Topic: Logos, Logic and Metaphysics
This In-Person Conference is intended to provide a formal occasion and central location for philosophers and scholars of the Midwest region (and anywhere elsewhere) to present and discuss their current work on Aristotle and his interpreters in ancient and medieval philosophy.
Please note: Plans are for an in-person conference. We will switch to a hybrid or fully online format only in the event of a significant surge in local Milwaukee area COVID infection rates. If a presenter selected for the conference program is later barred from travel due to COVID infection rates in the home country or region, we will arrange for an online presentation.
Registration: Contact Prof. Owen Goldin (Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu), Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
Presented by the Marquette Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy & the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group (AAIWG) with the support of the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University
Seventeenth Annual Marquette Summer Seminar on Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition
DATE: 19-21 June 2023
Beaumier Conference Center B-C
Raynor Memorial Library
PRESENTERS: Established Scholars: send a title and tentative abstract (not exceeding 500 words); Graduate Students: send a title, abstract (not exceeding 500 words) and have your faculty advisor or dissertation director email indicating that you are doing professional level work. (This need not be a full recommendation.) Send applications to:
CLOSING DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS: 15 February 2023
The Organizing Committee will select presenters on the basis of promise of quality of proposals (title and abstract) and scholarly record as the primary criteria. Presenters selected will be asked to confirm their participation by registering and paying the conference fee ($45).
PROGRAM ANNOUNCED: March 15, 2023 or earlier
ATTENDING ONLY: Send Registration check with name, address, academic affiliation.
CONFERENCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED FOR ALL PRESENTERS AND ATTENDEES
(fees cover breakfasts, refreshments, picnic dinner one night)
Advance Registration ($40 by check) Deadline: May 1, 2023 (except for presenters who must confirm earlier)
NOTE => After May 1 Registration only at the door: $50 cash.
CHECKS SHOULD BE MADE OUT TO: Marquette University
(Fees are waived for Marquette students, faculty and staff for on-campus events only.)
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Registration Form.
=> ALL ATTENDEES (including the Marquette community) are asked to register.<=
NAME:
TITLE:
ACADEMIC AFFILIATION:
ADDRESS:
EMAIL ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE:
CHECK NUMBER:
(Registration fees are waived for members of the Marquette community.)
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Print the Registration Form above and send your check made out to “Marquette University” to:
Owen Goldin
Philosophy Department
Marquette University
P.O. Box 1880
Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
For housing options, see the bottom of this webpage.
Conference Schedule 2023
All sessions will be held in the Beaumier Conference Center in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.
For a campus map, click https://www.marquette.edu/campus-map/marquette-map.pdf
Monday 19 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: Richard Taylor, Marquette University, “Ibn Sina / Avicenna and the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas: Foundations and Critical Innovations”
10:20-11:35 am: Karen Taliaferro, Arizona State University, “Averroes on Human and Divine Intellect: A Window into his Islamic Writings”
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: Hashem Morvarid, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Avicenna’s Account of Divine Simplicity Revisited”
2:20-3:35 pm: Seth Kreeger, Marquette University, “The Avicennian Background to William of Auvergne: Anticipating Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Being”
3:40-5:00 pm: Paul Quesnel, Marquette University, “And the Wisdom to Know the Difference: Grace and Nature in Aquinas’s Epistemology”
6:00 pm Picnic This Evening! Carpooling available.
Tuesday 20 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: Owen Goldin, Marquette University, “Adverbs in Aristotle”
10:20-11:35 am: Ignacio De Ribera-Martin, The Catholic University of America, “Philosophy and the Homonymy of Metaphors in Aristotle”
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: Eric D. Perl, Loyola Marymount University, “Aristotle the Eleatic”
2:20-3:35 : Ian McCready-Flora, University of Virginia, “Precision and Security — Aspects of Aristotle’s Epistemic Psychology”
3:40-5:00 pm: Usha Nathan, Louisiana State University, “Knowing Particulars”
Dinner suggestions will be provided at the meeting. Restaurants in downtown Milwaukee (click HERE)
Wednesday 21 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: Xin Liu, Nanjing University, “A Historical Investigation on Classification of Quantity and Classification of Mathematics: Aristotle, Ammonius, and Avicenna” (Video presentation online)
10:20-11:35 am: Nicola Cirulli, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University – Milan, Italy, “Λόγος as «a significant voice»: a case for audism in Aristotle?”
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: Gregory Sadler, Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design, “Logos, Moral Qualities, and Human Nature: Apprehension, Communication, Community, and Conflict.”
