Topic: “Knowledge, Nous, and Noetics in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Traditions”
This In-Person Conference is intended to provide a formal occasion and central location for philosophers and scholars of the Midwest region (and anywhere elsewhere) to present and discuss their current work on Aristotle and his interpreters in ancient and medieval philosophy.
Please note: Plans are for an in-person conference. We will switch to a hybrid or fully online format only in the event of a significant surge in local Milwaukee area COVID infection rates. If a presenter selected for the conference program is later barred from travel due to COVID infection rates in the home country or region, we will arrange for an online presentation.
Registration: Contact Prof. Owen Goldin (Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu), Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
Presented by the Marquette Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy & the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group (AAIWG) with the support of the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University
Seventeenth Annual Marquette Summer Seminar on Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition
DATE: 19-21 June 2024
Beaumier Conference Center B-C
Raynor Memorial Library
PRESENTERS: Established Scholars: send a title and tentative abstract (not exceeding 500 words); Graduate Students: send a title, abstract (not exceeding 500 words) and have your faculty advisor or dissertation director email indicating that you are doing professional level work. (This need not be a full recommendation.) Send applications to:
CLOSING DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS: 15 February 2024
The Organizing Committee will select presenters on the basis of promise of quality of proposals (title and abstract) and scholarly record as the primary criteria. Presenters selected will be asked to confirm their participation by registering and paying the conference fee ($50).
PROGRAM ANNOUNCED: March 15, 2024 or earlier
ATTENDING ONLY: Send Registration check with name, address, academic affiliation.
CONFERENCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED FOR ALL PRESENTERS AND ATTENDEES
(fees cover light buffet breakfasts, refreshments, picnic dinner one night)
Advance Registration ($50 by check) Deadline: May 1, 2024 (except for presenters who must confirm earlier)
NOTE => After May 1 Registration only at the door: $60 cash.
CHECKS SHOULD BE MADE OUT TO: Marquette University
(Fees are waived for Marquette students, faculty and staff for on-campus events only.)
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Registration Form.
=> ALL ATTENDEES (including the Marquette community) are asked to register <=
NAME:
TITLE:
ACADEMIC AFFILIATION:
ADDRESS:
EMAIL ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE:
CHECK NUMBER:
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Print the Registration Form above and send your check made out to “Marquette University” to:
Owen Goldin
Philosophy Department
Marquette University
P.O. Box 1880
Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
For housing options, see the bottom of this webpage.
Conference Schedule 2024
All sessions will be held in the Beaumier Conference Center in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.
For a campus map, click https://www.marquette.edu/campus-map/marquette-map.pdf
Wednesday 19 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: Christopher Lutz, Duquesne University
“The Generic Unity of Ἐπιστήμη: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Logic as a Non-Constitutive Work of Philosophy”
10:20-11:35 am: Lucas Angioni – University of Campinas
“Aristotle on Nous, Noein and Spotting the Best Explanation”
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: Z. Quanbeck- Princeton University
“’Interpreting Doubts for the Best’: Aquinas’s Ethics of Belief”
2:20-3:35 pm: Riza Tevfik Kalyoncu – Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey.
“An Interpretation of The Concept of Intelligible (ma‘qūl) in the First Part of al-Fārābī’s The Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf)”
3:40-5:00 pm: Paul Quesnel, Marquette University
“Popular Religion in Aristotle and Al-Farabi: Similitudes (and Dissimulations?)”
6:00 pm Picnic This Evening! Gordon Park, Covered Shelter. Carpooling available.
Thursday 20 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: Sr. Anna Wray, Catholic University of America
“A Critical Examination of Three Readings of ἀληθής in Aristotle’s DA III.6”
10:20-11:35 am: Patrick Corry, Villanova University
“Philia and Nous in Nicomachean Ethics 9 and 10”
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch – suggestions:Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: Fr. Ignacio De Ribera-Martin – The Catholic University of America
“The rational soul of the human embryo in Aristotle’s GA II.3”
2:20-3:35 : Jonathan A. Buttaci – Assistant Professor of Philosophy – The Catholic University of America. “Intellectual Agency and Activity in the Thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias”
3:40-5:00 pm: Rory O’Donnell – Marquette University
Proclus on Epistêmê and Recollection.
Friday 21 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: Owen Goldin – Marquette University
“Positing Demonstrative Principles: Communicative Strategy or The Grounding of Intelligibility?”
10:20-11:35 am: Richard Taylor – Marquette University
“The Importance of the Paraphrase of the De Anima of Themistius for Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sīnā”
Friday afternoon: Explore Milwaukee!
