On Happiness, part B Aquinas
SUPPLEMENT: OPTIONAL STUDY ON HAPPINESS
Lecture Class 5b of 5
Ultimate Human Happiness in the Arabic Tradition and in Thomas Aquinas
PART B: Aquinas in the Commentary on the Sentences, Summa contra gentiles Book 3 and
Summa theologiae, prima secundae, Qq. 1-5.
Preview:
In his first detailed discussion of ultimate human happiness in his Commentary on the Sentences, Book 4, D. 49, Q.2, A.1, Aquinas analyzes the issue of ultimate happiness in seeing God face-to-face or per essentiam in heaven as an instance of what the philosophers of the Greek and Arabic traditions called the ultimate happiness of seeing or intellectually apprehending separately existing intellectual substances. Relying almost exclusively on Book 3 of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De Anima as his source for information on the Greek and Arabic traditions (which the exception of Avicenna whose De Anima and Metaphysics Aquinas used in this matter), Aquinas follows Averroes in refuting the views of al-Farabi, Ibn Bajjah, Avicenna and Alexander and the turns to refute Averroes himself. Aquinas rejected the model of the separate Agent Intellect as assisting human beings as a supervening “form for us” making possible knowledge through intellectual abstraction found in natural epistemology in Alexander and Averroes. But he accepted and used this model to describe how in heaven God is that by which (quo) the human power of intellect is raised above its natural powers to see or intellectual know the essence of God (quod) entering into the human soul.
More comprehensive accounts of the attainment of ultimate happiness based on reasoning found in Aristotle’s works and conceptions of the nature and end of human beings are found in philosophical form in Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles Book 3 and in a similar albeit theological form in Aquinas’s later Summa theologiae, prima secundae, Questions 1-5. In these works he reasons to an ultimate fulfillment and happiness in the presence of God, leaving Aristotle’s account behind as a merely natural account of worldly fulfillment.
Readings:
(i) Commentary on the Sentences, Book 4, d. 49, q. 2, a.1.
See Texts Link
(ii) Summa theologiae, prima secundae, Q.1, a.1-2; Q.3, a.4 & 8; Q.5, a.1.
Find it via https://isidore.co/aquinas/.
Recommended: Summa contra gentiles, book 3, chapters 47-57.
Video lecture resources:
Aquinas, Preliminary remarks on philosophical sources:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuvRr4O8ols&feature=youtu.be
(i) Aquinas, his first discussion of ultimate happiness at In 4 Sent, d. 49, q.2, a1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJ__bEcnQT8&feature=youtu.be
Recommended:
Two videos on happiness in Summa contra gentiles Book 3:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq0hVoQ4m1U&feature=youtu.be
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T3vVa2fxRDQ&feature=youtu.be
(ii) Three videos on happiness in the Summa theologiae Ia IIae Qq. 1-5:
ST Ia IIae Qq. 1-2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Te9xt_xZ18k&feature=youtu.be
ST Ia IIae Q. 3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnLW17U6XiI&feature=youtu.be
ST Ia IIae Qq. 4-5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soW4cT455y8&feature=youtu.be
Secondary sources:
R. C. Taylor, “Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’: Arabic / Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in his Commentary on the Sentences IV, 49, 2, 1,” The Thomist 76 (2012) 509-550. See Text Link.
Katja Krause, “Transforming Aristotelian Philosophy: Alexander of Aphrodisias in Aquinas’ Early Anthropology and Eschatology.” Przegląd Tomistyczny 21 (2015a): 175-217. See Text Link.
Katja Krause,”Remodelling Ultimate Human Happiness: Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences and its Sources,” Divus Thomas 118 (2015b): 15-56. See Text Link.
(i) For the account of Aquinas in the Commentary on the Sentences, see my article, “Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’: Arabic / Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in his Commentary on the Sentences IV, 49, 2, 1,” The Thomist 76 (2012) 509-550. See Text Link. Also see my video on this: click HERE.
(ii) Also see my video lectures on the accounts of happiness by Aquinas in the Summa contra gentiles and Summa theologiae.
