it has in it nothing taken as preexisting and as acting as a subject for what is created.  It is in this way that creation can be demonstrated and has been conceded by the philosophers. Or it can be taken according to duration so that it is understood that what is created before had no being and afterwards has being. We accept creation in this way and not in the way that it has been asserted by the philosophers.  Nor can it be demonstrated but rather it is held by faith.

I respond that it should be said that faith holds not only that there is creation but also that reason demonstrates <it>. For, it is the case that everything which is in some genus comes forth as imperfect from that in which the nature of the genus is found primarily and perfectly, as it clear concerning heat in hot things <which come> from fire. However, since any given thing and whatever is in the thing participates being in some way, even if mixed with the imperfect, it is necessary that every thing according to the whole of what is in it arise from the first and perfect entity. But we call this to create, namely produce a thing in being according to its whole substance. Hence, it is necessary that all things proceed from the first principle through creation.

Nevertheless, it should be known that the notion of creation involves two things. The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing which is said to be created. Hence, in this it differs from all other changes, because generation presupposes matter which is not generated but through generation is made complete as transformed into the act of a form, while for the other <kinds of> changes a subject which is a complete being is presupposed. Hence, the causality of what generates or changes does not extend itself to everything found in the thing but [only] to the form which is educed from potency into act.  But the causality of creating extends itself to all that is in the thing.  For this reason creation is said to be from nothing because there is nothing which preexists creation as if uncreated.   The second is that in the thing which is said to be created non being is prior to being, not by a priority of time or duration so that earlier it was not and afterwards it is, but by a priority of nature in such a way that if the created thing is left to itself non being would result. For it has being only from the influence of a superior cause.  For what does not have being from another is prior to what has being from another.  On the basis of this creation differs from eternal generation, for it cannot be said that, if left to himself the Son of God does not have being, since he receives from the Father that very same being which belongs to the Father, which is unqualified being not dependent on anything.  

For those two reasons creation is said to be from nothing in two ways. One is such that the negation negates the order of creation in regard to something preexisting implied by the preposition from, so that being is said to be from nothing because it is not from something preexisting. That is with respect to the first. The other is such that the order of creation in regard to nothing preexisting remains affirmed with respect to nature so that creation is said to be from nothing because the thing created naturally has non being prior to being. If these two suffice for the notion (ratio) of creation, then creation can be demonstrated in this way and in this way the philosophers have asserted creation.  However, if we take a third [consideration] to be required for the meaning of creation so that the thing created has non being in duration before being so that it is said to be from nothing because it is temporally after nothing, creation cannot be demonstrated in this way nor is this conceded by the philosophers, but is supposed by faith.

To the first it should be said that according to Avicenna agent (agens)has two senses, one natural which is agent through motion and another divine which is the giving of being, as was said. Similarly, it is necessary to take brought about (actum) or made (factum) in two ways. One [is] through the motion of a natural agent. Everything such as this must come to be because not only an active but also passive potency precedes <it> in time, because motion is the act of what exists in potency. The other <is such that> it is made insofar as it receives being from a divine agent without motion.  If that thing made is new, it is necessary that an active and not passive potency precede its being and such a <newly> made thing is said to be possible to come-to-be by an active potency. However, if it is not new, then an active potency does not precede <it> by duration but rather by nature.

To the second it should be said that creation is not a <kind of> making which is a change properly speaking but rather is a certain reception of being. Hence, it is not necessary that it have an essential order except to what gives being. In this way it is not from non being except insofar as it is after non being, as night is from day.

To the third it should be said that no permanent thing can at once come to be and have been made <to come to be>, if coming into being is taken in the proper sense. But there are some things which signify that proper (rectum) being through the mode of becoming, as when motion is said to be terminated.  For, as <something> is at once terminated and has been terminated, so likewise <something> is illuminated and has been illuminated at once, as the Commentator says in [his commentary] on Physics 4. Similarly too substantial form is at once received and has been received and similarly [too] something is at once created and has been created. If it is objected that before every being that has been made to come to be there is a coming into being properly understood, I say that it is true in regard to all things which come to be through motion, as generation follows the motion of change and illumination <follows> local motion. However, it is not so in regard to creation, as was said.

To the fourth it should be said that creation can be taken actively or passively. If it is taken actively, when creation signifies a divine operation which is its essence with a certain relation, in this way creation is the divine substance. However, if it is taken passively, in this way <creation> is a certain accident in the creature and it signifies a certain thing, not what is in the category of passion properly speaking but what is in the genus of relation.  It is a certain disposition of what has being from another following upon a divine operation. In this way it is not inappropriate that it be in the created thing which is educed through creation as in a subject.  As sonship is in Peter insofar as he receives human nature from his father, nor is it prior to Peter himself. But it follows upon an action and a motion, which are prior. However, the relation of creation does not follow motion but rather only a divine action which is prior to the creature.

To the fifth it should be said, as was said earlier in the first [article of this Question], whenever a creature is referred to the creator, a relation is really founded in the creature and in God <a relation> is only according to reason. Hence, the very relation implied in the name of creation does not assert <the existence of> something uncreated but rather only something created.  Nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be created by another creation, because that which is a relation essentially is not referred to something else by another mediate relation, as was said in the first [article of this Question], except by reason. It is not impossible that relations of this sort which are according to reason alone to be multiplied into infinity.                                

(C) In 2 Sent d1 q1 a3 in the edition of Mandonnet. 

      (First unedited draft translation)

(c) Richard C. Taylor, tr. 25 October 2015

Whether to create belongs to things other than God.

We proceed to the third as follows.

1. It seems that creating also belongs to things other than God. For everything which is not produced in being through generation, if it is comes to be de novo (as new), is created. But the rational soul comes forth into being through generation. Therefore, regardless of the way it comes into being, it is created. But the rational soul comes forth into being through the power of the intelligences; for this reason Plato portrayed God as saying to the secondary gods, “Fenus quod credidistis ad vos recipite (? Receive for yourselves the profit which you believed ?),” and he says this in reference to the rational soul. Likewise in the Book of Causes proposition 3 it is said that the soul is created by the mediation of the intelligence. Therefore  it seems that the angels or intelligences are able to create.

2. Furthermore, whatever dignity of which the creature is capable, this is communicated to it from one who is generous to the highest degree. But the power of creating is communicable to a creature, as the Master says in Book 4, distinction 5. Therefore, it seems that to create has been communicated to some creature.

3. Furthermore, to the extent that something is more resistant to an agent, the more difficult it is for something to come into being from it.  But a contrary is more resistant than absolute non-being. But a natural agent makes a contrary from contrary. Therefore it seems  that something is able to come to be from absolute non-being, and in this way it is able to create.

4. Furthermore, insofar as things come out from God, in this way too they are ordered to Him. But according to Dionysius in many passages, the law of divinity is such that the lowest things are never reach their end except through intermediaries. Therefore it seems that the lowest of beings are also not immediately created by God, but through intermediate causes.

5. Furthermore, the first cause never acts on the effect of a second cause except insofar as it acts on it by a second acting cause. But God, who is the first cause of all things, is the creator of every given thing. Therefore also the second cause in which God creates the power of operation (operando) ought also to be called creator. And in this way to create does not belong to God alone.

[Contraries]

On the contrary, Damscenus, in On the Orthodox Faith, condemns all those who say that the angels create something. Still, concerning these it seems it seems more to be the case than concerning others.

Furthermore, being and absolute non-being are infinitely distant [from one another]. But to move through an infinite distance is characteristic of an infinite power, the likes of which is divine power only.  Therefore to create belongs to It alone.

[Solution]

I respond that it should be said that concerning this there are three opinions.

For some philosophers held that there is one first effect immediately from the First Cause and from it afterward there are others, and so forth to the last. In this way they asserted one intelligence to be cause by the mediation of another and the soul by the mediation of intelligence and corporeal nature by a spiritual mediating.  This was condemned as heresy, because this opinion attributed to a creature the honor that is due to God. In this way it is close to involving idolatry. 

Hence others said that creation belongs to no creature and also is not communicable, as also the being of infinite power which the work of creation required.

Still others said that creation can be communicated to no creature, though communicari tamen potuisse (? it could have been communicated?). The Master asserts this in Book 4 distinction 5.

Both of these last opinions seem to have something to which they point. For although it is  of the nature of creation that something does not exist prior to it, ad least according to the order of nature, this can be taken on the part of what creates or on the part of what is created. If [taken] on the part of what creates, in this way that action is said to be creation which founded on the action of some prior cause. [But] the action of the first cause is such as this because the action of a second cause is founded on the action of the first cause. Hence, just as it cannot be communicated to some creature that it be the first cause, so too it cannot be communicated to it that it be something that creates (creans). If, however, it is taken from the side of the thing created, in this way creation does belong properly to that to which something does not preexist in the thing, namely, being. For this reason it is said in the Book of Causes proposition 4 that the first of created things is being. And in the same work in proposition 1 [wrong reference] it is said that being is through creation and other perfections are added through an informing and chiefly in composed things that being which is of the first part, namely, matter. And by accepting creation in that way, it could have been communicated to a creature so that through the power of the first cause operating in it some simple being or matter would be produced. In this way the philosophers asserted that the intelligences create, although this is heretical.

[Responses to objections]

To the first, therefore, it should be said that in this issue the authorities of the philosophers should not be accepted because they were in error about this. Nevertheless all those authorities could be interpreted in this way so that they would be said to create soul insofar as through the motion of the orbs they disposed bodies to the reception of the soul.  But this is not the intention of these.