Friday Evening: Optional Friday ca. 8 pm Dinner (self-pay) at the Fox and Hounds Restaurant 30 miles north of Milwaukee, preceded by a reception at Prof. Taylor’s lakeside home. Carpooling available. Famous Fish Fry Dinner is $17.99 +tip. Reservation required.
ABSTRACTS
Lucas Angioni – University of Campinas
“Aristotle on Nous, Noein and Spotting the Best Explanation”
Abstract forthcoming
Link to handout: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1D6Yon8wxY0jUViHxjNaXQKNQQHYSS_Aa/view?usp=share_link.
Jonathan A. Buttaci – Assistant Professor of Philosophy – The Catholic University of America
Intellectual Agency and Activity in the Thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias
Following Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias offers a theory of human thinking that relies on an agent intellect; this much is uncontroversial. He is usually taken to identify this agent intellect with the divine intellect, but that interpretation is not universally held. Rather than seeking the identity of the agent intellect, however, my paper focuses on its functional role in human knowing in Alexander’s account, asking not what the agent intellect is but what it does.
It is sometimes said that, for Alexander, “the office of the νοῦς ποιητικός is the development of material νοῦς into νοῦς as ἕξις, the actualization, that is, of our native ability to think into the developed skill of intelligent thought” (Kosman 1992, citing Kahn 1981). I propose, by contrast, that Alexander sees the agent intellect as principally shaping intellectual activities by which intellectual hexeis then come to be (n.1) My reading is motivated by Alexander’s repeated use of energeia and kat’ energeiain in his account of intellect-in-hexis. These terms, however, are often translated as “actual” or “actuality” in connection with the habitual mind (see e.g. Sharples 2004). But translating energeia as “actuality” is misleading: for both Aristotle (De Anima II.1) and Alexander (Mantissa §1 103, 11ff.), we know that the inactive possession or hexis of knowledge (echein kai mē energein) is an actuality (entelecheia). We might be tempted to infer that all Alexander wishes to say is that nous-in-hexis is actual just as any knowledge inactively possessed is an actuality (entelecheia). But if that’s right, why does he appeal to activity (energeia) when treating of nous-in-hexis, given that activity (energein) is explicitly denied of that first sort of actuality (entelecheia)?
Here we come to the second motivation for my view, namely, Alexander’s commitment to the idea that even intellectual hexeis come to be by like intellectual activities (see e.g. De An. 85, 25 and In Top. 116, 21-24). My paper, then, seeks to resolve some incongruities in the reception of Alexander as a reader of Aristotle, while also resolving some puzzles about Alexander himself. To take one example: Fotinis (1979) follows Bruns in positing a lacuna at De Anima 83, 2: “*The intellect’s ability to receive such development results from its performing [individual] intellective acts.* . . .” Fotinis comments that “the words enclosed in asterisks above are obscure in themselves.” Sharples, too, raises a similar question about the place of activity in Alexander’s account in a note to his translation (2004, 27 n58). Neither, however, explores the implications of this issue for his account of intellect in any focused or systematic way.
In order to resolve these sorts of issues in the interpretation and reception of Alexander, I draw on my previous work in Aristotle. For Aristotle and Alexander alike, on my view, the determination of intellectual potency is accomplished by means of engaging in activities of a determinate shape. Therefore, for neither author should learning be taken as an inactive reception of intelligible form but as the activation of an intellectual potency according to some determinate intelligible form, such that the potency comes to be shaped in a certain way by means of activities that bear a certain shape. Those activities, in turn, receive their determinate shape by the agent intellect. Precisely what that means, however, is likely where Alexander goes beyond what little Aristotle himself gives us. I hope that this project will shed some light on Alexander’s account of agent intellect by adopting a fresh interpretive method, by looking first at its functional role in the development of nous-in-hexis, with special attention to the place of energeia in his account.
(n.1) This principle is acknowledged by Kahn, in fact, but as part of an argument for seeing hexis-acquisition as the primary concern, both in Alexander’s account of the agent intellect and in his own reading of Aristotle. Although I follow Kahn’s reading of some key passages in Alexander, I nevertheless follow Kosman in believing Kahn draws the wrong conclusions. Kosman, by contrast, and perhaps ironically, has a mistaken interpretation of Alexander (on my view) but a more defensible substantive account.
