Two Translations
The following translation of In 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 is based on S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis, Tomus 1, P. Mandonnet, O.P. ed., Paris: P. Lethielleuxm 1929, pp. 194-197. It is based on a previously unpublished translation by R. E. Houser now with some of my own modifications. My thanks to Dr. Houser for his permission to make use of his work here. We retain the references found in the Mandonnet edition.
To the first we proceed as follows.
[Objections]
1. It seems that being is not properly said of God. For what is proper to something is what belongs to it alone. But being belongs not to God alone but rather also to creatures. Therefore it seems that being does not belong properly to God.
2. Furthermore, we can name God only insofar as we know Him. Hence the Damascene [lib. 1, Fid. orth., cap. xiii, col. 858, t. 1] [writes that] “The word is an angel, that is, an messenger of intellect.” But we cannot know God in an immediate way in this life but [rather] only from creatures. Therefore neither [can we] name [Him]. Since, therefore, “He who is” does not indicate a relation to creatures, it seems that it does not properly name God.
3. Furthermore, just as created wisdom is deficient in reference to uncreated wisdom, so too created being [is deficient] in reference to uncreated being. But for this reason the name of wisdom is said to be deficient in relation to the perfect signification of divine wisdom, because it is imposed by us in accord with the apprehension of created wisdom. Therefore it seems that by the same reasoning neither does this name “He who is” properly signify divine being. And in this way it is not necessary that it be called a more proper name of Him than other names.
4. Again, the Damascene [lib. I Fid. orth., cap. IX, col. 834, t. 1] says that “He who is” does not signify what God is but rather a certain infinite sea of substance. But the infinite is incomprehensible and consequently not able to be named but [rather is] unknown. Therefore it seems that “He who is” is not a divine name.
To the contrary is Exodus 3, 14, “The Lord said to Moses, ‘If they ask my name, say the following to the sons of Israel: He who is sent me to you.’” The same is seen in the Damascene, as indicated above [cap. 9], who says that “He who is” is the name of God proper in the highest degree. [This is also indicated by] Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] who says that this name is the ineffable name of God which has been held to be most worthy.
[Response]
I respond that it should be said that of all the other names “He who is” is the name of God proper in the highest degree. The reason for this can be fourfold: the first is taken from the text of the words of Jerome regarding the perfection of Divine being. For the perfect is that which has nothing outside it. Our being, however, has something of itself outside itself, for it lacks something which has already passed by for it and something which is yet to come. But in Divine being nothing has passed by nor is there anything to come. For this reason His whole being is perfect and on account of this being properly befits Him with reference to all other things. The second reason is taken from the words of the Damascene [lib. I Fid. orth., cap. IX] who says that “He who is” signifies indeterminate being and not what He is. [This is] because in this life we know of Him only that He is and not what He is, except through negation and we are able to name [something] only insofar as we know [it]. For this reason He is most properly named by us “He who is.” The third reason is taken from the words of (ps.)Dionysius who says that among all the other divine participations of goodness such as to live, to understand and the like, it is first and [is] as a principle for all the others having in itself all the others mentioned united in a certain way. In this way God is also the Divine principle and all things are one in Him. The fourth reason can be taken from the words of Avicenna [tract. 8 Metaphysics, cap. 1] in the sense that, since in everything which is there can be considered its quiddity through which it subsists in a determinate nature and its being in virtue of which it is said of it that it is in act, then this name “thing” is imposed on the thing from its quiddity, [and] according to Avicenna [tract. II Metaphysics, cap. 1] this name “who is” or “being” is imposed from its act of being. Since, however, it is the case that in any created being its essence differs from its being, that thing is properly denominated by its quiddity and not by the act of being, as human being by humanity. However, in God His very being is His quiddity. And for this reason the name taken from being names Him properly and is His proper name, just as the proper name of a human being which is taken from its quiddity.