Summa contra gentiles Book 3:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq0hVoQ4m1U&feature=youtu.be
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T3vVa2fxRDQ&feature=youtu.be
Summa theologiae Ia IIae Qq. 1-5:
ST Ia IIae Qq. 1-2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Te9xt_xZ18k&feature=youtu.be
ST Ia IIae Q. 3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnLW17U6XiI&feature=youtu.be
ST Ia IIae Qq. 4-5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soW4cT455y8&feature=youtu.be
The account of ST Ia IIae Qq 1-5 Thomas Aquinas on the Nature and Attainment of Happiness
Aquinas on ultimate happiness in the Summa theologiae, Ia IIae Qq.1-3
See Videos 12a
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Te9xt_xZ18k&feature=youtu.be,
12b
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnLW17U6XiI&feature=youtu.be
Concerning ultimate human happiness in the context of theology
ST Ia IIae Qq 1-3 overview
Georg Wieland, “Happiness (Ia IIae qq. 1-5) in The Ethics of Aquinas (2002)
This section is on ST Ia IIae Qq 1-3 in which Aquinas takes up issues of the ultimate end of human beings as ultimate happiness in a theological context.
In his article among the required reading for this class, Wieland emphasizes the contextual differences between (i) the SCG where the foundations for the discussion in Book 3 of that work were philosophical determinations and proofs found in the earlier books of that work and (ii) the approach of the ST which is essentially and professedly a book of theology. But is this really as profoundly true as Wieland seems to assert it? Let’s be on the watch for it.
After considering the question above, we will go on to consider teachings in Qq 1-3. But this consideration will not be in quite the order of the texts.
By that last remark I mean to indicate that rather than considering the texts in the order in which they appear, for each Question I want to begin with consideration of the last article since that will display for us the goal toward which Aquinas reasons for each question. Perhaps it is not always true that the final article of any question in the works of Aquinas is the culminating point toward which prior articles are pointing. Still, in this case I think we can profit from considering each Question first from the consideration of the final article and then considering how each of the prior articles in the question contribute to the reasoning in the concluding article.
There is also some merit from considering in a general way how Questions 1-2 contribute to the goals of Question 3.
By that I mean that we should appreciate that Question 3 deals with just what happiness is for human beings as intellectual beings. This focuses on the object to be attained in happiness which is the essence of God noetically apprehended in the visions of God’s essence. There God Himself is the end to be attained. Question 1 was more about consideration of the nature of human beings and the end for human beings as human beings (though in its last article it is established that God is not just the end for human beings). Question 2 again considers human beings and the various ends that are open to humans with a view to establishing whether happiness is found intrinsic to human operations or must be found in something extrinsic to the human being.
With this perspective on the order of the Questions in mind, let’s proceed to Question 1.
This question consists of eight (8) articles, concluding with an article on “Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?”
In Q1, A8 he reaches the more universal conclusion that God is not only the end of human beings but the end of all created reality. Hence, the case for human beings is just a instance of how all creatures have God as their end toward which they tend in ways varying with their natures. Of course, intellectual beings in this differ radically from non-intellectual created entities since what has intellect also has will for Aquinas.
With what is to be established in Q1, A8, in mind, let’s return to Q1, A1.
In Q1, A2, in the response Aquinas makes the important distinction between acts of human beings and distinctively human acts. The latter concerns those acts which are specifically those of a human being employing reason and will, that is, employing deliberation and “free will” (liberum arbitrium). And here he defines “free will” as “the faculty and will of reason.” Human actions are those in which reason and will are use, while actions of humans (such as scratching a beard, an example he uses elsewhere following Avicenna’s discussion of human teleology) may be actions done by humans but perhaps do not have a distinctly rational part to them. As he puts it, “they are not properly to man as man.”
His purpose here is to establish that reason and will in relation to some end as a desired good indicate that human beings act for an end in the fullest sense when they deliberate by means of reason and decide voluntarily by means of will in regard to what is good.
In Article 2, “Whether it is proper to the rational nature to ac for an end?”, Aquinas explains that the first cause in any action is the end as final cause for the action by any agent. But what is called an agent properly “does not move except out of intention for an end”.
But all things have ends, some moving by ends that they determine for themselves by rational intellect and will, some moving by ends determined for them in their natures by some external cause.
The latter move to an end by a natural inclination, that is, by an inclination built into their natures which as such is irresistible for them. These do not have knowledge (are not intellectual) and so cannot act by will. Hence, these are instruments of God in the fullest sense. “[A]ll things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine Will.” (Rep to Obj 3)
Rational animals, however, are able to choose their ends, sometimes making good choices, other times making poor choices.