Patrick Corry, Villanova University
Philia and Nous in Nicomachean Ethics 9 and 10
What is it that one knows and loves in a good friend, and how does one know it? In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains love of a friend by first describing true love of self. The virtuous person is first a friend to himself by doing things that are good “for the sake of his thinking part” (1166a17), for “each person would seem to be his activity of thinking [τὸνοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι]” (1166a22–23). One is a friend to oneself by virtue of acting for the sake of and in accordance with the thinking part, or the activity of thinking itself. In his discussion of friendship, Aristotle repeatedly calls this part intellect or nous (1168b35, 1169a19, 20). The paradigm for the explanation of friendship based in virtue is the virtuous person’s relation to their own nous.
It is easy to assume that here nous denotes practical sensibility in general, rather than the special capacity to grasp the variable first principles of action which was introduced in NE 6.8 and 6.11. This paper will argue, however, that Aristotle’s application of the model of genuine self-love to love between friends suggests that nous in book 9 indicates precisely the intellectual capacity for the perception (aisthēsis) of indemonstrable particulars which was introduced in book 6 as [practical] nous. The paper further shows that this account of nous in NE 9 indicates a greater continuity than is often supposed between the active life of friendship discussed in NE books 8 and 9 and the life of noetic contemplation introduced in book 10.
Aristotle links self-love to friendship by giving an account of the relationship between the goodness of one’s own being and one’s awareness (aisthēsis) of that being (1170a25). Because what is best in each person is nous, the aisthēsis of the activity of nous will be that by virtue of which one’s own highest activity is apprehended as good and choiceworthy. Against a common reading, this paper gives a textual argument that aisthēsis of the activity of nous must itself be an operation of an intellectual power. Finally, insofar as that of which one is aware is a contingent, particular human, this aisthēsis will be an intellective apprehension of a particular active being. It follows that a friend (of the highest kind) can only be known as such by this kind of intellective apprehension, through that friend’s intellectual activity as manifested in action.
Finally, Aristotle calls the apprehension of a friend’s activity “contemplation” (theōrein) (1169b33). We propose to understand Aristotle’s later remark in book 10 that “happiness extends as far as contemplation” (1178b30) in light of the former designation. The highest action in friendship at once follows from and is disclosive of nous apprehending nous, and so realizes, if in a mode more particularized, the pleasure of that “divine [theion],” philosophic life “in accord with the intellect,” the praise of which concludes the Nicomachean Ethics (1177b30)
Fr. Ignacio De Ribera-Martin – The Catholic University of America
“The rational soul of the human embryo in Aristotle’s GA II.3”
In Generation of animals II.3, Aristotle asks explicitly whether seeds and embryos (kuêmata) have soul in some sense, and he answers in the affirmative (735a4-9). Later on, toward the end of Chapter 3 he arrives at the same conclusion (737a16-18). While Aristotle answers clearly in the affirmative the general question of (i) whether (poteron) embryos have soul, there are other four, more specific, questions regarding soul that Aristotle discusses that are not so easily answered: (ii) Which (poia) soul they have?, Which kind (plant soul, animal soul, human soul), Which part (nutritive, sensitive, rational/intellect); (iii) When (pote) they have soul? At which stage of embryological development; (iv) Whence (pothen) they have soul? From the sperma (gonê or katamênia) or from without (thurathen); and (v) How (pôs) do they have soul?
As regards (v), Aristotle introduces three qualifications. First, he distinguishes between “having soul in dunamis” and “having soul in energeia,” a novel distinction that needs to be articulated. Second, he says that something may be closer or further way in dunamis, so we should expect more than one way of having soul in dunamis (735a9-11). Finally, he distinguishes between having soul in some respect (part) or simply (II.5 741a10-12).
In this paper I want to focus on what happens to the soul from the moment of conception until the generation is completed. For Aristotle, upon entering contact, the seminal fluid and the menstrual fluid interact with one another and set up together a solid kuêma, which has a heart (with two blood vessels) differentiated as its first part. This kuêma already has the two principles of generation and starts to nourish itself and to grow by itself, drawing in food from the mother through the umbilicus (739b35-740a24 and 735a11-26).
I will argue that, while there is an essential transformation of the soul when the two spermatic residues make contact and interact with one another, once the kuêma has been set up together and differentiated with the heart, the essence of the soul is no longer transformed, but remains the same throughout the whole process of generation. What is transformed through the process of physical generation are rather the powers of the soul. Aristotle’s distinction between the soul and its powers in the De anima will prove key to illuminating Aristotle’s account of the soul during the process of generation in his treatise on the Generation of animals. The soul, according to Aristotle, is the essence (ousia), and not a quality or a harmony, of the living body. Each kind of soul has different parts and powers, which flow from the soul as their principle (archê) and are held together and unified in essence by the soul.