[Responses to Objections]
To the first, therefore, it should be said that when something is said properly to belong to something, this can be understood in two ways. (1) [It can be understood] that in virtue of what it means to be proper to something everything extraneous to the nature of the subject is excluded, as when it is said that it is properly of a human being to be able to laugh, because it belongs to nothing extraneous to the nature of a human being. In this way being is not said to be a property of God because it also belongs to creatures. Or (2) [it can be understood] insofar as everything extraneous to the nature of what is predicated is excluded, as when it is said that this thing is properly gold because it does not have the admixture of another metal, and in this way being is called a property belonging to God because Divine being does not have some privation or potentiality as does the being of a creature. For this reason propriety and truth are taken for the same in the text, for we say that true gold is what is unmixed with what is extraneous.
To the second it should be said that God comes to be named from creatures in three ways. [This occurs] in one way when the name itself actually connotes an effect in the creature owing to a relation to the creature implied in the name, as Creator and Lord. [It occurs] in another way when the name itself in virtue of its notion names the principle of some divine act in creatures, such as wisdom, power and will. [It occurs] in another way when the name itself indicates something represented in creatures, such as living, for every [sort of] life is exemplified by Divine life. Likewise this name “He who is” names God through being found in creatures which has been derived from him in the way of exemplar.
To the third it should be said that, since the being of a creature imperfectly represents Divine being, this name, “He who is,” also imperfectly signifies it because it signifies in the manner of a certain concretion and composition. But it signifies still imperfectly through other names, for when I say, God is wise, then, when being is included in this statement, a twofold imperfection is signified there. One is on the part of concrete being itself, as in this name, “He who is,” and another is added from the proper notion of wisdom. For created wisdom is deficient in reference to the notion of divine wisdom. On account of this the imperfection is greater in the other names than in this name, “He who is,” and for this reason this is a more worthy and more proper of God.
To the fourth it should be said that all other names indicate being according to some determined notion (ratio), as wise indicates some being. But this name, “He who is,” indicates being absolute and undetermined by something added. For this reason the Damascene says that it does not signify what God is but rather it signifies a certain infinite sea of substance, as if undetermined. Hence, when we proceed to God by way of remotion, we first deny of Him corporeal things; second [we deny of him] also intellectual things, insofar as they are found in creatures, such as goodness and wisdom. Then there remains in our intellect only that He is and nothing more. Consequently it is as in a certain confusion. Finally, however, we even remove from Him being itself insofar as it is in creatures. And then He remains in a certain darkness of ignorance [and] according to this ignorance, to the extent that it pertains to the present life, we are conjoined to God in the the best way, as (ps.)Dionysius says, and this is a certain obscurity in which God is said to dwell.
The following translation of In 1 Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2 is based on S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis, Tomus 1, P. Mandonnet, O.P. ed., Paris: P. Lethielleuxm 1929, pp. 221-223. It was made by Richard C. Taylor and Andrea Robiglio in October 2022.
Whether God is in the category of substance
To the second we proceed as follows.
[Objections]
1. It seems that God is in the category of substance. For everything which is, either is substance or accident. But God is not an accident, therefore He is substance. Since, therefore, substance is predicated of Him as a substantial predicate, and not the converse, because not every substance is God, then it seems that it is predicated of Him as genus, and in this way God is <included> in the genus of substance.
2. Furthermore, substance is that which does not belong to a subject, but is being (ens) per se. Since, therefore, this is maximally fitting for God, it seems that He is in the genus of substance.
3. Furthermore, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics 10, t. 3 and following), any given thing is measured by the minimum of its genus, and there the Commentator says that that against which all substances are measured is the prime mover who, according to him, is God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
Contra.
1. Whatever is in a genus, either is as the most general or is as something contained under it. But god is not in the genus of substance as the most general because He would be predicated of all substances; nor also [is He] as something contained under the genus because He would imply some addition above the genus and in this way the divine essence would not be the most simple. Therefore, God is not in the genus of substance.
2. Furthermore, whatever is in a genus has its being determined to that genus. But divine being is in no way determined to some genus; in fact, it comprehends in itself the excellences (nobilitates) of all genera, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say in Metaphysics V (text 21).
[Response]
As a consequence <one should say that> God is not in the genus of substance. This should be conceded from all points of view.