To the second it should be said that whatever is communicable to a creature, what is pertinent to the perfection of its nature is communicated to it. However, it is not true of the second perfections. Not every human being who is able to receive the regal dignity is made a king by God. And it is also so regarding the authority of creating, according to those who say that creation can be communicated to a creature.

To the third it should be said that a resistant contrary does not bring about difficulty in acting except insofar as it makes the potency more distant from being in act. [This is] because to the extent that one of the contraries is more intense, to that extent the potency is more remote from the other. This is the reason that something which comes from non being is absolutely of greater power than what what comes about from a contrary.  [This is] because no potency remains in being taken absolutely.

To the fourth it should be said that, although ultimate things are traced back to the ultimate end through intermediaries, nevertheless the influence of the ultimate end on is never communicated to one of the intermediates in such a way that it is what is the ultimate thing desired. And in this way too the influence of the of the first agent which is creation can be communicated to one of the second principles.

To the fifth it should be said that the proximate agent, as generating, cannot operate in this generated thing other than by educing form from the potency of matter. But the operation of the first cause is also in creating matter itself. For this reason the proximate natural agent is only generating this [particular] thing but the divine agent is creating. From this it is clear that just as the operation of art is founded on the operation of nature, in as much as nature prepares the matter of art, so too the operation of nature is founded on creation, insofar as it ministers to the matter of nature.

(D) In 2 Sent., d. 1, q.1, a.4: Whether something other than God makes / brings about another thing.

In 2 Sent d1 q1 a4 unedited first draft translation 

by (c) Richard C. Taylor 25 October 2015

(2.2) Whether something other than God brings about another thing.

To the fourth we proceed as follows.

1. It seems that nothing else makes some thing except God. For the agent which acts without an intermediate is more perfect than that which requires an intermediate in its action. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore it seems that he produces all things without an intermediate.

2. Furthermore, of all creatures angels are the more noble. But the bringing about of things is not attributed to the angels, for one of the angels is not the cause of another nor is cause of a corporeal creature. Therefore it seems that much less are other creatures causes of any other [creatures].

3. Furthermore. one and the same species is not produced by agents diverse in species. But the first individuals of all species have been created by God immediately, when we assume that the world has not existed eternally. Therefore it seems that nothing can produce something similar to itself in species.

4. Furthermore, that which is not from some matter cannot come to be except through creation. But the forms and accidents do not have matter as part of themselves or the reasoning would go out to infinity. Therefore then cannot come to be except through creation. Thus it is so. Every efficient cause of some thing gives to it form, be it substantial or accidental. But [things] of this sort do not produce unless through creation. Therefore nothing can be the efficient cause of some thing except the creator who is God alone, as was said.

5. Furthermore, an efficient cause is never more deficient than [its] effect. But natural agents act only through active qualities which are accidents. This is proved from the fact that it is not possible that something be the substantial form in one thing and the accidental form in another. Hence, heat which is an accident in a human being cannot be the substantial form of fire, and so for other things. Therefore no natural agent produces some substantial form, and so the conclusion is the same as before.

[Contra]

On the contrary, according to Damascene in 2 On the Orthodox Faith, for each and every thing there is a proper operation. But every thing which has its own active operation is the cause of something by its operation. Therefore it seems that fire by heating is the cause of heat, and so for the others.

Furthermore, if God were to cause all things immediately, one thing would not depend on another as effect on cause, and in this way a think would not come to be more from one thing than from another thing. But we see by sense that any given thing does not come to be from any given thing but rather a human being is always generated from the seed of a human being. Therefore the seed of the father is the efficient cause of the son.

[Solution]

I respond that regarding this question three are three positions. One of them is that God immediately brings about all things in such a way that nothing is the cause of some thing, to the extent that they say that fire does not [cause] heat but rather God [does]. Nor does a hand move but rather God causes its motion, and likewise regarding other things. But this position is foolish because it destroys the order of the universe and the proper operation by things and it destroys the judgment of sense. The second position is that of certain philosophers who, in order to sustain the proper operations of things, deny that God creates all things immediately. But they say that He is the cause of what is first created and that is the cause of another and so forth to the end. But this opinion is erroneous because according to faith we do not assert the angels to be creators but only God to be the creator of all things visible and invisible. The third position is that God immediately brings about all things and that individual things have their own operations  through which they are the proximate causes of things but nevertheless not of all but only some of them. For [this is] because, as was said, according to faith a creature is not asserted to produce in being another creature, neither by its own or an external power. For this reason God alone is the immediate cause of all those things which come forth into being by creation.  Things of this sort are those which cannot come forth into being by motion nor by generation. First [this is the case] on account of the simplicity of its essence in which they subsist, because every thing which is generated must be composed of matter and form. Hence, neither the angels nor rational souls can be generated but only created. This follows concerning other forms which also, if they are simple, to not have absolute being since they are not subsisting. Hence, going forth into being does not belong to them but rather to the composite having such form that it is said to be generated per se as if having per se being. The mentioned forms are not said to be generated except per accidens. For the same reason prime matter which underlies generation is not generated due to its simplicity but  it is created. Secondly, [this is the case] on account of the elongation of contrariety as [in the case of ] the celestial bodies, for everything generated is generated from a contrary. Third, [this is the case] on account of the necessity of a similar generating in the generated species. On account of this the primary hypostases are created by God immediately, for human beings cannot be generated except from human beings. It is otherwise regarding those things for the generation of which an agent like in species is not required but the power of the heavens wit active and passive qualities suffices. Of other things which are produced through motion and generation, a creature can be a cause. [This is] either such that it has causality on the whole species, as the son is cause of the generation of a human being or a lion, or in such a way that it has causality in regard to only one of the individuals of the species, as a human being generates a human being and a fire generates a fire. Nevertheless, the cause of these too is God, operating in them more intimately than other moving causes. [This is because] He is what gives being to things. The other causes are as it were determanants of that being.  (???) For the whole being of no creature takes its beginning from some creature (???), since matter is from God alone. Being (esse), however, is more intimate to any thing than what determines being. Hence, it remains that, when those have been removed, as is said in the Book of Causes, proposition 1. Hence the operation of the creator pertains more to the intimate constituents of the thing than does the operation of secondary causes. For this reason that a created thing is cause of other creatures does not exclude that God operates immediately in all things, insofar its power is as an intermediate conjoining the power of any given second cause with its effect. For no power of a creature can be in its effect except the power of the Creator from whom is every power, conservation of power and order to effect. [This is] because, as is said in the Book of Causes, the causality of the second cause ultimately is through the causality of the first cause.

[Responses to objections]

To the first it should be said that it is not out of the need of God that there is need of other causes for creating but from the goodness of Him who also wished to confer the dignity of causing upon other things. 

To the second it should be said that, if we assert according to the opinion of some that the angels serve God in the motion of the orbs, it follows that the angels will be the cause of generation and corruption through the motion of the orbs. That causality will work its way into all things, although not all all will be occupied with this ministry. [This is] because, according to Dionysius, the higher angels illuminate the lower according the ministries being carried out by them. If, however, this is not supposed, it can be said that from the fact that the angels are more noble, it does not follow that they have this dignity which is to cause generation and corruption, but another dignity more great which consists in the cognition of God.

To the third it should be said that the same effect in species cannot be from diverse immediate efficient causes having operations determined to determinate effects, as by art and nature. But God does not have an operation determined to some effect, but rather by one operation alone he is able to produce all the effects which He wishes. Hence the effect the same in species which nature produces God can make without nature operating.

To the fourth it should be said that concerning the going forth of things into being through generation was a threefold opinion. The first was of those asserting latitationem, namely Anaxagoras, (1 Phys. texts 32 & 33) who asserted that all things are in all things and that generation comes about by separation. In this way he did not assert true generation which is when a new substantial form is acquired for matter. Into this failing fell every opinion of the ancients who did not assert true generation but generation to be through bringing things together or separating them out or through alternation alone. This happened for them beause they did not assert the formal cause but either only the material cause or also with this the agent cause. Another opinion contrary to this was that of Plato who asserted separate forms which he called ideas to be inducing forms in matters. And, [it is] as if the opinion of Avicenna reduces to this, who says that all forms are from the intelligence and there is no natural agency except the preparing of matter for the reception of the form. That opinion proceeded from the fact that he wished each and every thing to be generated from its like which is not found frequently in natural sciences, as it is in those things that come to be through putrefaction. [He held] this also cannot be because coming to be per se comes to an end at that which has being which is the termination of a making. This is only something composed, not for or matter and so for is generated only per accidens.  The third is that of Aristotle Metaph 7, who had an opinion between these, namely, that all forms are in potency in prime matter, not however in act as those asserting latitationes said. The natural agent brings about not form but the composite, by reducing matter from potency to act. This natural agent in its action is as it were an instrument fo God as agent Himself who also created matter and gave potency to form (???).  Hence, it is not necessary, in sustaining this opinion, that what generates creates the form or that it makes something from nothing, because it does not make form but the composite.

To the fifth it should be said that, as natural heat acts in the power of the soul as an instrument of it, as is said in De Anima book 2, on account of the fact that it not only heats but acts to bring about the generation of living flesh, so too the active quality acts in the power of the substantial form. For this reason through that action not only is matter brought into the act of an accidental form but also into the act of a substantial form.