I will start considering the generation of an animal and then move to the problem of the human soul. While nous obviously raises additional questions, we must consider animals first, because there are important questions that already arise in the case of the soul of animals which are relevant for the specific problems of the human soul. For example, the essential unity and integrity of a soul with more than one power and how to understand the successive acquisition of souls through the process of generation.
Owen Goldin – Marquette University
“Positing Demonstrative Principles: Communicative Strategy or The Grounding of Intelligibility?”
G. E. R. Lloyd has forcefully argued against the thesis that preliterate peoples had a different “mentality” that could be considered “mystical” or “prelogical.” Following Vernant, he has argued that extended lines of inferential argument in general, and philosophical argument in particular, emerged in ancient Greece on account of the democratization of Greek society. For important decisions were made through deliberation, which required hearing both sides of an issue, making explicit objections against the views of others, and giving reasons for one’s own views. In Demystifying Mentalities and elsewhere, he understands Aristotle’s theory of demonstration, which rests on basic indemonstrable principles grasped by nous, as a development of this kind of communicative strategy. This presentation both supports and challenges Lloyd’s account of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration and nous. Greater emphasis can be placed on how Aristotle takes demonstration to be primarily concerned with determining the reasons why things as they are. The inferential techniques of determining what is responsible for things being as they are, the ultimate causes, can indeed be ultimately traced to the legal argumentation by which legal responsibility can be assigned. Posterior Analytics 2.11 is especially instructive in this regard. Lloyd however takes demonstration to be primarily a way of convincing others that a certain view is true, continuous with other modes of persuasion found in cultures innocent of philosophical inference. Aristotle however insists that revealing an asymmetrical ontological and causal structure of reality is central to the activity of demonstrative explanation, and it is this that is unprecedented in Greek philosophical thought.
Riza Tevfik Kalyoncu – Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey.
An Interpretation of The Concept of Intelligible (ma‘qūl) in the First Part of al-Fārābī’s The Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf)
This paper is about one of the major aspects of al-Fārābī’s noetics which comprises his analyses on the concept of intelligible in The Book of Letters. The paper tries to understand the conceptual unity and consistency in al-Fārābī’s theory of intelligible in The Book of Letters. This means that the paper analyzes this concept inside al-Fārābī’s theory of abstraction and meaning using the other works of al-Fārābī which comments on the issue of intelligible. For this reason, the method of the paper is to read closely the passages of The Book of Letters and to relate these passages to the works that comment on the same issue.
In the first part, the paper analyzes al-Fārābī’s interrelation between categories and words and how he describes the concept of intelligible for the explanation of the relation between the words and categories. al-Fārābī is keen on explaining the idea that the words signify meaning but for him, there is a pattern in intelligibles and categories which is the basis of the mechanism of language also. al-Fārābī’s analyses in The Book of Letters on the concept of intelligible show how to construct the intelligibles as the basis of the relation between categories and the words which signify categories. This is also one of the major issues that al-Fārābī painstakingly tries to solve in his Utterances Used in Logic (alfāẓ al-musta‘mala fī al-manṭiq)
In the second part of the paper, I discuss the concept of “first and secondary intelligibles” (ma‘qūlāt ṯavānin) referring to al-Fārābī’s theory of abstraction and also to the interaction between intelligible and word. al-Fārābī’s position on the issue of first intelligibles is not so clear. The paper examines the related passages in al-Fārābī’s works towards the problem of the first intelligibles and shows that different interpretations of the passages in The Book of Letters are possible. In the passages that is analyzed in the paper, al-Fārābī proposes a theory that the paper calls “unity argument” and criticizes Anisthenes’s (c.446-366 B.C.) argument for the eternal regress of the process of intellection. Therefore, the paper aims to contribute to a philosophical understanding of The Book of Letters referring to the mindset of the “Second Master”.
Christopher Lutz, Duquesne University
In the preface to his commentary on Prior Analytics I, Alexander of Aphrodisias argues that logic is a work (ἔργον) of philosophy but not a part (μέρος) of philosophy (in An. Pr. 1,5–9). Most literature on this argument is historically focused, concerned primarily with Alexander’s “instrumentalist” opposition to Stoic logic. Less attention has been given to elaborating the underlying Aristotelian commitments motivating his position. This paper explores one such commitment: Alexander’s view that (first) philosophy is a science (ἐπιστήμη) as defined in the Posterior Analytics.