A fourfold reason (ratio) is assigned [for this]. The first is asserted in the literal meaning and is taken from the name. For the name ‘substance’ is imposed from ‘standing under’; God, however, stands under nothing. The second reason is taken from the notion (ratio) of what is in the genus. For everything of this sort adds something to the genus and for this reason that which is simple in the highest degree cannot be “in a genus.” The third, more subtle reason is that of Avicenna (Metaphysics V, ch.4 and IX ch.1): Everything in a genus has a quiddity different from [its] existence (esse), as is the case for a human being. For being in act is not owed to humanity from the fact that it is humanity. For humanity can be thought (cogitari) and nevertheless it can be that it is unknown whether some human being actually exists. The reason for this is, because what is common is predicated of those things which are in the genus, it predicates the quiddity, since genus and species are predicated in what something really is (in eo quod quid est). To that quiddity, however, being is not owed except through what is taken up in this or that individual. And for this reason the quiddity of the genus or species is not communicated according to one being for all, but only according to one common notion (ratio). Hence, it remains that its existence (suum esse) is not its quiddity. In God, however, His being is his quiddity (esse suum est quidditas sua), for otherwise it would occur to the quiddity and in this way it would have been acquired by Him from another and He would not have existence through His essence (esse per essentiam suam). And for this reason God cannot be in some genus.
The fourth reason comes from the perfection of the divine being (ex perfectione divini esse) which brings together all the excellences (nobilitates) of all genera. Hence, He is determined to no singular genus, as was objected.
[Responses to Objections]
1. To the first, therefore, it should be said that God in full is not an accident, nor may He in an altogether appropriate way be called substance both because the name of substance is said from standing under (a substando), and because substance names a quiddity which is distinct from its being. Hence, that is a division of the created being (divisio entis creati). If, however, one wishes that it would not happen so, God could be called substance in a broad way (largo modo). [This is] because such substance is nevertheless understood to be above all created substances with regard to what there is of perfection in any substance, as not belonging to something else and of this sort. Then substance is the same in what is predicated and in the subject as is the case in all things which are predicated of God. For this reason, it does not follow that everything which is substance is God, because nothing other than Him receives the predicate of substance taken in this acceptation. Thus, owing to the different mode of predication, substance is not said of God and creature univocally, but analogically. This can be another reason (alia ratio) why God is not in some genus, namely, because nothing is predicated of Him and other things univocally.
2. To the second it should be said that this definition, according to Avicenna (Metaphysics 2, ch 1 and 3 ch 8), cannot be the definition of substance, viz., substance is what is not in a subject. For being (ens) is not a genus. This negation “not in a subject,” however, asserts nothing. Hence what I say, “being is not in a subject” does not indicate some genus. [This is] because in any genus it is necessary to signify some quiddity, as was said, the concept of which does not imply existence (de cujus intellectu non est esse). Being (ens), however, does not indicate quiddity but only the act of being, since it is its principle. For this reason it does not follow: it is not in a subject, therefore it is in the genus of substance. But it is necessary to add: there is something which has a quiddity which is followed by being not in another subject; therefore it is in the genus of substance. But this statement is not fitting for God, as was said.
3. To the third it should be said that measure is properly said in regard to quantities. For measure is said to be that through which the quantity of a thing is made known, and this is the ‘minimum’ in the genus of quantity or simply, as in numbers, what are measured by unity which is the least simply. Or the minimum according to our position, as in continuous dimensions, in which there is no minimum absolutely speaking. Hence, we place the palm in place of the least for measuring fabrics or the stade for measuring a roadway (viam). Subsequently, the name of measure has been transferred to all genera so that that which is first in any genus and the most simple and most perfect may be called the measure of all the things in that genus so that any given thing is known to have something of the truth of the genus more or less, insofar as it more approaches or receded from it, as white in the genus of color. Accordingly, also in the genus of substance that which is most perfect and most simple is called the measure of all substances, as is the case for God. Hence, it is not necessary that He be in the genus of substance as something contained but only as the principle having in itself all perfection of the genus as unity in numbers, but, nevertheless, in a diverse way because only numbers are measured by unity. But God is the measure not only of substantial perfections but of all things which are in all the genera, as of wisdom, power (virtutis) and the like. For this reason, although unity is contained in one determinate genus as principle, nevertheless God is not.