(E) Aquinas on Human Knowing

For a study and translation, see Richard C. Taylor, “Aquinas and the Arabs: Aquinas’s First Critical Encounter with the Doctrine of Averroes on the Intellect, In 2 Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 1,” in Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, Luis X. López-Farjeat and Jörg Tellkamp, eds. (Paris: Vrin 2013), 142-183 & 277-296.

 Translation by R, C. Taylor

In 2 Sent. D. 17, Q.2, A.1.

Whether there is one soul or intellect for all human beings

Question 2.

Third it is asked whether the soul was created outside the body. Regarding this two issues are raised. First, whether there is one soul or intellect for all human beings, as a certain separate substance flowing into all bodies. Second, if there are many [souls and intellects], whether they are created in the body or outside the body.

First Article.

To the first we proceed as follows.

[Objections]

1. It seems that the rational soul or intellect is one in number in all human beings.  For no form except a material form is multiplied in being with the division of matter.  But the intellect, as is proven in De Anima 3 is not a material form since it is not the act of a given body. This is proven from its very act because it knows all material forms. This could not be the case if it were to have one of these in its own nature or [if] it were determined to [one] on the basis of the body for which it is the act, just as the visual power would not know all colors if the pupil which is its organ were to have a determinate color.  Therefore, the intellect is not multiplied in being with the division of matter and so it remains one in all individuals of the human species who are divided [into individuals] only in virtue of matter.

2. Furthermore, it is impossible that the principle be more material than what it is the principle of, because the principle must be more simple. But, as is conceded by all, there are some powers of the rational soul which are not acts of a given body nor of an attached organ, the principle and root of which is the very essence of the soul.   Therefore, it seems that neither is the rational soul united to the body through its essence as its act. And so it follows, as it seems, that rational souls are not distinguished with the division of bodies.

3. Furthermore, everything which is received in something is received in it in the mode of the recipient, not in its own mode, as is held by Dionysius and the Book of Causes. If, therefore, the intellect were individuated with the division of body in order to be distinct in diverse [individuals], it is necessary that intelligible forms received in [the individual intellect] also be individuated.  From that two unacceptable consequences seem to follow. One is that, since no particular is understood in act but rather [only] in potency, species of this sort will not be intelligible in act but will require that they be understood through other species, and so forth into infinity. The other is that the mode of receiving forms in prime matter and in the possible intellect will be the same, because in the case of both they are received as those are and not as are forms taken absolutely. Hence, just as prime matter does not know forms which it receives, so too neither [does] the possible intellect [know forms which it receives], as it seems.

4. Furthermore, for any things distinguished from one another, it is necessary that there be something diverse in the nature of each. But since the intellect is none of the things which exist before [it is actually] understanding, it seems that there cannot be something diverse found in it unless according to the diversity of understood species. Therefore, the intellects of one individual and another do not differ in essence but through understood species alone.

5. Furthermore, for all substances existing per se and immaterial, diversity in number is due to diversity of species. [This is] because, if they have their own absolute subsisting being, they cannot be distinguished essentially through something which is outside their essence on which they are spread, as bodily forms are spread on matter.  However, in the essence of these there is nothing but form, and the diversity of [form] brings about the diversity of species.  But it cannot be said that the intellects of  diverse human beings differ in species because human beings themselves differ in species by the diversity of their forms.  Therefore, since the rational soul is a substance subsisting in itself — otherwise it would not remain [in existence] after [the death of] the body —― and is immaterial, it seems that it also does not differ in number in diverse human beings.

[Contrary arguments]

1. The case for the contrary is that it is impossible for a form one in number to belong to many individuals.  But the rational soul is the form of any given human being. For, if a human being were to have the being of a human from the substance of the sensitive or nutritive soul, it could not be found in a human being in reference to his first being which is the basis for [a human being] rising above other animals, and that is an unacceptable consequence. Therefore it is impossible for there to be one rational soul belonging to all [human beings].

2. Furthermore, it is impossible for diversity in second being to be found in those things for which there is no diversity with respect to first being. [This is] because the diversity of secondary perfections and contrariety cannot exist at once with the unity of first perfection because in this way contraries would exist in the same thing. But we find ultimate perfections in second being to be diverse and contrary in diverse human beings, for some of them are fools and some wise, some vicious and some virtuous.  Therefore, it is necessary that the first perfection, namely the soul, be varied in diverse [human beings] in first being.

3. Furthermore, the soul is the form and mover of the body. But in celestial bodies, according to the position of the philosophers, diverse movers are assigned to diverse bodies. Therefore it seems that diverse souls are much more surely in diverse human beings.

[Solution]

[A] I respond.  It should be said that there are many opinions on the part of the philosophers regarding the unity and diversity of the rational soul, when we have set aside those who assert that the intellect is one for all intellectual nature or who hold that the intellect is the same as the divine essence. 

[B] To understand these [sorts of views] it is necessary to understand that intellect is distinguished by the philosophers into three: the possible intellect, the agent intellect and the intellect in a positive disposition. Possible intellect names what is in potency for receiving all understood forms, as vision is in potency for receiving all colors. Agent intellect names what makes intelligibles in potency to be [intelligibles] in act, as light which makes colors visible in potency to be visible in act. Intellect in a positive disposition or formal [intellect] is so named by them when the possible intellect has already been perfected by the intelligible species so that it is able to operate [in its own right], for no passive power has an operation unless perfected by the species of its object, as vision does not see before it has received the species of color.

[C] In light of these considerations, it should be known that nearly all the philosophers after Aristotle are in agreement that the agent intellect and the possible [intellect] differ in substance and that the agent intellect is a certain separate substance.  It is both last among the separate intelligences and related to the possible intellect as that by which we understand, as higher intelligences [are related] to the souls of the spheres.  But this cannot be sustained according to the faith.  For if, as Anselm proves, God did not will that the salvation of humanity come about through an angel, lest the parity in glory of human beings and angels be abolished were an angel to come to be the cause of human salvation.  Likewise, if our soul were held to depend on some intelligence or angel for a natural operation, it could not reasonably be sustained that the soul will be equal to the angel in glory. [This is] because the ultimate perfection of any given substance is in the completion of its operation. For this reason the philosophers mentioned hold that the ultimate happiness of human beings is to be united with the agent intellect. And for this reason some Catholic teachers, correcting and partially following this opinion, asserted in a probable enough way that God Himself is the agent intellect. [This is] because by turning to Him our soul is made blessed, which they confirm in virtue of what is written at John 1, 9: He was the true light, etc.

[D] Concerning the possible intellect there has likewise been great diversity among the philosophers following Aristotle. For some have said that the possible intellect is diverse in diverse [human beings], while others [have said that it] is one for all [human beings]. 

Among those who held it to be diverse in diverse [human beings] there are three opinions.  

[Alexander]

[E] For some say that the possible intellect is nothing other than a disposition which is in human nature for receiving the impressions of the agent intellect and that this is a bodily power consequent upon the human constitution.  This was the opinion of Alexander [of Aphrodisias].  But this cannot stand up even according the intention of Aristotle who wants the possible intellect to be receptive of intelligible species. However, a disposition is not [itself] receptive but rather something which has been disposed [is receptive]. But what has been disposed by this disposition is a body or a power in a body, and in that way what receives intelligible forms would be a body or a power in a body, which the Philosopher refutes. Furthermore, it would follow that the possible intellect would not be a power for having knowledge. For no power caused by the commixture of elements is able to know, because in this way the quality belonging to the elements would act beyond [the limits of] its species, which is impossible.

[Ibn Bâjjah / Avempace]

[F] For this reason other [philosophers] said that the possible intellect is nothing but the power of imagination, insofar as it is naturally constituted such that forms which come to be understood in act are [already] in it.  This is the opinion of Ibn Bâjjah.  But this is also impossible because, according to the Philosopher in Book 3 of the De Anima, phantasms which are in the imaginative [power] are related to the human intellect as colors to vision.  For this reason it is necessary that the phantasms be what move the possible intellect, as color moves vision. The ability which is in the possible intellect for understanding is similar to the ability which is in the patient in potency so that it may be patient in act. The ability which is in the imaginative [power] is as the ability of the agent in potency so that it may be agent in act. However, it is impossible that the same thing be mover and moved, agent and patient.  Therefore, it is impossible that the imaginative power be the possible intellect.  Furthermore, to this extent it would follow that the power receiving the intelligibles in act which is called possible intellect would be employing a bodily organ, since the imaginative power would have a determinate organ.

[Conclusion re. Alexander andIbn Bâjjah / Avempace]

[G] It should also be known that, according to these opinions, the possible intellect is generated with the generated body and corrupted with the corrupted body and, since there is no difference of intellect in diverse human beings except the possible [intellect] because the agent [intellect] is one, what remains of the intellect from all human beings after death is one in number, namely the agent intellect.  And this is heretical in the extreme because in this way reward of those deserving after death would be abolished.

[Avicenna]

[H] For this reason there is the third opinion  belonging to Avicenna, who holds the possible intellect to be diverse in diverse individuals, to be founded upon the essence of the rational soul and not to be a bodily power, to begin to exist with the body but not to come to an end with the body. Hence, with respect to the possible intellect, his opinion is what we hold according to the Catholic faith, although he errs with others concerning the agent intellect, as was said.