The Posterior Analytics restricts the subject matter of each science to a single genus (75a38). Since being is not a genus (92b14), this restriction may preclude the Metaphysics’ project of a universal science of being qua being, viz., first philosophy. Mindful of this, Aristotle in Metaphysics Γ argues that first philosophy is generically one, for it is the science of substance (οὐσία, 1003b15–22). In addition to substance, however, first philosophy also studies logical axioms: trans-generic first principles that hold immediately of substances and non-substances alike (1005a22–29). Notably, Aristotle does not establish whether first philosophy’s study of axioms, like its study of substance, is somehow generically unified. If it is not, then first philosophy may fail to be scientific in the Posterior Analytics’ sense.
In his commentary on Metaphysics Γ, Alexander is likewise silent about the generic unity of the first-philosophical study of axioms. Moreover, he asserts that first philosophy studies not only axioms but also syllogisms and demonstration, which he elsewhere regards as logical topics, and indicates that a first-philosophical treatment of these topics is precisely what we find in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, which he elsewhere regards as logical texts (in Metaph. 267,32–268,6). So, in Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics Γ, first philosophy’s problem of generic unity vis-à-vis axioms becomes a broader problem about its relationship to logic.
I propose that Alexander’s preface to his commentary on Prior Analytics I offers his solution to this problem: logic is a non-constitutive work of philosophy. Because logic arises directly from axioms that hold of all beings, only first philosophy is equipped to study it, so that it is necessarily a work of first philosophy. But in order that first philosophy remain a generically unified science, Alexander denies that logic, being trans-generic, is a part of it. As a result, logic is a non-constitutive, and so non-scientific, work of first philosophy.
After detailing the above-outlined problem surrounding first philosophy, logic, and the generic unity of science, my paper shows that this problem motivates the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive works of philosophy in Alexander’s preface to his commentary on Prior Analytics I. Then, I interpret some of the preface’s specific arguments in consideration of Alexander’s commitment to first philosophy’s being a science. Finally, I suggest why Alexander does not frame his preface explicitly in terms of the problem of generic unity: doing so would violate the very restriction that motivates his position.
Rory O’Donnell – Marquette University
Proclus on Epistêmê and Recollection.
There is much debate about what Plato means by epistêmê in his various dialogues. Following the diachronic reading of Plato, many scholars view the propositional knowledge of the Meno as being rejected later by Plato in the Republic, in which epistêmê has forms for its proper objects. For a unitarian reading of Plato, this shift requires an explanation, or at least a theory as to how the epistêmê uses are different yet related or justified.
In the tenth chapter of his Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, Proclus takes on an objection apparently found in his own circle (Platonists) that mathematics is not true science (epistêmê). Those who disdain mathematics can cite Plato in the Republic (510c and 533b-d) to show that mathematicians engage in guesswork with the first principle unknown. Proclus responds with some passages of Plato praising mathematics, but more interestingly, uses the response as an opportunity to synthesize various ways Plato discusses epistêmê in the Sophist, Statesman,Gorgias, and Symposium dialogues. Proclus sets out 4 levels of episteme: (1) knowing universals (distinct from perception which knows particulars), (2) knowing universals with a logos or cause (distinct from knowing a routine), (3) knowing universals of abstract, unchanging being (distinct from knowing universals of changelings), (4) knowing in order to reach (ascend) to the unhypothetical principle (distinct from knowing hypotheses and using them to get conclusions or descend). It is only to level 3 that mathematics reaches—level 4 is in reference to the top of the Republic’s divided line: noêsis.
I argue that Proclus has a solution for the unitarian reader: Proclus can reconcile the various uses of epistêmê by including dianoia of the divided line as a kind of epistêmê. Further, Proclus offers epistemological mechanics as to how intellect’s forms are present in dianoia’s hypothetical propositions. These mechanics (of unfolding and realization) are so akin to the soul’s make-up such that recollection is considered excellent analogy for the lower epistêmê. As a harmonist, Proclus does all of this while considering Aristotle’s teaching on noêsis, epistêmê, and dianoia.
Z Quanbeck- Princeton University
“Interpreting Doubts for the Best”: Aquinas’s Ethics of Belief
In recent years, analytic epistemologists and ethicists have devoted significant attention to the ethics of belief (i.e., how moral considerations affect what we ought to believe). But with the exception of a few famous figures (e.g., Immanuel Kant, William James, and W.K. Clifford), the rich history of philosophical work on the ethics of belief has been largely ignored. One significant figure in this history is Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s views about the ethics of belief are standardly considered only in the context of his views about the relationship between faith and reason. Yet in his discussion of judgment in ST II-II 60.3-4—where Aquinas considers whether it is “unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions” and “whether doubts should be interpreted for the best”—Aquinas provides a promising account of 1) why our beliefs about people matters morally, and 2) how moral considerations interact with theoretical (i.e., epistemic) considerations to affect what we all-things-considered ought to believe. In this talk, I examine Aquinas’s answers to these two questions to systematically reconstruct Aquinas’s ethics of belief and to show that Aquinas offers a distinctive, plausible account of the ethics of belief which merits serious philosophical consideration.