For Article 3 it is asked, “Whether human acts are specified by their end?”
Note that for his response here (and elsewhere) he holds that the natures of things are determined in their species by their forms and clearly states “it is the definition that shows the specific nature.”
“[T]he object of human will is the good and the end,” he writes, and the principle of action is the end. That is, the end follows upon the nature of the thing. But, of course, since humans have reason and will they are able to choose freely the ends they pursue. A disordered human being may have a natural end from its nature but it is open to being distracted into pursuing ends which are not fully in accord with its nature.
ST Ia IIae Q 1 A4
The conclusion of A 3 indicating that there are specific ends for human beings qua human beings (as well as for every nature in view of its species and manifested in its definition), leads to the issue of A 4, “Whether there is one last end of human life?”.
(Again, keep in mind whether his reasoning is philosophical following what has been established earlier by philosophical reasoning, e.g. the existence of God as will, good, intellect and intentional creator of the natures of things, or whether his reasoning here is theological.)
ST Ia IIae Q 1 A4
In the Response of A 4 Aquinas reasons that there cannot be an indefinite and ending procession of prior ends. If the ultimate end is removed or otherwise unavailable, all the intermediate ends will be made null and void.
Aquinas distinguishes the order of intention and the order of execution (surely following Aristotle albeit with different terminology) indicating the second is the first in action and the first is the goal and so first in intention. The first in intention is the last to be attained, the first in execution is last in the formation of the intention even if the first beginning in action. And neither of these can be infinite. Why?
There is one last end for humans and that is God, and because of that the intermediate ends also exist without being infinite and unrealizable.
ST Ia IIae Q 1 A5
Hence, there is one last end and many intermediate ends. But A 5 considers “Whether one man can have several last ends?”
In his Response he rejects the possibility of differing last or final ends for human beings because human appetite cannot be for different ultimate perfections.
First Aquinas indicates the disorder in the soul if there are a plurality of ultimate ends since this would mean that when one ultimate end is reached another is yet to be reached, which undermines the conceptual content of the term ultimate end.
Second, though he does not put it in this way, the disorder of the form and the species with regard to its end specified in its definition is part of this consideration. More directly, however, he indicates that there would be confusion among the appetites for what is desired, since there must be one ultimate goal of a rational appetite, not several. That is, it needs to be one.
Third, thinking in similar ways, Aquinas writes, “Since . . . all things that can be desired by the will belong, as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.”
ST Ia IIae Q 1 A6
Article 6 asks, “Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?”
Now, before we proceed, let’s think about this and raise the question of whether the answer has already been provided implicitly in what has gone before such that we need only analyze what preceded for us to attain the answer in this article.
Simply put, every thing has a good that follows in its nature; things that have intellect have will and so these things will the last end at least implicitly even if they can be distracted by weakness and diverted to lesser imperfect ends.
He writes,
“First, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.”
ST Ia IIae Q 1 A7
Now note how the reasoning of Article 7 follows from what has already been established.
A 7 has the title, “Whether all men have the same last end?”
Two things should be considered: (i) the nature (ratio, ‘aspect’) of the last end itself, and (ii) that in which the last end is realized. (Aristotle in De Anima Book 2 speaks of final causality as involving (i) that at which something aims and (ii) the being for whose good the end is achieved.) All human beings (i) “desire the fulfillment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfillment in which the last end consists” but (ii) that which they attain and realize can be much less since what is attained may not be the proper end but rather some lesser good than the ultimate good appropriate to human beings as intellectual.
ST Ia IIae Q 1 A8
(Has the account thus far been theological or has it been a philosophical analysis of accepted conceptual meanings and a drawing out of their senses through analytical thinking?)
The title of A 8 is, “Whether other creatures concur in that last end?”
Distinguishing (via Aristotle) between (i) the end as that for which and (ii) the end as that by which, Aquinas reasons easily that God is the end as (i) and that (ii) the acquisition of that end is through knowing and loving God on the part of rational intellectual creatures: “For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, insofar as they share in the Divine likeness, in as much as they are, or live, or even know” (in some extended sense of ‘to know’, I add.)
ST Ia IIae Q 2 & Q2 A8
Q 2 also has 8 articles the last of which is “Whether [man’s happiness consists] in any created good?”