[Theophrastus and Themistius]

[I] Among those who hold the possible intellect to be one for all [human beings], there is a twofold opinion. One is that of Themistius and Theophrastus, as the Commentator [Averroes] attributes to them in his Commentary on book 3 of the De Anima. For they say that even the intellect in a positive disposition, which is the third, is one in all [human beings] and eternal and [that] it is, as it were, composed of the agent intellect and the possible [intellect] such that the agent intellect is as its form and, through the conjoining of the possible intellect, the agent intellect is also conjoined with us.  [This occurs] in such a way that the agent intellect is of the substance of the theoretical intellect which also is called the intellect in a positive disposition through which we understand.  They indicate as a sign of this sort of thing that  that action of the intellect which is in our power pertains to the intellect in a positive disposition.  Therefore, since to abstract species from phantasms is in our power, it is necessary that the agent intellect belong to the intellect in a positive disposition as its form. They are led to this position because, since they wish on the basis of the demonstration of Aristotle to hold the possible intellect to be one in all [human beings] because [the possible intellect] is not a determinate particular nor a power in a body and consequently is eternal. And, further, the agent intellect is likewise eternal according to them, and it is impossible for the effect to be generable and corruptible if the agent and recipient is eternal. [Hence,] they asserted that the understood species are eternal. For this reason it does not happen that, in virtue of the fact that new intelligible species which were not before come into being, sometimes the intellect understands and sometimes it does not. Rather [this intermittent understanding happens] from the conjunction of the agent intellect with the possible [intellect], according to which it is conjoined to us through its impression.  

[Averroes Refutation of Theophrastus and Themistius]

[J] But the Commentator also refutes this opinion. [This is] because it would follow that the forms of natural things which are understood would exist from eternity without matter and outside the soul. Due to that those species are not placed in the possible intellect as its form because the form of the possible intellect is asserted by them to be the agent intellect. Since the ultimate perfection of human beings is according to the intellect in a positive disposition and the first [perfection] according to possible intellect,  it would also follow that one human being would not differ from another human being, neither according to ultimate perfection nor according to first [perfection]. Thus, there would be one being and one operation for all human beings, which is impossible.

[Averroes]

[K] For this reason he himself held another way, that the agent intellect as well as the possible [intellect] is eternal and is one in all [human beings], but the intelligible species are not eternal. He also holds that the agent intellect is not related to the possible [intellect] as its form but as a craftsman to matter and [that] the understood species abstracted from phantasms are as form of the possible intellect [and that] from the two of these there comes to be the intellect in a positive disposition.

[Aquinas’s Refutation of Averroes]

[L] In virtue of this position he tried to escape all the impossible things which occurred for Themistius.  First because he shows that, if the agent intellect is eternal and the recipient eternal, namely the possible intellect, it is not necessary that they, namely the intelligible species, be made eternal.  For the visible species has a twofold subject: one in which it has spiritual being, namely vision, and one in which it has material being, namely a colored body.  Similarly, the intelligible species also has a twofold subject: one in which it has material being, namely the very phantasms which are in the imagination, and according to this being those species are not eternal; and another [subject] in which it has immaterial being, namely the possible intellect, and according to this subject they do not have the characteristic of being generable and corruptible. But that seems to be no response [at all].  For, as the species of color which is in the wall and which is in the eye is not the same in number, so too the species which is in the imagination and in the possible intellect are not the same in number. Hence, it still remains that that species which is in the possible intellect has one subject only which is eternal and in such a way that [that species] is itself eternal only and what is generable and corruptible in the imagination is different in number. [This is so] unless perhaps he says that [the species] are eternal absolutely but not by reference to a [particular human being]  in whom the phantasms ― the likenesses of which are present in the possible intellect ― do not exist from eternity. But nevertheless, since no phantasms are eternal, it still would follow that those species which are in the possible intellect from eternity would not have been abstracted from some phantasms, and this is contrary to the intention and words of the Philosopher.

[M] Secondly, however, he tries to show that from this position it does not follow that there is one being and one operation belonging to all human beings, according to which all are equally wise. For he says, the understood species is related to the possible intellect in some way as form to matter and because of that somehow one complete thing is made from them. [Consequently, in this the possible intellect’s] conjunction with us is through that which is formal in the mentioned conjunction, namely, through the understood species, which he says is the phantasm in us as one subject and the possible intellect itself as the other [subject]. Hence, since diverse phantasms are in diverse [human beings], the possible intellect is conjoined to diverse human beings with a diverse conjunction. On the basis of this human beings have diverse being. Also on the basis of this one knows and another is ignorant.  [This is] because [the possible intellect] is conjoined to one [human being] according to one understood species without being conjoined to another according to that [same species].  Still, there are certain understood [things]  such as the first conceptions of the intellect by which it is conjoined to all human beings, [concepts] which the possible intellect is never deprived of, with [the understanding that] human beings exist from eternity, as he says. Hence, however much of the intellect that is in us he concludes is in a way corruptible and in a way incorruptible.  [This is] because for that part in virtue of which it is multiplied, namely the phantasm, corruption occurs; but for the part in virtue of which it is a unity, namely on the part of the possible intellect, there is incorruptibility.  Hence, it follows also from this that there would remain no diversity of souls after the corruption of bodies. 

[N] But this response is shown to be frivolous in many ways.  First, [it is frivolous] because, as was said, the species which is the form of the possible intellect is not the same in number in the phantasm as in the subject. Rather, it is a likeness of that. Hence, it follows that the possible intellect is in no way conjoined with us, and so we will not understand through it.  Second, [it is frivolous] because the conjunction of the possible intellect with the understood species is through an operation of intellect pertaining to second perfection. Hence, it is impossible that his first perfection and substantial being be acquired by a human being through such a conjunction. In this way, since a human being has intellect from such a conjunction as they say, a human being would not be a human being in a determinate species insofar as [the human being] has intellect.  [This is] because that medium, namely the understood species, is conjoined with both of the extremes by the mode of an accident to a subject, namely with the imaginative power and with the possible intellect. [But] this is also contrary to [what] the Philosopher [writes] at Metaphysics 8, where he shows that the soul is united to the body without anything intermediate and also without any mediating knowledge, as Lycophron said.  That position seems to return to the one [of Lycrophon].  Third, [it is frivolous] because the operation does not come forth from the object but from potency, for the visible thing does not see but rather vision [does].  If, therefore, the intellect is conjoined with us only through the fact that the understood species in some way has a subject in us, it follows that this human being, namely Socrates, does not understand but rather that the separate intellect understands these things which [a human being] imagines.  And it is not difficult to adduce many other absurd things [from the position of Averroes].

[Aquinas]

[O] For this reason, when all the errors mentioned have been set aside, I say with Avicenna that the possible intellect begins to exist, but does not go out of existence with the body, that it is diverse in diverse [human beings], and that it is multiplied according to the division of matter in diverse individuals, just as other substantial forms.  And I also add that the agent intellect is diverse in diverse [human beings], for it does not seem likely that in the rational soul there does not exist some principle which can fulfill a natural operation.  That follows if there is held to be one agent intellect, be it called God or intelligence. Nor again do I say these two, the agent intellect and the possible [intellect], are one power named in diverse ways due to diverse operations. [This is] because [when] any given actions are reduced to contrary principles, it is impossible to reduce them to the same power.  On the basis of this memory is distinguished from sense because receiving species of sensibles which belongs to sense and retaining [them] which belongs to memory are reduced to contrary principles also in bodily things, namely dampness and dryness.  Therefore, since receiving understood species which belongs to the possible intellect and making them intelligibles in act which belongs to the agent intellect cannot [both] come together in the same thing, but receiving belongs to some thing insofar as it is in potency and making [belongs to something] insofar as it is in act, then it is impossible that the agent [intellect] and the possible [intellect] not be diverse powers. 

[P] But how [the possible intellect and the agent intellect] could be rooted in one substance is difficult to see. For it does not seem that it could belong to one substance both to be in potency with respect to all intelligible forms which is the possible intellect and to be in act with respect to all those [intelligible forms] which is the agent intellect. [But were it] otherwise, it could not make all intelligible forms, since nothing acts except insofar as it is in act.  But, nevertheless, it should be known that it is not unacceptable that there be some two things each of which is in potency with respect to the other in diverse ways, as fire is in potency cold which belongs to water in act, and water is in potency hot, which is in act in fire.  Hence, [both] act and are acted upon with respect to one another.  I say that the sensible thing is related to the intellective soul similarly. For the sensible thing is intelligible in potency and has a nature distinct in act. Yet there is in the soul an intellectual light in act. But the determination of knowing with respect to this or that nature is there in potency, as the pupil is in potency with respect to this or that color.  For this reason the soul has a power by which it makes sensible species to be intelligible [species] in act, and this power is the agent intellect. And [the soul] has a power by which it is in potency for being made in the act of determinate knowing brought about by a sensible thing’s species made intelligible in act, and this power or potency is called possible intellect.  Upon the operations of these two powers follows all our understanding, both of principles as well as of conclusions. Hence what some say appears to be false, [namely] that the agent intellect is a disposition of principles.

[Responses to objections:]

1. Therefore to the first it should be said that the intellect is not denied to be a material form, so that it might be prevented from giving being to matter as substantial form with reference to first being.  For this reason it is necessary that the multiplication of the intellect, that is, of the intellective soul, follow upon the division of matter which causes diverse individuals. But this is said with respect to its second act which is an operation. [This is] because understanding does not take place by means of a mediating bodily organ.  This occurs because an operation proceeds from the essence of the soul only through its mediating power or potency. Hence, since it has certain powers which are not acts of certain organs of the body, it is necessary that certain operations of the soul are not through a mediating body.

