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Plato’s PARMENIDES
I. Introduction/Prologue
II. The Story (Conversation)
A. First Part of the Story: Zeno, Parmenides and Socrates
on Form Theory (126A-135D)
1. Zeno and an introduction to Form Theory (127-130E)
a. The response to Zeno:
(i) The 1st hypothesis of the first argument of Zeno
“If things are many. . . .”
(ii) Socrates’ response: the Theory of Forms as a refutation of Zeno
(iii) Elaboration on Form Theory
b. Of what things are there Forms? (130A-E)
(i) Likeness, Unity, Plurality
(ii) Rightness, Beauty, Goodness
(iii) Man, Fire, Water
(iv) Hair, Mud, Dirt
2. Parmenides’s criticism of Form Theory (130E-134E)
a. “partake”–How is it to be understood? (130E-131E)
(i) Presentation of possibilities
(ii) Criticism
b. the largeness of the Large (131E-132B): First Regress Argument
(Third Man Argument 132-A-B)
(i) Presentation (131E-132A) (Compare: REP. 507B,
PHAEDO 100B, SYMPOSIUM 210B; 211B-D,
MENO 71E ff.
(ii) Criticism (132A-B)
c. Are the Forms thoughts? (132B-C) (cf. Aristotle, De Anima 429b26 ff.)
(i) Presentation (132B)
(ii) Criticism (132B-C)
d. Are the Forms patterns (paradigms) in Nature?
(132C-133A)–Second Regress Argument
(i) Presentation
(ii) Criticism
e. The Forms as separate (133B-134E)
(i) Presentation (133A-B)
(ii) Criticism: The Forms or ideas
cannot even be known.
(A) None of the absolute ideas exist in us (133C)
(B) Separate forms concern only things separate
and like-named things in our world only
concern our world.
(1) Example: Mastery-Slavery
master-slave
(2) Conclusion: Absolute & Complete Separation
(a) The Absurdity of (2):
Separate Objects, Separate Knowledge
3. Parmenides’s summary of the issues at stake and the need for training
in dialectic (134E-135D)
Supplement:
Propositions and principles, from S. Rickless, “Plato’s Parmenides,” SEP. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides/.
(Causality) Things that are F (other than the F) are F by virtue of partaking of the F.
(Separation) The F is itself by itself, at least in the sense of being separate from, and hence not identical with, the things that partake of it.
(Impurity-S) Sensible things are impure inasmuch as they can (and, in fact, often do) have contrary properties.
(Purity-F) Forms cannot have contrary properties.
(One-over-Many) For any plurality of F things, there is a form of F-ness by virtue of partaking of which each member of the plurality is F.
(Uniqueness) For any property F, there is exactly one form of F-ness.
(Self-Predication) For any property F, the F is F.
(Oneness) Each form is one.
(Non-Identity) No form is identical to anything that partakes of it.
“How to Save the Forms: The Plan of the Deductions 134e–137c
After having articulated potentially devastating criticisms of the theory of forms, one might expect Parmenides to conclude that the theory is a lost cause and should be abandoned. But, surprisingly, Parmenides does exactly the opposite. He claims, rather, that one who does not “allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same” (a clear reference to One-over-Many) will “destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (135b8–c2). Here Parmenides means one of two things, depending on whether “dialectic” is taken in a technical sense (as meaning the process by which a philosopher is supposed to acquire knowledge of the forms—see Republic 534b3–c5) or in a non-technical sense (as meaning the ability to converse or communicate).
In any event, Parmenides makes it clear that the power of dialectic (however this is understood) cannot be saved unless the forms themselves are saved. As a means of saving the forms, Parmenides recommends a process of training that focuses on forms and takes note of the fact that forms wander (in the sense of having contrary properties, such as being like and unlike: 135e1–7). In particular, Parmenides suggests that the training process take the following shape. First, concerning some form, it must involve extracting consequences from the hypothesis that that form is; second, concerning the very same form, it must involve extracting consequences from the hypothesis that that form is not (135e8–136a2). Parmenides goes on to say that it is also important to consider different sorts of consequences: first, consequences for the form that is hypothesized to be (or to not be), and second, consequences for things other than the form that is hypothesized to be (or not to be). Parmenides also says that the training process should involve extracting consequences for the relevant form in relation to itself and in relation to the others, and consequences for things other than the relevant form in relation to themselves and in relation to the relevant form.”