Aquinas’s conclusion is negative, as we must expect. He writes,
“It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which satisfies the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can satisfy man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: “Who satisfies thy desire with good things.” Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.” (tr. mod. underlined)
Now note the form of this response. Up to the confirming citation of Ps. 102, the entire discussion of Aquinas follows on the basis of the philosophical analysis that preceded.
The only thing that is contingent in what he states is the question of whether it is altogether true that “the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true.”
And this takes us all through the issue of the ultimate object of the will, through the issue of the ultimate end of all created things, through to the issue of whether all things are created by God, and whether God is intellect and will such that God creates with intention and purpose and so places in each created thing a desire for its ultimate end and perfection, namely, God. But that has all been established philosophically earlier.
ST Ia IIae Q 2 A1-7
Now that we have seen how Aquinas draws the consequences of is previous discussion to conclude in A 8 that there is no created good that can constitute a human being’s ultimate happiness, we can quickly look to Articles 1-7 more easily. (Note Aquinas is to some extent following NE 1.5 in this analysis.)
Article 2 asks, “Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth?” which receives a negative answer after a distinction between natural wealth and artificial wealth. Neither of these satisfies as ultimate happiness. A key to this is mentioned in the response to objection 3: “The desire for natural riches is not infinite,” and so not what the human seeks. And the desire for artificial riches is without end or infinite but not infinite in the way that the desire for the ‘sovereign good; as possessed is infinitely demanding to a human being.
Article 3 asks, “Whether man’s happiness consists in honors?” but for Aquinas such a thing is only a part of happiness, a share of happiness, though certainly not “man’s perfect good.” Of course, honor is a consequence of esteem by others and not in our full control, as discussed in Aristotle. (See Aquinas A 3, resp to objections 2 & 3.) Here Aquinas writes in the Response,
“It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.”
In response to objection 2, Aquinas writes, “Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent.”
Hence, honor is not ultimate human goodness.
Much the same follows for Article 3, “Whether man’s happiness consists in fame or glory” to which Aquinas remarks in the Response,
“Man’s happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists “in being well known and praised,” as Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God’s knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known.
“Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another’s happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man’s good depends on God’s knowledge as its cause. And therefore man’s beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Ps. 90:15,16: “I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.””
Does the reasoning follow philosophically or only theologically? Does the theological reference of Ps. 90 serve as a confirming proof of the reasoning somehow? What is its function?
A 4 asks, “Whether man’s happiness consists in power?” and again the response must be negative. The reasoning again seems to be philosophical.
Power is a principle and a tool but does not have the nature of the last end which is complete happiness. Further, it can be use for good or bad, but happiness is proper to a human being and so is only good and for good. “Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.” There is no need for us to go through in detail here the rest of the Response though it is philosophically interesting and worth study.
A 5 asks, “Whether man’s happiness consists in any bodily good?”
Isn’t the response obvious from what has already been reasoned?
First, human beings have their perfection not in the body but in the will and intellect or reason; hence, “it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of mans’ reason and will cannot be the preservation of man’s being” (in the body, I would add).
Second, as per Aristotle De Anima 2.1 and following, the body exists for the same of the soul and the soul is the formal, efficient and final cause of the body. Aquinas writes in his own voice, “[All] goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently, happiness, which is man’s last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.”
A 6 asks, “Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure?”
Isn’t the response yet again obvious from what has already been reasoned?
In the Response Aquinas writes,
“Because bodily delights are more generally known, “the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them” (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them . . . Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man’s happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.”
But body does not bring ultimate human good, for, as we have seen repeatedly, the fulfillment of a human being is through its highest powers of reasoning and intellect.
“Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that “all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand.” And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.”
A 7 asks, “Whether some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness?”
In his Response Aquinas again draws on Aristotle’s of the end as what is desired and what is attained. The soul is a potentiality for knowing. The soul is not the end in the first sense but its realization in knowledge of the highest good does take place in the soul and is the perfection of the soul itself. To paraphrase Aquinas, happiness does belong to the soul in this latter way but it is brought to this fulfillment only through something external to the soul which the soul comes to have as the object of its knowing.