2. To the second it should be said that, whenever two things which are such that one is more powerful than another are joined and one draws the other to itself, one has some power beyond that which is subject to it. [This] is clear in regard to a flame, because fire, overcoming the vapor to which it is conjoined, has the power of illuminating and the action of the enflamed vapor can extend itself by making heat in addition to that [illuminating]. Since, therefore, in the conjunction of form to matter the form is found controlling,  the more noble and the more controlling of the matter the form will be, the more it will be able have a power exceeding the condition of matter.  Hence, beyond the active and passive qualities which they themselves hold on the basis of matter, certain mixed bodies have certain powers which follow upon the species, such as that the magnet attracts iron.  This is even [evidently] more found in plants, as it is clear in growth which is controlled by the power of soul, which could not be through the power of fire, as is said in De Anima 2. This is found still more to be the case in animals because sensing is in every way above the power of the elemental qualities and [is found] most perfectly in the rational soul which is the most noble of forms.  For this reason [the soul] has certain powers in which it does not share with the body at all and certain [powers] which it does share [with the body].

3. To the third it should be said that, according to Avicenna, the understood species can be considered in two ways, either with respect to the being that it has in the intellect, and in this way it has singular being, or with respect to the fact that it is a likeness of such an understood thing, to the extent that it leads to the knowledge of it, and on the basis of this part it has universality. [This is] because it is not a likeness of this thing insofar as it is this thing but rather according to the nature in which it agrees with others of its species.  Nor is it necessary that every singular being be intelligible in potency alone, as is clear concerning separate substances. But [it is necessary] in regard to those which are individuated by matter, as are bodies. But that species is individuated through the individuation of the intellect and, consequently, it does not lose intelligible being in act. [This is] just as I understand that I understand, although my understanding is a certain singular operation. It is also evident in itself that the second unacceptable consequence does not follow, because the mode of individuation through intellect is other than [the mode of individuation] through prime matter.

4. To the fourth it should be said that, as the Commentator also says in his Commentary on book 3 of the De Anima, it is not necessary that what is receptive of some things be deprived of any determinate nature but that it be free of the nature of what are received, as the pupil [is free] of the nature of colors.  For this reason it is necessary that the possible intellect have a determinate nature. But before the understanding which is through the reception of species it does not have in its nature any of these things which it receives from sensibles. This is because it is said that “it is none of these things which are,” etc.

5. To the fifth it should be said that, although the soul does not have matter as a  part of itself by which it exists, nevertheless it has matter in which it exists as [the matter’s] perfection.  With the division [of matter] [the soul] is multiplied in number and not in species. However, it is otherwise in the case of those immaterial substances which do not also have matter for which they are the forms. [This is] because in these there can be no material multiplication but only formal [multiplication] which brings about the diversity of species.

(F) In 1 Sent d. 8, q. 5, a. 2: Whether the soul is simple.

To the second we proceed as follows. 

1. It seems that the soul is simple. For as the Philosopher says (De anima 2, text 2), the soul is the form of the body. But in the same place he says that form is neither the matter nor the composite. Therefore the soul is not composed.

2. Furthermore, everything that is composed has being from its its components. If, therefore, the soul is composed, then it has some being in itself and that being is ever removed from it. But from the conjunction of the soul to the body it follows that a certain being which is the being of a human being. Therefore, there is a twofold being in the human being, namely the being of the soul and the being of what is conjoined. [However,] that cannot be the case since the being of one thing has a unique being.

3. Furthermore, every [sort of] composition that comes to a thing after its complete being is accidental to it. If, therefore, the soul is composed of its principles, having complete being in itself, its composition to the body will be accidental for it. But accidental composition is limited to one thing accidentally. Therefore, only something one  accidentally is brought about from soul and body; and so a human being is not a being in its own right (per se), but only accidentally (per accidens).

4. To the contrary is what is found in Boethius [De Trinitate 1, ch. 2, col. 1250, t. II): No simple form can be a subject. But the soul is a subject for powers, dispositions, and intelligible species (potentiarum et habituum et specierum intelligibilium). Therefore it is not a simple form.

5. Furthermore, a simple form does not have being per se, as was said. But that which does not have being except insofar as it is in something else cannot remain [in existence] after that [in which it is contained], nor too can it be a mover although it can be a principle of motion, because it is a being complete in itself. Hence, [for example] the form of fire is not a mover, as it is said in Physics 8 [text. 40]. The soul, however, remains after the body and is the mover of the body. Therefore it is not a simple form.

6. Furthermore, no simple form has in itself what individuates it, since every form is in its own right common. If, therefore, the soul is a simple form, it will not have in itself what individuates it, but it will be individuated only through the body. However, when what is the cause of individuation has been removed, individuation is destroyed.  Therefore, when the body has been removed, diverse souls will not remain as individuals. Thus, there will remain only one soul which will be itself the nature of soul.

[Solution]

I respond that it should be said that here there is a twofold opinion. (1) For some say that the soul is composed of matter and form, and there are some of these who say that the same matter of the soul belongs also to other corporeal and spiritual things. But this does not seem to be true because no form is made intelligible except insofar as it is separated from matter and the concomitants of matter.  However, this is not insofar as it is corporeal matter perfected by corporeity, since the form of corporeity is intelligible through separation from matter. Hence, those substances which are intelligible naturally do not seem to be material, otherwise the species of things in themselves would not exist according to intelligible being. Hence, Avicenna [Metaphysics, book 3, ch. 8, Van Riet ed., pp. 158-9.] says that something is said to be intellective because it is free of matter. And furthermore, prime matter, to the extent that it is considered stripped of all form, does not have some diversity, nor [reading nec with Parma, not Mandonnet’s sed] is it made diverse through some accidents before the advent of the substantial form since accidental being does not precede substantial [being]. One perfection [alone] belongs to one perfectible thing. Therefore, it is necessary that the first substantial form perfect the whole matter. But the first form which is received in matter is corporeity, of which the thing is never divested, as the Commentator [Averroes] says [in his Comm. on Physics 1, text & comm. 63]. Therefore the form of corporeity is in the whole matter and so matter will exist only in bodies. For if you were to say that the quiddity of a substance  were the first form received in matter, still the same issue will arise. [This is] because matter does not have division from the quiddity of the substance but from corporeity, which the divisions of quantity in act follow. Later diverse forms are acquired in it through the division of matter insofar as it is disposed in diverse places. For the order of the nobility in bodies seems to be according to the order of their place, as fire is above air. For this reason it seems that the soul does not have matter unless matter is taken in an equivocal way.

(2) Others say that soul is composed of “that by which it is (quo est)” and “what is (quod est)”. However, “what is” differs from matter, because “what is” indicates the supposite itself having being. But matter does not have being but rather the composite of matter and form [has being]; hence, matter is not “what is” but rather the composite [is “what is”]. Hence, in all things in which there is a composition of matter and form there is also a composition of “that by which it is” and “what is.” However, in things composed of matter and form this can be said in three ways. (i) For “that by which it is” can be called the form of the part itself, which gives being to matter.  (ii) “That by which it is” can also be calls the very act of existing (ipse actus essendi), namely, being (esse), as that way which one runs is the act of running. (iii) “That by which it is” can also be called the very nature which results from the conjunction of form with matter, such as humanity. This is chiefly for those who assert that the form which is the whole — which is also called the quiddity — is not the form of the part, concerning which Avicenna [writes in Metaphysics 5, ch. 3]. However, since it is of the very notion of the quiddity or essence that it is not what is composed or a composite, what results can be found and understood as some simple quiddity, not something following the composition of form and matter.  If, however, we would find some quiddity which is not composed of matter and form, that quiddity or its being either is its very being or not. If that quiddity is its very being, in this way it will be the very essence of God Himself which is his very being and it will be altogether simple. But if it is not being itself, it is necessary that it have being acquired from another, as is the case for each created quiddity. And because this quiddity has been asserted not to subsist in matter, being in something else has not been acquired for it, as is the case for composite quiddities, but rather being in itself has been acquired for itself.  And in this way the quiddity will be this “that which is” and its very being will be “that by which it is.”  Because everything which does not have something of itself is possible with respect to that, a quiddity of this sort — since it has being from anther — will be possible with respect to that being and with respect to this from which it has being, in which there is no potency.  It this way potency and act will be found in such a quiddity insofar as the quiddity itself is possible and its being is its act. In this way I understand the composition of potency and act in angels to be of “that by which it is” and “that which is” and likewise in the soul.  Hence, the angel or soul can be said to be a quiddity or nature or simple form, insofar as the quiddity of these is not composed of diverse things. But, nevertheless, there a composition of these two, namely, of quiddity and being, comes about.

[Responses to objections]

1. To the first therefore it should be said that the soul is not composed of things which are parts of its quiddity, as is also the case for any other form. But because the soul is a simple form not dependent on matter — something which belongs to it on account of its likeness and nearness to God — it has being in its own right (per se) which other corporeal forms do not have. Hence, in the soul there is found a composition of “being (esse)” and “what is (quod est)” and not in other forms. [This is] because being itself absolutely does not belong to corporeal forms, as [it belongs] to these things which exist but [are] composite.

2. To the second it should be said that the soul undoubtedly has complete being in itself, although this being does not result from the parts composing its quiddity, nor is some other being brought about through the conjunction of body. Rather, this being itself which belongs to the soul per se comes to be the being of what is conjunct. For the being of the conjunct is nothing but the being of the form itself. But it is true that some material forms do not subsist through that being on account of their imperfections, but they are only principles of being.