2:20-3:55 pm: William Cox, DePaul University, “The Improper and Indirect Object of Metaphysics: Entia Rationis and Supertranscendental Being in Suarez’s Disputations”
Dinner suggestions will be provided at the meeting. Restaurants in downtown Milwaukee (click HERE)
Interested in dinner (self-pay) at the Fox and Hounds Restaurant 30 miles north of Milwaukee? If so, you are also invited to my home on nearby Friess Lake for lakeside drink before dinner. We will discuss this option and ride-sharing on Monday at the conference. Richard Taylor
Presentation Abstracts
Cox, William. DePaul University, “The Improper and Indirect Object of Metaphysics: Entia rationis and Supertranscendental Being in Suarez’s Disputations”
Abstract
In the first of his Metaphysical Disputations, Francisco Suárez argues that beings of reason (entia rationis) are excluded from the subject matter or object of metaphysics, which is the science of real being (ens reale). In his final disputation, he argues that an account of beings of reason can belong to no other science, and indeed, that such an account is a necessary component of metaphys- ics. Scholars disagree regarding how this can be the case. Some, like Jean-François Courtine, John Doyle, and Olivier Boulnois, argue that Suárez’s metaphysics is a supertranscendental science, having as its object a concept of being common to real beings, which include the traditional tran- scendentals, and beyond them, beings of reason. Others, like Jan Aertsen and Rolf Darge, argue that such an interpretation contradicts Suárez’s repeated assertions that there is no concept of being univocal to real being and merely rational being.
I propose to reframe the terms of this debate, and in so doing, to contribute to resolving it. The latter group of authors is right to insist that beings of reason do not belong to the object of Suárez’s metaphysics. In this sense, he does not forward a supertranscendental science. But the former group of authors is right to emphasize the commonalities that Suárez attributes to real beings and beings of reason. In this sense, he does adopt a supertranscendental perspective in his study of real being. Most significant on this count is Suárez’s repeated affirmation that there are cases in which it is impossible to make real being intelligible absent the use of beings of reason, as in the explication of the concept of real being itself. The transcendental properties of being, namely one, true, and good, do not posit a proper real essence and so count as beings of reason. Nevertheless, Suárez affirms, they are our only mode of rendering the essence of real being intelli- gible to us. Still other comparisons of real being to logical second intentions like definition, genus, and species, as well as to negations and privations, and even to fictional and chimeric beings, abound throughout the Disputations. All in all, while Suárez’s metaphysics may not have a super- transcendental object, it is nevertheless a supertranscendental science.
I begin the paper with a brief recapitulation of the scholarly debate concerning Suárez’s metaphysics as a supertranscendental science. I then survey the various passages in which Suárez explicitly excludes beings of reason from the proper object of metaphysics. Finally, I reconstruct the various modes in which Suárez mobilizes beings of reason to render the proper object of meta- physics intelligible.
Cirulli, Nicola. Vita-Salute San Raffaele University – Milan, Italy, “Λόγος as «a significant voice»: a case for audism in Aristotle?”
Abstract
In the fourth chapter of De Interpretatione, Aristotle provides his famous definition of λόγος as «a significant voice, some part of which is significant in separation» (16b 26-27). Voice (φωνή) is defined in De Anima B 8 as «a particular sound made by something with a soul» (420b 5-6). Sound is the proper sensible of hearing (418a 10-14), and whoever lacks a sense cannot be affected by the action of the proper sensible of that sense (424b 3-18), nor can they have any imagination connected to that sense (427b 14-15). The consequence that would follow from these premises is that deaf people are incapable of λόγος, but Aristotle never draws this conclusion. Curiously, however, in the first chapter of De Sensu et sensibilibus, Aristotle claims that blind people are more intelligent (φρονιμώτεροι) than deaf people because per accidens hearing contributes more than sight to learning and reason (437a 12-18). Starting from this textual evidence, my presentation questions whether the Aristotelian theory of λόγος is exclusionary of deaf people. This particular problem is part of the general problem of whether Aristotle’s logic is psychologistic, as reported by Frege, or universal and necessary, as the previous philosophical tradition maintained. The usual translation of φρονιμώτεροι as «more intelligent» in the aforementioned passus from De Sensu hides the fact that Aristotle denies not only that deaf people can develop reason, but as well φρόνησις, wisdom, at the same degree as non-deaf people: in fact, he states that «per accidens, hearing makes the largest contribution to wisdom» (437a 11-12). Starting from the interpretation of the learning of virtue in women and slaves given by Marguerite Deslauriers in her recent Aristotle on Sexual Difference, I claim that the motives for the exclusion of deaf people from λόγος and φρόνησις can be found in Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. While women, children and slaves can become virtuous and develop natural reason if they receive teachings and admonitions from men, this cannot be the case for deaf people if those teachings and admonitions are given orally. The conclusion provides a necessary completion of Aristotle’s ethics and a challenge for the logical definition of λόγος, as well as an essential historical witness on the social condition of deaf people at the time of Aristotle. By saying that non-deaf people are φρονιμώτεροι than deaf people, Aristotle intends to acknowledge that the standard cultural model of transmission of knowledge poses a limit to the development of ethical virtues in deaf people due to posing a limit in their learning and impedes their development of dianoetic virtues because of the limit put in the learning of ethical virtues. The exclusion of deaf people from λόγος is therefore not necessary but incidental, and the definition of λόγος as a signifying voice, as pointed out by many interpreters across the Aristotelian tradition, is restrictive and partial.