And finally we come to Q 2 A 8 which we considered earlier with its conclusion:
“It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which satisfies the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can satisfy man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: “Who satisfies thy desire with good things.” Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.” (tr. mod. underlined)
Has reached this conclusion theologically or philosophically?
ST Ia IIae Q 3 overview
Question 3 is focused on just what is happiness and consists of eight (8) articles.
As I did with Questions 1 & 2, here I want to begin with consideration of the last article of Q 3 which likewise consists in a culmination of the Question.
Let’s look at some important parts of the text.
The title of A 8 is “Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?”
From our earlier studies we know that ultimate human happiness will be reasoned to consist in just that, the vision of the divine essence.
ST Ia IIae Q 3 A 8
Let’s look carefully at the entire Response in A 8:
“I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause “what it is”; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is.
Let’s look carefully at the entire Response in A 8: continued
“Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, “what it is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
Let’s look carefully at the entire Response in A 8: continued
“If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than “that He is”; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists, as stated above (Articles [1],7; Question [2], Article [8]).”
Let’s now return to articles 1-7.
A 7 has the title, “Whether happiness is something uncreated?”
For consideration of the Response of Aquinas, let’s first turn to Aristotle, De Anima 2.4, 415b1-2:
“The phrase ‘for the sake of which’ is ambiguous; it may mean either the end to achieve which, or the being in whose interest, the act is done.” (J. A. Smith, tr, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, v. 1, 1984)
Phrased another way, the notion of end includes both that which is aimed at and the perfection of the being in the attainment of the end of the action. E.g. John aims his efforts at perfect health and realizes in himself some perfection of health by doing so.
In the achievement of the end, some benefit is enjoyed by John.
In the case of seeking happiness, God is the end sought to be attained and the attainment is the perfection and completion of the human being in attaining God.
To reach this conclusion Aquinas uses the Aristotelian notion of a twofold end of (i) what is desired and (ii) what is possessed in the fulfillment of having the end, of achieving the end.
Let’s look at this in the text of Aquinas.
“In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.”
A 2 asks, “Whether happiness is an operation?”
Another way to put this it to ask whether it is an activity. (Aristotle)
For Aquinas happiness is not something consequent upon an activity as is pleasure nor is it a disposition (‘habit’). Rather, it is an operation or activity of the soul in accord with virtue, in particular with intellectual virtue in contemplation since human beings are in their fullest nature as rational beings exercising intellect. And this is something that comes to be in a human being as a fulfillment of actuality in the activity of knowing God.
Aquinas writes,
“In so far as man’s happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness is man’s supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man’s last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it “second act” (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be “for its operation” (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man’s happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.”
And let’s take a close look at Aquinas’s reply to Objection 4:
“Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued.
“And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man’s happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: “We call men happy, but only as men.” But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be “as the angels . . . in heaven” (Mt. 22:30).
Clearly enough, the ultimate perfection in operation cannot be had in the present life in the body since, as Aristotle notes, human beings tire and cannot be carrying out theoretical contemplation continuously without stop.
A 3 is entitled, “Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?”
After indicating that happiness can belong to something (1) essentially, (2) antecedently and (3) consequently, Aquinas rejects the notion of it being an operation of the sensitive part essentially since the conjoining with God is immaterial, not sensual in its own right.
Still, he does allow for it to be antecedently involved since intellect naturally requires the senses for its operation and for it to be consequently involved because of the resurrection.
Still, “the operation whereby man’s mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.”
A 4 is entitled, “Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?”
In his Response Aquinas distinguishes the essence of happiness and the proper accident of it which is the delight connected to it. Its essence consists in the attainment of the end in actuality, which is not an act of will but an act of intellect. Will may direct a human being toward the end, but the end is the activity and actuality of intellectual apprehension of God.
He writes, “For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained. So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect; but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will.”
Note also his reply to Objection 4:
“Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for “naught is loved save what is known,” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.”
A 5 is entitled, “Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?” (Generally I prefer ‘theoretical’ to ‘speculative’.)
His response is that it is of the speculative / theoretical intellect for three reasons:
1. It has to be an operation of the highest human power in relation to the highest object. This is an operation of intellect in the activity of realizing itself as theoretical intellect in the contemplation of divine things, the operation which is “most proper to man and most delightful to him.”
2. This intellectual contemplation is for its own sake while the practical is for the sake of action.
3. By the speculative / theoretical intellect the human intellect shares something with God and the angels with a likeness in happiness.