3. In virtue of this also the solution to the third objection is also evident. [This is] because the composition which comes to the soul after complete being, according to the mode of understanding, does not make another being because undoubtedly that being would be accidental and for this reason it does not follow that the human being is a being accidentally  (per accidens).

4. To the fourth it should be said that, if Boethius speaks concerning subject in relation to any of its accidents, his statement is true concerning the form which simple such that it is also its being, as is God. Such simplicity is neither in the soul nor in an angel. However, if he speaks of the subject in relation to accidents which have being grounded in nature (firmum in natura) and which are accidents of an individual, then his statement is true also concerning a simple form the quiddity of which is not composed of parts. For there are some accidents which do not have being truly but only intentions of natural things.  Of this sort are the species of things which are in the soul. Again, among accidents having the being of nature, some follow upon the nature of the individual, namely, matter, through which the nature is divided, as white and black in human beings. Hence, they also do not follow for the whole species, and the soul cannot be the subject for such accidents.  However, some have the being of nature but they follow from the principles of the species, as [those that] are properties consequent upon the species. A simple form can be the subject for such accidents. Nevertheless, this [form] is not its own being by reason of the possibility which is in its quiddity, as was said, and such accidents are powers of the soul, for in this fashion both the point and unity have their properties.

5. To the fifth it should be said that every form is some likeness of the First Principle which is pure act. Hence, to the extent that [a form] approaches more closely to Its likeness, [that form] participates more of Its perfections.  However, among forms of bodies (Inter formas autem corporum) the rational soul approaches more closely to the likeness of God. For this reason it participates some of the nobilities of God, namely that it understands (quod intelligit), that  it is able to move, that it has being in its own right (quod habet esse per se), the sensible soul less, the vegetable soul still less, and so forth. Therefore I say that neither does to move belong to the soul nor to have absolute being (esse absolutum: simple being) insofar as it is form, but rather insofar as it is a likeness of God.

6. To the sixth it should be said that, according to the things said earlier, there is not something in the soul by virtue of which it is individuated. They who denied it to be a determinate particular (hoc aliquid) understood this and not that it does not have absolute being (absolutum esse: simple being). I say that it is not individuated except from the body. Hence, the error of those asserting that souls are created beforehand and later placed in bodies (incorporatas: incorporated) is something impossible, because they are not made many except insofar as they are impressed in a plurality of bodies. But, although the individuation of souls depends on body with respect to its beginning, nevertheless [it does] not [depend on the body] with respect to its end, namely, in such a way that when bodies cease to exist, the individuation of souls ceases (reading cessat with Parma). The reason for this is that, since every perfection is impressed on matter according to its capacity, the nature of the soul will be impressed on diverse bodies in this way, not according to the same nobility and purity. Hence, in any given body the being will have a determination according to the measure of the body. However, the determined being, although it is acquired by the soul in the body, nevertheless [it is] not from body nor through dependence on body. Hence, when bodies are removed, there still will remain for each soul its own determinate being, according to the affections or dispositions which followed for it, to the extent that it was the perfection of such a body. This is the solution of Avicenna [De Anima 1, ch.3] and can be made evident by a sensible example. For if some one thing does not retain a shape distinguished though diverse vases, as is the case for water, when the vases will be removed, the proper distinctive shapes will not remain, but there will remain just one water. Such is the case concerning material forms which do not retain being in their own right (esse per se). However, if there is something retaining shape which is distinguished according to diverse shapes through diverse instruments, when those have also been removed, the distinction of shapes will remain, as is clear in [the case of] wax. And such is the case concerning the soul which retains its own being after the destruction of the body, because individuated and distinct being also remains in it.

(G) In 2 Sent D. 3, Q. 1, A. 6: Whether the angel and the [human] soul differ in species

To the sixth we proceed as follows. 

1. It seems that the angel and the soul do not differ in species. For whatever things agree in ultimate constitutive difference are the same in species, because it is what completes the notion (rationem) of the species. But the angel and the soul are of the same sort. Therefore they do not differ in species. The proof of the minor: The ultimate constitutive difference is taken from the fact that it is what is most noble in the thing, since it is related to the genus and precedent differences proportionally as form to matter. But the angel and the soul agree in regard to what is most noble in both, namely in the intellect. Therefore, they agree in the ultimate constitutive difference.

2. If you were to say that the ultimate constitutive difference of an angel is intellectual because it is taken from the intellect, while the ultimate difference of the soul is rational, as also Dionysius says (Ecc. hier. col. 374, t. I), it seems to make a distinction between the order of intellects and that of rational entities. To the contrary: Things which commonly agree in two things do not have a distinction between them (non distinguunt inter ipsa). But the intellect is placed not only in angels but also in the soul, as is clear in De anima 3, text 5: likewise also not only belongs to the soul but also to the angel. Hence, Gregory (in Homil. Ephiph, col. 1110, t. II) calls the angel a rational animal. And above the Master [Lombard] distinguished rational creation into the angel and the soul. Therefore, the angel and the soul do not differ at all as rational and intellectual.

3. If you were to say that it is distinguished as unitable (unibile) to body and as not unitable (non unibile) [to body], to the contrary: Whatever follows upon a thing having complete being does not distinguish it essentially from another thing, because all things of this sort which follow upon a thing in this way are of the genus of accidents. But the union to the body which is a certain relation which follows for a soul having complete being in itself not depending on the body, [for] otherwise it could not exist without the body (alias sine corpore esse non posset). Therefore that it is unitable to body does not distinguish soul from angel essentially or according to species.

4. Furthermore, the specific difference is not assigned to some thing except insofar as it is in the genus as species, because the difference is that by which the species flows from the genus. But the soul, insofar as it is the form of such a body, is not in the genus of substance as species but rather as principle. Therefore, since unitability does not belong to the soul except insofar as it is form, it seems that unitable being (esse unibile) cannot be what distinguishes the soul from the angel according to species.

5. Furthermore, things which are such that they have one end do not differ in species, since the end corresponds more properly to any given thing. But the end of the angel and of the rational soul is the same, namely eternal beatitude, as the Master [Lombard] says above. This can also be gathered from what is said at Matthew 23, 30: They will be as the angels of God in heaven.  Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ in species.

On the contrary, the soul differs more from the angel than one angel from another. But one angel differs from another in species. as was said. Therefore, all the more so [does] the soul [differ] from the angel.

Furthermore, the same perfectible corresponds to the same form or perfection. But the soul and the angel are certain forms, to the extent that we say commonly that all substances separate from matter are forms, of which material forms are images, as Boethius says in Book 1 of De Trinitate [c. II, col. 1250, t. II]. Therefore, since this perfectible which is the human body corresponds to the soul, but to the angel [there corresponds] either nothing or another species, as with the etherial body, according to what Augustine [book 3, De Gen ad lit., c. II, col 280, t. III] seems to say, or even the celestial body according to the opinion of Avicenna [lib. De intelligentiis] and certain other philosophers, then it seems that the soul and the angel are not of one species.

Solution

I respond that concerning this there are three opinions.

(1) For some say that the soul is not in the genus of substance as species but as principle, since it is the form. Hence, the soul is not properly said to differ from or to agree with some other substance [in species], but it is properly said that what is composed from another or with another substance agrees or differs in species according to soul (sed proprie dicitur, quod secundum animam compositum ab alia vel cum alia substantia convenit specie vel differt). But  this does not seem necessary because, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics (book 2, c.1, & book 6, c. 5), to the extent that something is properly in the genus of substance it is required that it be a thing having a quiddity, to which there belongs absolute being (cui debeatur esse absolutum), so that it may be said to exist per se or be subsisting. For this reason it can happen in two ways that something pertaining to the genus of substance is not in the genus of substance as species: either because that thing does not have a quiddity other than its own being, and  on account of this God is not in the genus of substance as species, as Avicenna humself says, as indicated above (in Metaphysics book 6, ch, 5-7); or because that thing does not have absolute being so that it can be called a being in its own right (ens per se), and on account of this prime matter and material forms are not in the genus of substance as species, but only as principles. The rational soul, however, has absolute being not dependent on matter because it is other than its quiddity, as also is said about the angels. For this reason it remains that it is in the genus of substance as species and also as principle insofar as it is form of this body. And as a result that distinction comes about, because of forms some are material forms which are not species of substance, while some are forms and substances, as rational souls.

(2) The second opinion is that of those who say the soul and the angel to be of one species. This can in no way be the case if the composition of form and matter is denied of [both] the soul and the angel, as was said regarding the angels.

(3) And for this reason a third opinion is more common to which it seems one ought to assent, that the soul and the angel differ in species.