First, I argue that Aquinas takes our beliefs about others to be morally significant in virtue of entailing holding other morally significant attitudes such as blame and contempt. When we believe ill of others, Aquinas argues, we thereby blame or contemn them. Aquinas argues that when we blame or contemn others on the basis of indeterminate evidence about whether they merit blame or contempt, we not only harm them but wrong them. Consequently, our beliefs can wrong in virtue of entailing unfitting blame or contempt. Aquinas thus not only anticipates contemporary accounts of “doxastic wronging” but provides a distinctive, plausible explanation of why beliefs can wrong.
Second, I argue that Aquinas’s broadly Aristotelian, teleological account of epistemic normativity grounds a lexical ranking of two kinds of epistemic goods—knowledge (scientia) and mere true belief—on which only the lesser kind of epistemic good can trade off against moral goods and bads. Following Aristotle, Aquinas takes the chief good of the intellect to be knowledge of universal, necessary truths. By contrast, true beliefs about particular, contingent propositions constitute lesser goods which do not pertain to the perfection of the intellect. Aquinas observes that our evidence often does not settle whether to believe particular contingent propositions which reflect either well or poorly on others. But since these are lesser epistemic goods, Aquinas argues, even if we are likely to epistemically err by forming charitable beliefs about others, we should believe well of others because believing ill of others can wrong them. Thus, the risk of wronging others outweighs the risk of forming false beliefs about particular contingent propositions. For epistemologists sympathetic to a value-first approach to epistemic normativity, I suggest, Aquinas offers a promising account of how epistemic and moral values interact to determine what we should all-things-considered believe.
Richard C. Taylor, Marquette Univeristy & Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
The Paraphrase of Aristotle’s De Anima by Themistius (d. 387) in Arabic translation by Ishaq Ibn Hunayn was available to the three well known philosophers of the Classical Rationalist Philosophical Tradition, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd. For Ibn Rushd the text played key roles in his evolving development of his understanding of human intellectual understanding through his Short, Middle and Long Commentaries on the De Anima. For al-Fārābī, there is evidence that he made use of the Paraphrase but research on its importance for his thought requires more intensive work. In the case of Ibn Sīnā, here I reason that a careful comparison of details of his thought to that of Themistius in the Paraphrase gives cause to hold that Ibn Sīnā is likely to have been significantly influenced regarding the role of the Productive Intellect / Agent Intellect in his own account of human soul and intellect.
Sr. Anna Wray, Catholic University of America
A Critical Examination of Three Readings of ἀληθής in Aristotle’s DA III.6
The opening lines of DA III.6 distinguish between the thinking of what is undivided (τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις) and thinking that involves some synthesis of objects of thought (σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων) (430a26-28): in the former there is no falsity, while the latter is either false or true. The chapter concludes with the same distinction, only specified and stronger: thinking the what-it-is in the sense of essence (τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) is true, while thinking something about something (τι κατά τινος) is not always true, but is in every case true or false (430b26-28, 30).
The intervening passages contain no explicit account of what it means for thinking to be true and not false, as opposed to being either true or false. It has thus become common practice for commentators to fill out what is wanting in DA III.6 by turning to Aristotle’s explicit accounts of truth in De Int I and Meta VI.4. This practice has given rise to two dominant interpretations of the truthfulness that Aristotle attributes to noetic (viz., non-synthetic) thinking in DA III.6. According to some (Hamlyn, Ross, Shields), when Aristotle says that noetic thinking is true and not false, he means merely that noetic thinking is not actually either true or false, but only potentially so. According to others (Mignucci, Noriega-Olmos), Aristotle means merely that noetic thinking is true in a way that all intentional acts are true: to say that an act of thinking is true and not false is to say nothing more than that it is actual; every act of thinking has an intentional object.
