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Aristotle’s NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: Brief Previews
Virtue Ethics. Aristotle’s NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book I.
Preview: After a discussion of where the science of ethics fits in the Aristotelian division of the sciences, we will begin to follow the assigned readings with a discussion of the notion of the Good. In ethics we seek what is good for us and so this is a ‘good’ starting place. This is a conceptual analysis of the good and involves consideration of ends in the two senses of purposes and as goals to be achieved. The good in the sciences of human action is found most fully in the science of Politics and then in a more individual way in Ethics. That hierarch established, we must consider what are the common starting points of the study of the human good and its attainment. But not all starting points are sound so we must critique common ideas and try to figure out which actions are good insofar as they yield or produce what is good for human beings. Aristotle is playing with ideas here but also setting aside common notions still alive today (e.g., Money & wealth necessarily will make us happy, you can always count on it!) to see what is really good.
Another approach to the notion of good is through the function argument. (What is that and how does that ‘function’?) Since we are after the human good which seems to be happiness, how do we acquire happiness? Further, is it only in the mind or does it have an external objective reality in the world? Can we make mistakes about what we think happiness is? (If I think or believe I am happy, does it necessarily follow that I am happy?)
Note how Aristotle closes out Book 1 by explaining his conception of the human soul or life principle and its parts. Here he explains the foundations for how he will proceed in the discussion of moral virtue and later in the discussion of intellectual virtue. (What does virtue mean? Excellence.)
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS II
Preview: Book 2 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics begins his detailed account of virtue of character. (At the end of Book 1 he explained that virtue of intellect would be treated later. Virtue of character is about the rational part of the soul controlling the part of the soul that is non-rational but is able to listen to reason. To some extent this maps onto human emotions and actions done out of emotion without much guidance by reason.) He begins by emphasizing the importance of habituation. But this presents puzzles. How can we become good without already knowing what it is and even already being good? Isn’t it the case that in order to do just actions we should already be just people? (There is an issue of language and concepts here.) Later he focuses on the formal definition of virtue in terms of genus, species and difference. (What is his notion of the mean and why does it not apply to adultery or murder?) He completes Book 2 with a discussion of kinds of virtue (or excellence of character) and a reminder of the definition of virtue.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III
Preview: Book 3 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics focuses on the Preconditions of virtue, that is, on the conditions that must be present for their to be virtue and virtuous action. These include (i) voluntary action which is not forced; (ii) the notion that extreme duress does not excuse us from responsibility even in difficult situations of certain sorts; (iii) recognition that voluntary action is done willingly and has its origin in the agent or person doing the action; (iv) the recognition that emotions, appetites, desires and hyper attractive options (winning the lottery, beauty, and the like) do not make our actions involuntary thanks to what we today call negative freedom; (v) recognition that ignorance does not always excuse us from responsibility; (vi) the importance of knowledge of particulars of a situation; (vii) how decision (proaireis) is not appetite, emotion, wish or belief but rather is something requiring deliberation by reason and thought; (viii) deliberation as involving only things that are up to us or in our control, not unchangeable facts; (ix) that decision involves rational wish; (x) that it is hard sometimes to distinguish what appears good from what is really good for us; and more. How does Aristotle handle that last issue (x)? Could it be that because we did not choose our parents or the society into which we were born, then we are not really responsible in a moral for our own actions?
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V, 1129a1-1138b14. Justice
Preview: Book 3 of Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle discussed the various virtues or states of character such as bravery, temperance and even wit indicating that these are means or middle points between excess and deficiency. He declined to give the same analysis to justice and indicated it would be treated elsewhere. Here in Book 5 he gives his fullest account of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. He provides definitions of justice and breaks it down into four forms of special justices or kinds of justice since the term can involve different sorts of actions in different situations. Take note of the following issues for discussion: Who is excluded from political justice? Justice concerns rightness in human social conduct. But is it better to do or to suffer injustice? (What distinctions are required here to deal with this question?) Is justice something found naturally in human societies? What is the difference between justice as a state of character and just actions? (If you do a just action once, does that make you a just person? What is the definitional problem here?) Speaking of actions, what is the self that acts in Aristotle’s conception of justice action? For Aristotle, decency is higher and better than justice? What could he mean by that?
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, VII 1-10, 1145a15-1152b1. Continence and incontinence. And NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book X, ch.1-8,
Preview, Books 7 & 10: Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics concerns incontinence. Recall that this is weakness of character, an inability to maintain one’s position or views, with the result that one slips up or fails to do what is right (or fails and thereby does what is wrong). This is very important because we want to know just how people who are otherwise mostly good sometimes fail to do what is right or fail by doing something they should not do. (What is the Christian view of human failings? Does Aristotle hold the same thing regarding incontinence?) You will see here that Aristotle considers this psychological phenomenon and proceeds to explain it with a model derived from his study of logic with its notion of syllogistic argument. It is as if we are making a mistake in reasoning. As you read, take note of the different character traits that he indicates for the virtuous, continent, incontinent, simply incontinent and vicious. And, of course, pleasure is involved here. Note that Aristotle starts the discussion of pleasure at the end of Book 7 and then returns to it at the start of Book 10. (He took a break to discuss the nature of friendship in Books 8-9.) Book X concerns pleasure but distinguishes it from happiness. He also goes on to distinguish two levels of happiness and to emphasize that happiness is not pleasure or a resting contentment but an activity in accord with virtue. Just what that means will explore in detail.