However, by what specific differences they are distinguished is assigned in diverse ways. For some  assign these to be distinguished by species through the fact that it is unitable to the body and not unitable [to the body]. But others [assign the specific differences] in virtue of rational being and intellectual [being]. With a third [difference is assigned] insofar as there is [the difference of] having possible intellect with respect to higher things only, which belongs to the angel which receives illumination from the higher, namely, from God or an angel.  According to this [the difference] is constituted in having possible intellect with respect to what is higher and [also with respect to] what is lower; this belongs to the human soul which is illuminated also by what is higher and [yet] receives cognition from phantasms. For a fourth [difference is assigned] insofar as there is [the difference of] having unchangeable veritability, which belongs to the angel, in virtue of the fact that it immutably adheres to good or bad in regard to the fact that it turns itself once through choice, or [insofar as there is the difference of] having mutable veritability which belongs to the human being who is able to change from good into bad, and the contrary. For a fifth [difference is assigned] according to interpretative power, because, according to Damascene [lib II, Orth. fidei, ch. III, col. 267, t. I] the angel interprets or speaks by certain nods and intellectual signs without expression of voice, as will be clear below; the human being, however, speaks with expressed voice. Nor is there any wonder that angels and souls are assigned to differ in diverse ways such as this because essential differences which are unknown and unnamed, according to the Philosopher [Metaph. VII, text. 35], are designated by different accidents which are caused by essential [differences], as the cause is designated through its effect, as hot and cold are assigned as the differences of fire and water. Hence, many differences can be assigned as specific [differences], according to many properties of things differing in species, from essential differing effects. Nevertheless, of these those are better assigned which are prior, as more proximate to essential differences.

Since, therefore, among simple substances, as was said regarding angels, there is a difference in species according to the grade of possibility in these, then on the basis of this the rational animal differs from the angel because it holds the last grade in spiritual substances, as prime matter [holds the last grade] in sensible things, as the Commentator says in De Anima 3, [comm. 5 & 6]. Hence, because it has more of possibility, its being is to this extent near to material things so that material body is able to participate that, while the soul is united to the body in one being. For this reason those differences unitable and not unitable follow between soul and angel from the diverse grade of possibility. Again from the same the other differences, rational and intellectual, follow, because from the fact that the angel has more of act than the soul and has less of potency, it participates intellectual nature as it were in full light, in virtue of which it is called intellectual. But the soul, because it holds the lowest grade in intellectual things, participates intellectual nature more defectively as if placed under a shadow. For this reason it is called rational because reason, as Isaac says [in the book On Definitions], arises in the shadow of intelligence. A third distinction follows from the first and second, for from the fact that the soul is form and act of the body, from its essence there proceed  certain powers affixed to organs, such as sense and the like, from which it receives intellectual cognition. [This is] on account of the fact that what rational is something that has cognition running from one thing to another and in this way it comes from sensibles to intelligibles. In virtue of this [soul] differs from angel which does not receive cognition from sensibles by working toward intelligibles.  However, a fourth distinction follows from the second because it is said that in virtue of the fact that the angel has a god-like intellect (intellectum deiformem), it turns toward anything without motion. In this the angel is said to differ from the soul which is does not have a god-like intellect but rather has cognition through the inquisition of reason. A fifth [difference]  also follows from the first because on account of the fact that the soul is united to the body it can form a bodily voice, while the angel cannot.

Hence it is evident that the first of those distinctions is the better because it is taken according to the being of the soul which is first. The second and the third are taken with the presence of the cognitive or intellective power, as the second, or with the presence of the intellective and sensitive at once, as the third. However, the fourth is taken with the presence of the appetitive power, because choice pertains to appetite, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics [book 6, ch. 2], through which the soul mutably changes. Hence, since the appetitive is posterior to the cognitive, this is less dominant than those that precede. The fifth is taken with the presence of the motive power, for the formation of the voice is through the bodily motion of parts. However, the motive [power] is posterior to the cognitive and appetitive, hence it is less dominant among them.

Responses to objections

1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the difference is not more noble than the genus as one nature is more noble than another, or as one form is more noble than another, because the difference indicates no form which is not contained implicitly in the nature of the genus, as Avicenna says [in Metaphysics 5, last chapter]. For the genus does not signify a part of the essence of the thing but rather the whole. But it is called more noble in genus, as the determinate [is more noble] than the indeterminate. In this way to have intellect is more noble than to have intellect simply [simpliciter]; to have sense in this way is more noble than to have sense simply [simpliciter] (Sed dicitur genere nobilior, sicut determinatum indeterminato; et per hunc modum habere intellectum sic, est nobilius quam habere inteIlectum simpliciter; et habere sensum sic, quam habere sensum simpliciter.) For this reason soul and angel do not come together in what is more noble in them in that way. Hence, it is not necessary that they come together in the ultimate specific difference and so would be same in species.

2. To the second it should be said that in the human being there is intellect. Nevertheless, it is not placed in the order of intellects on account of that, because that intellectual substance  is said to be that whose whole cognition is according to intellect, because all the things which it knows are offered to it immediately and without inquiry. However, it is not so concerning the cognition of the soul because it comes to knowledge of a thing through inquiry and discourse of reason. For this reason it is called rational because its cognition according to the end term and according to the beginning is intellectual. [This is so] according to beginning because it knows the first principle immediately without inquiry; hence the intellect is said to be a disposition (habitus) of indemonstrable principles, but determinate because the inquisition of reason is terminated at the knowledge (intellectum) of the thing. For this reason it does not have intellect as proper nature but through a certain participation. However, reason is said both of God and of angels. but nevertheless it is taken in another way insofar as every cognition can be called  an immaterial reason (immaterialis ratio), to the extent that  reason is divided against sense, and not against intellect.

3. To the third it should be said that unitability is not a proper essential difference, but is a certain designation of an essential difference through the effect, as was said.

4. And in virtue of this the response to the fourth is evident, because that which belongs to soul insofar as it is form is an effect of the essential difference.

5. To the fifth it should be said that those things which differ in species differ according to a proximate end which is permanence or operation of a thing, as is said in On the heavens, II. Nevertheless, they can come together in the ultimate end and beatitude is an end of this sort.

(H) In 3 Sent. . 5, q.3, a.2, response only: Whether the separated soul is a person.

Aquinas, In 3 Sent. d.5, q.3, a.2, resp. in Scriptum Super Sententiis, v.3, ed. Moos (Paris 1933), pp. 206-7:

109. I respond that it should be said regarding the union of the soul to the body that there was a twofold opinion among the ancients.      

     There was one which holds that the soul is united to the body as a complete being to a complete being (ens completum enti completo), so that it would be in the body as the sailor is in the ship. Hence, as Gregory of Nyssa says, Plato held that the human being is not something constituted from soul and body, but rather the soul is clothed with the body (corpore induta).  According to this the whole personality of a human being would consist in the soul, to the extent that the separated soul could truly be called the human being, as Hugo of St. Victor says. According to this opinion what the Master [scil. Lombard] says would be true, that the soul is a person when it is separate <from the body>.

110. But this opinion cannot stand, because in this way the body would come to the soul in the way of an accident.  Hence, this name human being — the meaning of which is soul and body — would not signify <something> one per se; and so it would not be in the genus of substance.

111. Aristotle has a different opinion which all the moderns follow, that the soul is united to the body as a form of matter (anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae). Hence, the soul is part of the human nature, and not some nature in its own right (non natura quaedam per se). And because the notion of <being> a part is contrary to the notion of a person, as was said, for this reason the separated soul cannot be called a person, because, although the separated <soul> is not a part in act, nevertheless it has a nature such that it is a part.

(I) In 1 Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 Whether being (esse) is properly said of God.
Mandonnet v. 1, pp. 194-197. R. E. Houser, tr., rev. R. Taylor

To the first we proceed as follows. 1. It seems that being is not properly said of God. For what is proper to something is what belongs to it alone. But being belongs not to God alone but rather also to creatures. Therefore it seems that being does not belong properly to God.
2. Furthermore, we can name God only insofar as we know Him. Hence the Damascene [lib. 1, Fid. orth., cap. xiii, col. 858, t.1] [writes that] “The word is an angel, that is, an messenger of intellect.” But we cannot know God in an immediate way in this life but [rather] only from creatures. Therefore neither [can we] name [Him]. Since, therefore, “He who is” does not indicate a relation to creatures, it seems that it does not properly name God.
3. Furthermore, just as created wisdom is deficient in reference to uncreated wisdom, so too created being [is deficient] in reference to uncreated being. But for this reason the name of wisdom is said to be deficient in relation to the perfect signification of divine wisdom, because it is imposed by us in accord with the apprehension of created wisdom. Therefore it seems that by the same reasoning neither does this name “He who is” properly signify divine being. And in this way it is not necessary that it be called a more proper name of Him than other names.
4. Again, the Damascene [lib. I Fid. orth., cap. IX, col. 834, t. 1] says that “He who is” does not signify what God is but rather a certain infinite sea of substance. But the infinite is incomprehensible and consequently not able to be named but [rather is] unknown. Therefore it seems that “He who is” is not a divine name.

To the contrary is Exodus 3, 14, “The Lord said to Moses, ‘If they ask my name, say the following to the sons of Israel: He who is sent me to you.” The same is seen in the Damascene, as indicated above [cap. 9], who says that “He who is” is the name of God proper in the highest degree. [This is also indicated by] Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] who says that this name is the ineffable name of God which has been held to be most worthy.