In this paper, I argue against both of these dominant interpretations of noetic thinking’s truthfulness and in favor of an alternate one, implicitly held by Pritzl, Biondi, and Fatal, but nowhere systematically presented or defended. In the first part, I critique the two dominant interpretations, noting first how each conflicts with the text of DA III.6, and then tracing the cause of this tension to three methodological assumptions held by adherents of both interpretations. In the second part, I propose an alternate interpretation of noetic thinking’s truthfulness, based not on the discussions of linguistic truth in De Int and Meta VI.4, but on the DA’s preceding discussion of the truth of acts of sensation, which are both analogous to and referenced in DA III.6. According to this alternate interpretation, the truth Aristotle attributes to noetic thinking is opposed neither to falsity nor deception but to ignorance, and is actual and non-trivial in character.
Housing on the Marquette Campus and local hotel information 2024
Among the most convenient local hotels is the four-star Ambassador Hotel at 2308 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233, tel. 414-345-5008. Search for the best rates online Do check http://www.ambassadormilwaukee.com. But rates are dynamic and change with demand, especially when there are many other summertime events ongoing in Milwaukee.
Some rooms are available at Marquette University
Room Commitment: Six 2-bedroom suite-style units featuring two private bedrooms, each furnished with two extra-long twin beds.
Residence Facility:
Humphrey Hall, located at 1716 W. Wisconsin Ave., features air-conditioned sleeping rooms with a private bathroom. Rooms are furnished with extra-long twin bed(s), dresser(s), closet space, and desk(s)/chair(s). Bed and bath linens are provided. Additional Humphrey Hall amenities include a secured 24-hour front desk, complimentary internet, coin-operated laundry on each sleeping floor, vending machines and a common area to watch television or just relax. We regret that we are not able to provide wake up calls or personal toiletry items.
The Desk Receptionist (DR) will provide each guest with a room key at check-in. To expedite the check-out process, please return the room key in the provided key envelope prior to departure.
Room Block Dates/Sleeping Room Summary:
Arriving June 18, 2024, departing June 22, 2024
Each shared 2-bedroom suite accommodates 2 people, one guest per private bedroom.
Nightly Room Rate
Humphrey Hall
Two-bedroom suite
$99/night ($49.50 per person shared occupancy – one person occupying each bedroom)
Cut-Off Date
Cut-off date: May 18, 2024. Rooms requested after the cut-off date are subject to availability.
Standard check in time: After 3 p.m.*
Standard check out time: Prior to 10:30 a.m.*
*These times are based upon Central Standard Time.
Reservation Procedures
Method of reservation is Individual/Direct. Individuals are requested to email donna.wells@marquette.edu to secure a room reservation. Individuals should let the reservations assistant know they are associated with the Summer Seminar on Aristotle and The Aristotelian Traditions. Due to limited rooms in the conference block, it is highly recommended that a room reservation be made as soon as possible. Reservation deadline is no later than two weeks prior to arrival date.
Note that all suite-style, 2-bedroom units are shared occupancy with each guest occupying a private bedroom. The suite has one private bathroom. Please let the reservations assistant know if you have a suite-mate preference.
Guaranteed Reservations
Guests must confirm their room reservation with receipt of a check payable to Marquette University for the entire stay. Full payment must be received no later than 10 days prior to arrival date. Please provide an email address for invoicing purposes. Submit payment to:
Donna Wells
Alumni Memorial Union 407
1442 W. Wisconsin Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53233
No refunds, including instances involving early departures, will be issued after check payment has been submitted except in the case of illness, injury, medical or family emergency, or other extenuating circumstances and must be approved by the Director of Conference Services. Failure to check out at the posted time on date of departure may result in a penalty fee.
Linen Service
Basic bed and bath linens are provided in guest rooms. Linen service includes one pillow, sheets/pillowcase, and one bath towel/washcloth per guest. Soiled towel/washcloth may be exchanged for fresh bath linens at the front desk.
Guest Identification
Additional Policies
Rooms reserved under room blocks are not guaranteed to be in the same area of the residence hall. We will attempt to keep groups together, but at times circumstances prohibit this from happening.
Each guest is expected to leave his/her guest room in the same condition in which it was found at check-in. Any damage sustained to the room during the guest’s stay will be billed directly to the guest. Any damages noticed by a guest should be brought to the immediate attention of the desk staff.
Key Lockout and Replacement
Each guest must sign for her/her room key prior to check-in. There is a $10 lockout policy enforced for any guest who requires use of a lock-out key to access his/her room. There is a $75 key replacement fee that is billed to the guest for any key that is lost or not returned at checkout. Rooms are re-keyed immediately for security reasons; therefore, we cannot issue refunds for guests who send in or return keys after checkout time.