Aquinas concludes the Response writing, “Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.”
Note also the following:
From reply to Objection 1: “But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and “information”; which is a much greater likeness.”
From reply to Objection 2: “The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth.”
And from reply to Objection 3:
“But since man’s last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man’s happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.”
A 6 is entitled, “Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?”
Since we have discussed Averroes and the confusion in the Latin tradition regarding his teachings on knowing and ultimate happiness, we should look carefully at the Response of Aquinas.
But please keep in mind the interpretation of Averroes which I provided earlier since, in my view, the real doctrine of Averroes is that happiness consists in the consideration of God and all the beings of the universe through the tools available to human beings in the speculative / theoretical sciences. Recall the quotation of Averroes regarding the “Sharī‘ah” or religious law of the philosophers.
A 6, Response:
“As stated above (Article [2], ad 4), man’s happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
“Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
“Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man’s final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown (FP, Question [88], Article [2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man’s happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.”
A 7 is entitled, “Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?”
We have encountered this issue before in the SCG so it is not surprising that Aquinas holds that perfect happiness is not in the partial perfection of the intellect through the consideration of truths of lower things. Perfect fulfillment is only in contemplation of the Being and Essence of God alone. Still, he allows, there is some imperfect happiness in contemplation of angels.
Now we make our own reditio or return to A 8 which was discussed at the beginning of this video.
Complete fulfillment and perfection in knowing the ultimate object of human desire, God, is not a knowing that God exists (demonstration quia) but rather is grasping or apprehending God in his essence which reveals something of just what God is in Himself. It reveals to the human intellect something of the very essence of God and the nature of divine activities.
In seeing the very essence of God perfect happiness is attained in fulfillment with the active knowing of the Divine Essence in a complete return.
See Video 13 on QQ 4-5
ST Ia IIae Q 4 overview
Question 4 is focused on what is required for happiness and consists of eight (8) articles.
For Questions 1-3 I started with the final article of each but that does not work as well in this case, so I begin with the first and proceed in order through to the end. We should note the important role of delight and his explanation of just what this is. (Note the similarity with Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure as something consequent upon happiness and not itself the end sought.)
Also take note of the restricted sense of “comprehension” as well as the importance of rectitude of will.
Regarding articles 5-8 note that all concern goods needed for the imperfect happiness of human life on earth, but are not needed for the perfect happiness found in the vision of God.
Let’s proceed with A1, Whether delight is required for happiness?
Aquinas distinguishes four senses in which something may be necessary:
“as a preamble and preparation”
“as perfecting”
“as helping it from without”
“as something attendant on it”
Delight is necessary as something “attendant on” or consequent upon the attainment of happiness. Put another way, we must do the operation or activity of happiness (intellectual vision of God) and then as a consequence of the activity, the delight — which is a fulfillment of the appetite, movement and desire of the will now no longer restless but motionless — comes subsequently.
As he says in response to Objection 2: “The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.” Of course, this is because the sight of God is ultimate fulfillment in happiness.
Note how he draws on Aristotle in the response to Objection 3: delight (pleasure in Arist.) can be a distraction but in reality it is not the end and fulfillment that happiness is.
A2: Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
Here Aquinas expands on what was implicit in the previous article and more explicitly draws on Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure to explain his own doctrine regarding delight. He explains that “delight consists in a certain repose of the will.”
And as already indicated, the operation of highest intellectual apprehension of God as the Good is the fulfillment of the will in every way, so he writes, “Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.”
A2: Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
The response to Objection 1 follows Aristotle again: “delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.”
The response to Objection 2 reminds us that only intellect apprehends the universal good so it is directed to its fulfilling operation, not something consequent to the operation. The senses seek delight in things of the world and do not apprehend the universal good but only particular goods.
The response to Objection 3 brings in the notion of Charity / caritas / love: “delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.”
A3: Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
We need to identify what must be set in order for the end of happiness. In the case of our intellect, we need to have the end pre-exist in the intellect, however imperfectly that may be, so that we know what we seek. In the case of the will (recall Aristotle 9.8 on self-love), there must be a first movement towards something and a relation of lover to beloved. He then writes that this is threefold,
“For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is
impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for.
A3: Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
(continued from previous page) “But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already stated (Article [2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.”