Solution. I respond that it should be said that of all the other names “He who is” is the name of God proper in the highest degree. The reason for this can be fourfold: the first is taken from the text of the words of Jerome regarding the perfection of Divine being. For the perfect is that which has nothing outside it. Our being, however, has something of itself outside itself, for it lacks something which has already passed by for it and something which is yet to come. But in Divine being nothing has passed by nor is there anything to come. For this reason His whole being is perfect and on account of this being properly befits Him with reference to all other things. The second reason is taken from the words of the Damascene [lib. I Fid. orth., cap. IX] who says that “He who is” signifies indeterminate being and not what He is. [This is] because in this life we know of Him only that He is and not what He is, except through negation and we are able to name [something] only insofar as we know [it]. For this reason He is most properly named by us “He who is.” The third reason is taken from the words of Dionysius who says that among all the other divine participations of goodness such as to live, to understand and the like, it is first and [is] as a principle for all the others having in itself all the others mentioned united in a certain way. In this way God is also the Divine principle and all things are one in Him. The fourth reason can be taken from the words of Avicenna [tract. 8 Metaphysics, cap. 1] in the sense that, since in everything which is there can be considered its quiddity through which it subsists in a determinate nature and its being in virtue of which it is said of it that it is in act, then this name “thing” is imposed on the thing from its quiddity, [and] according to Avicenna [tract II Metaphysics, cap. 1] this name “who is” or “being” is imposed from its act of being. Since, however, it is the case that in any created being its essence differs from its being, that thing is properly denominated by its quiddity and not by the act of being, as human being by humanity. However, in God His very being is His quiddity. And for this reason the name taken from being names Him properly and is His proper name, just as the proper name of a human being which is taken from its quiddity.
To the first, therefore, it should be said that when something is said properly to belong to something, this can be understood in two ways. (1) [It can be understood] that in virtue of what it means to be proper to something everything extraneous to the nature of the subject is excluded, as when it is said that it is property of a human being to be able to laugh, because it belongs to nothing extraneous to the nature of a human being. In this way being is not said to be a property of God because it also belongs to creatures. Or (2) [it can be understood] insofar as everything extraneous to the nature of what is predicated is excluded, as when it is said that this thing is properly gold because it does not have the admixture of another metal, and in this way being is called a property belonging to God because Divine being does not have some privation or potentiality as does the being of a creature. For this reason propriety and truth are taken for the same in the text, for we say that true gold is what is unmixed with what is extraneous.
To the second it should be said that God comes to be named from creatures in three ways. [This occurs] in one way when the name itself actually connotes an effect in the creature owing to a relation to the creature implied in the name, as Creator and Lord. [It occurs] in another way when the name itself in virtue of its notion names the principle of some divine act in creatures, such as wisdom, power and will. [It occurs] in another way when the name itself indicates something represented in creatures, such as living, for every [sort of] life is exemplified by Divine life. Likewise this name “He who is” names God through being found in creatures which has been derived from him in the way of exemplar.
To the third it should be said that, since the being of a creature imperfectly represents Divine being, this name, “He who is,” also imperfectly signifies it because it signifies in the manner of a certain concretion and composition. But it signifies still imperfectly through other names, for when I say, God is wise, then, when being is included in this statement, a twofold imperfection is signified there. One is on the part of concrete being itself, as in this name, “He who is,” and another is added from the proper notion of wisdom. For created wisdom is deficient in reference to the notion of divine wisdom. On account of this the imperfection is greater in the other names than in this name, “He who is,” and for this reason this is a more worthy and more proper of God.
To the fourth it should be said that all other names indicate being according to some determined notion (ratio), as wise indicates some being. But this name, “He who is,” indicates being absolute and undetermined by something added. For this reason the Damascene says that it does not signify what God is but rather it signifies a certain infinite sea of substance, as if undetermined. Hence, when we proceed to God by way of remotion, we first deny of Him corporeal things; second [we deny of him] also intellectual things, insofar as they are found in creatures, such as goodness and wisdom. Then there remains in our intellect only that He is and nothing more. Consequently it is as in a certain confusion. Finally, however, we even remove from Him being itself insofar as it is in creatures. And then He remains in a certain darkness of ignorance [and] according to this ignorance, to the extent that it pertains to the present life, we are conjoined to God in the the best way, as Dionysius says, and this is a certain obscurity in which God is said to dwell.

(K) The following translation of In 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2 is based on S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis, Tomus 1, P. Mandonnet, O.P. ed., Paris: P. Lethielleuxm 1929, pp. 221-223. It was made by Richard C. Taylor and Andrea Robiglio in October 2022.
 
Whether God is in the category of substance
 
To the second we proceed as follows.
[Objections]
 
            1. It seems that God is in the category of substance. For everything which is, either is substance or accident. But God is not an accident, therefore He is substance. Since, therefore, substance is predicated of Him as a substantial predicate, and not the converse, because not every substance is God, then it seems that it is predicated of Him as genus, and in this way God is in the genus of substance.
            2. Furthermore, substance is that which does not belong to a subject, but is being (ens) per se. Since, therefore, this is maximally fitting for God, it seems that He is in the genus of substance.
            3. Furthermore, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics 10, t. 3 and following), any given thing is measured by the minimum of its genus, and there the Commentator says that that against which all substances are measured is the prime mover who, according to him, is God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
 
Contra.
            1. Whatever is in a genus, either is as the most general or is as something contained under it. But god is not in the genus of substance as the most general because He would be predicated of all substances; nor also [is He] as something contained under the genus because He would imply some addition above the genus and in this way the divine essence would not be the most simple. Therefore, God is not in the genus of substance.
            2. Furthermore, whatever is in a genus has its being determined to that genus. But divine being is in no way determined to some genus; in fact, it comprehends in itself the excellences (nobilitates) of all genera, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say in Metaphysics V (text 21).
 
[Response]
            As a consequence God is not in the genus of substance. This should be conceded from all points of view.
            A fourfold reason (ratio) is assigned [for this]. The first is asserted in the literal meaning and is taken from the name. For the name ‘substance’ is imposed from ‘standing under’; God, however, stands under nothing. The second reason is taken from the notion (ratio) of what is in the genus. For everything of this sort adds something to the genus and for this reason that which is simple in the highest degree cannot be “in a genus.” The third, more subtle reason is that of Avicenna (Metaphysics V, ch.4 and IX ch.1): Everything in a genus has a quiddity different from [its] existence (esse), as is the case for a human being. For being in act is not owed to humanity from the fact that it is humanity. For humanity can be thought (cogitari) and nevertheless it can be that it is unknown whether some human being actually exists. The reason for this is, because what is common is predicated of those things which are in the genus, it predicates the quiddity, since genus and species are predicated in what something really is (in eo quod quid est). To that quiddity, however, being is not owed except  through what is taken up in this or that individual. And for this reason the quiddity of the genus or species is not communicated according to one being for all, but only according to one common notion (ratio). Hence, it remains that its existence (suum esse) is not its quiddity. In God, however, His being is his quiddity (esse suum est quidditas sua), for otherwise it would occur to the quiddity and in this way it would have been acquired by Him from another and He would not have existence through His essence (esse per essentiam suam). And for this reason God cannot be in some genus.
The fourth reason comes from the perfection of the divine being (ex perfectione divini esse) which brings together all the excellences (nobilitates) of all genera. Hence, He is determined to no singular genus, as was objected.
 
[Responses to Objections]
            1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that God in full is not an accident, nor may He in an altogether appropriate way be called substance both because the name of substance is said from standing under (a substando), and because substance names a quiddity which is distinct from its being. Hence, that is a division of the created being (divisio entis creati). If, however, one wishes that it would not happen so, God could be called substance in a broad way (largo modo). [This is] because such substance is nevertheless understood to be above all created substances with regard to what there is of perfection in any substance, as not belonging to something else and of this sort. Then substance is the same in what is predicated and in the subject as is the case in all things which are predicated of God. For this reason, it does not follow that everything which is substance is God, because nothing other than Him receives the predicate of substance taken in this acceptation. Thus, owing to the different mode of predication, substance is not said of God and creature univocally, but analogically. This can be another reason (alia ratio) why God is not in some genus, namely, because nothing is predicated of Him and other things univocally.
            2. To the second it should be said that this definition, according to Avicenna (Metaphysics 2, ch 1 and 3 ch 8), cannot be the definition of substance, viz., substance is what is not in a subject. For being (ens) is not a genus. This negation “not in a subject,” however, asserts nothing. Hence what I say, “being is not in a subject” does not indicate some genus. [This is] because in any genus it is necessary to signify some quiddity, as was said, the concept of which does not imply existence (de cujus intellectu non est esse). Being (ens), however, does not indicate quiddity but only the act of being, since it is its principle. For this reason it does not follow: it is not in a subject, therefore it is in the genus of substance. But it is necessary to add: there is something which has a quiddity which is followed by being not in another subject; therefore it is in the genus of substance. But this statement is not fitting for God, as was said.
            3. To the third it should be said that measure is properly said in regard to quantities. For measure is said to be that through which the quantity of a thing is made known, and this is the ‘minimum’ in the genus of quantity or simply, as in numbers, what are measured by unity which is the least simply. Or the minimum according to our position, as in continuous dimensions, in which there is no minimum absolutely speaking. Hence, we place the palm in place of the least for measuring fabrics or the stade for measuring a roadway (viam). Subsequently, the name of measure has been transferred to all genera so that that which is first in any genus and the most simple and most perfect may be called the measure of all the things in that genus so that any given thing is known to have something of the truth of the genus more or less, insofar as it more approaches or receded from it, as white in the genus of color. Accordingly, also in the genus of substance that which is most perfect and most simple is called the measure of all substances, as is the case for God. Hence, it is not necessary that He be in the genus of substance as something contained but only as the principle having in itself all perfection of the genus as unity in numbers, but, nevertheless, in a diverse way because only numbers are measured by unity. But God is the measure not only of substantial perfections but of all things which are in all the genera, as of wisdom, power (virtutis) and the like. For this reason, although unity is contained in one determinate genus as principle, nevertheless God is not.