Force Majeure
Neither party will be considered in default in the performance of its obligation under this Agreement if such performance is prevented or delayed by any cause which is beyond the reasonable control of the party affected, including severe weather, war, hostilities, revolution, civil commotion, acts of terrorism, zombie apocalypse, alien invasions, strike, lockout, epidemic, pandemic, accident, fire, wind, or flood or because of any law, order, proclamation, ruling, regulation, or ordinance of any government or subdivision of government or because of any act of God (“Force Majeure”).
Indemnification
Group agrees that it will defend and fully indemnify UNIVERSITY against any loss, cost, damage, injury, or expense (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) that may be sustained or incurred by UNIVERSITY, its trustees, officers, employees, students or agents as a result of the Group, its employees, participants, agents or guests use of, or presence at, the licensed space. Neither party will be liable to the other for any indirect, incidental, special, or consequential damages of any kind whatsoever, including lost profits, even if advised of the possibility thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Group will not be responsible to indemnify University against any loss caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the University, its trustees, officers, employees, agents, or contractors.
Compliance
All visitors to campus are required to comply with all UNIVERSITY policies, procedures, and health and safety measures in effect. This may include following campus procedures related to the COVID-19 pandemic or other community-wide epidemic or pandemic.
Conduct
All UNIVERSITY visitors are expected to show respect for order, personal and public property, and the rights of all individuals. UNIVERSITY is a community that consists of people of different backgrounds and beliefs. Conduct in violation of the rights of others will not be tolerated. Misconduct will be sufficient cause for removal from the UNIVERSITY. All guests staying in University Housing Facilities must comply with all University policies and procedures and health and safety measures in effect as well as any guidelines for University Facilities.
Smoking/Gambling
UNIVERSITY is a tobacco-free campus. This includes all indoor and outdoor campus spaces including campus buildings, grounds, exterior open spaces, green spaces, parking lots (including inside a vehicle if parked in a University lot), on-campus sidewalks (not bordering a city street), on-campus driveways and other paved areas, athletic facilities, practice facilities, and recreational spaces. Gambling of any nature is strictly prohibited on UNIVERSITY property.
Alcoholic Beverages
The possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by anyone under the age of twenty-one (21) is prohibited by Wisconsin law. Participants over the age of 21 may privately consume alcoholic beverages within their own rooms.
Drugs
The use, possession, distribution or sale of illegal drugs or narcotics is strictly prohibited. Non-compliance by any participant will result in immediate removal from the residence hall, dismissal from participation in activities on UNIVERSITY property and to prosecution.
Pets
No pets of any kind may be brought into or kept in a UNIVERSITY facility, except for service animals. If accommodations are required for a service animal, the Director of Conference Services must be advised in advance and approval granted.
Exclusivity
Many campus buildings are open to the public and serve a variety of functions. Though GROUP may have reserved space within a campus building, other space and access to the building will often be available to UNIVERSITY members or other program or camp guests. Special arrangements must be scheduled in advance and approved by the Director of Conference Services.
Reassignment
University reserves the right to reassign Group to alternate housing, dining hall, and conference space based on maintenance, safety, or other needs of UNIVERSITY.
Weapons Policy
The GROUP and its members are not permitted to: – Carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property except as expressly permitted by applicable state law.
– Openly carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property.
– Carry any weapons in any UNIVERSITY building or leased space or at any University special event marked with signage specifying “WEAPONS ARE PROHIBITED IN THIS BUILDING.”
– Store any weapons in a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property except in the vehicle’s glove compartment or trunk or encased such that the existence of the weapon is concealed. – Encased means completely zipped, snapped, buckled, tied or otherwise fastened, with no part of the weapon exposed. – Fail to lock a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property that contains any weapon when the GROUP member is not present in the vehicle.
– Possess unloaded ammunition on UNIVERSITY property.
– Imply possession of, threaten to use, display, brandish, use, or discharge a weapon on University property for any purpose or reason except lawful self-defense or lawful defense of others. – Fail to report timely to the UNIVERSITY Department of Public Safety the presence on University property of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy, unless doing so would subject the GROUP member or others to the threat of physical harm, or take other action in response to the presence of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy except for reporting the presence of the weapon to the University Department of Public Safety.
The GROUP members whose actions violate applicable State law with respect to the possession of weapons on UNIVERSITY property may be subject to criminal prosecution. GROUP members whose actions violate this provision will be asked to leave UNIVERSITY property immediately and may be subject to no-trespassing directives in the future. UNIVERSITY reserves the right to terminate this Rooms Agreement for one or more violations of this provision.