Note the explanation of ‘comprehension’ in the response to Objection 1:
“Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say ‘catch.’] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is necessary for Happiness.”
Comprehension here and in the responses to Objections 2 & 3 refers to the human intellectual (finite) grasp of the object of happiness, God.
A4: Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
Rectitude of the will involves a firm assent to the last end, something required for both before the attainment of happiness and in the attainment and possession of happiness (as an operation of intellect in the apprehension of God in vision):
“[F]inal Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God’s Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.”
A5: Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?
For imperfect happiness in this life, yes, it is necessary since humans develop intellect through use of the senses for the sake of intellect in use in practical and theoretical matters.
“But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): ‘While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord’; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: ‘For we walk by faith and not by sight.’
“Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God’s presence; wherefore the text continues: “But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord.” Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, “walk by sight,” seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.”
“Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the FP, Question [84], Article [7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the FP, Question [12], Article [3]. Wherefore, since man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.”
And note that he goes on in the rest of the Response to indicate the need for the body for the well being of the human being.
Notice that the responses to Objections make it clear that the soul can attain happiness and fulfillment in the absence of the body, which perhaps raises again the question for us of whether the body really is necessary for the afterlife. In his response to Objection 5 Aquinas writes,
“The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.”
A6: Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
Simply put, yes, with regard to the imperfect happiness of earthly life. Yet it is different for perfect happiness:
“But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that “for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal.” But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.
“Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), ‘if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven.’ Whence he concludes that, ‘when this body will no longer be ‘natural,’ but ‘spiritual,’ then will it be equaled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.’ Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that ‘God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fullness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature.’”
A7: Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
For imperfect happiness on earth, yes. For ultimate happiness in the vision of God, no.
A. 8: Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?
For imperfect happiness on earth, yes. For ultimate happiness in the vision of God, no. How could more than perfect happiness in the knowing of God require more? It is not necessary as such.
ST Ia IIae Q 5
Question 5, “Of the attainment of happiness” has 8 articles. Let’s proceed through them in their written order highlighting key notions & issues. You will note, however, that much follows simply from what has already been established.
A1: “Whether man can attain happiness?”
Simply put, yes, through the intellect:
“The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof.
“But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the FP, Question [58], Article [3]; FP, Question [79], Article [8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.”
A2: “Whether one man can be happier than another?
Yes: “As stated above (Question [1], Article [8]; Question [2], Article [7]), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another.”
A3: “Whether one can be happy in this life?
Yes, but not perfectly:
“First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a “perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes every evil, and fulfills every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
“Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the FP, Question [12], Article [11]. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.”
Note the response to Objection 2: happiness is imperfect if it is not had in the ultimate object, God; and all human happiness is imperfect if compared with that of God Himself.
Here Aquinas responds to Origen on the idea that perfect happiness can be lost.
For Aquinas, once seen, the Divine Essence is known as ultimate happiness and can never be willed against. That is analytic.
One cannot lose it by one’s own accord and there is no agent that can take it away once it is had.
A5: “Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?”
Sure, imperfect happiness but not perfect happiness:
“Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Question [63]). But man’s perfect Happiness, as stated above (Question [3], Article [8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God’s Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the FP, Question [12], Article [4]. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that “it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance.”
“But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.” And note the response to Objection 1:
“Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. “For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves” (Ethic. iii, 3).”
A6: “Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?”
Angels and others can be helpful in guiding human beings toward happiness.
“but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.”
A7: “Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?”
None can necessitate it but, yes, they can help in the formation of character:
“Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Question [4], Article [4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, “of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several.”
“Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in the FP, Question [62], Article [5]; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.”
A8: “Whether every man desires happiness?”
Yes, but human can be confused about the choice of mediate ends toward ultimate happiness and so go astray by weakness of will and pursuit of the fulfillment of desires as particular goods.
“Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above (Articles [3],4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one’s will be satisfied. And this everyone desires.
“Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.”
Further remarks on ultimate happiness and the role of Aquinas in the Latin tradition’s misunderstanding of the teachings of Averroes.
Aquinas discussed the issue of ultimate human happiness in seeing God face-to-face or per essentiam in Commentary on the Sentences, Book 4, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1. There he recounts the views of the philosophers.
For that he was using Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima book 3, comment 36.
He does this again in De veritate, Q. 18, a. 5 ad 8.