De Ribera-Martin, Ignacio. The Catholic University of America, “Philosophy and the Homonymy of Metaphors in Aristotle”
Abstract
Homonymy is a common and important phenomenon of language. It lies at the intersection of Logos and Metaphysics: we use the same name (logos) for things that are (being) different. Within homonymy, we distinguish accidental homonymy (only the name is the same; there is nothing else in common) from non-accidental homonymy or analogy (although the two things named are different, they have something in common). It is the latter kind that has philosophical relevance. Thus, it is not surprising that Aristotle’s account and use of homonymy has attracted the attention of important scholars (Owens, Ackrill, Shields, Ward—to name a few), who have discussed some of the complexities involved and have contributed to understanding it better. In particular, the focus has been on Aristotle’s use of pros hen homonymy and on what has been called the homonymy principle. In two separate published papers, I have already discussed the non-accidental character of homonymy both in artistic representations (based on the common external figure or schêma) and in embryological development (because they already have the internal principle of development towards a specific telos, albeit in an incomplete way).
In this paper, I want to discuss another important use of homonymy in Aristotle, namely, the use of metaphors, which is a form of homonymy involving four terms (sometimes called analogy of proportion, in contrast to pros hen analogy). Indeed, key notions of Aristotle’s philosophy belong to this metaphorical category of homonymy. For example, Aristotle’s use of the notions of matter and form to refer to the internal principles of living beings is metaphorical, using the same word (form) to name two essentially different things (the internal formal principle and the external shape of an artifact): the form of a living substance stands to the living substance as the shape of an artifact stands to its material; and the same goes for the underlying, which stands to the form as the material stands to the shape of the artifact. This metaphorical use of homonymy is not an uncommon occurrence in Aristotle’s philosophy, but a frequent one concerning fundamental philosophical notions. For instance, he says that the soul is a having (entelecheia) analogous to being asleep (De an. II.1), that prime matter is the analogous underlying in the case of substantial change (Phys. I.7), that form is an energeia analogous to change (Metaph. IX), and that nous is a habit analogous to light (De an III.5). Is the use of these metaphorical names necessary or dispensable in philosophy, particularly in natural philosophy and metaphysics? What is the role of imagination and the external figure (schêma) in the use of these metaphorical logoi? Is the use of language based on metaphorical names warranted? These are some of the questions that I will raise and address in this paper.
Goldin, Owen, Marquette University, “Adverbs in Aristotle”
Abstract
Contemporary symbolic first order logic makes a sharp distinction between subjects, the items in our “universe of discourse”, and predicates, what we say about them. We quantify over subjects, not predicates. There is no consensus on how to formalize adverbs. Ontological commitments are read off of the syntax of symbolized logic; accordingly there is no consensus on the ontological status of adverbs. Must they be included in our ontology, as Donald Davidson suggests? Or can their occurrence be adequately reduced to standard subject/predicate form?
The ontological distinction between subject and predicate, of course, has its historical and conceptual roots in the metaphysics of Aristotle, though Aristotle’s essentialism demands a certain blurring of the distinction (as certain essential predicates are ontologically identified with the basic subjects, substances). Aristotle never faces the problem of the ontological status of adverbs. However, the ontological analyses he does provide offer resources for reconstructing an answer, or rather answers. For Aristotelian metaphysics demands different answers for different kinds of adverbs.
The first case we might call simple adverbs. Suppose a woman changes from running quickly to running slowly. The activity of running is not a persisting subject for incompatible adverbs. Rather, the subject is the woman, and running quickly is one predicate, and running slowly is another. They are determinations of the generic accidental predicate “running.”
In a closely related case, which plays an important role in Aristotelian biology, the adverb qualifies an adjective which is a differentiation of a differentia of a substance. For example, “footed” differentiates the genus “animal” and “biped” differentiates “footed.” Though linguistically, “animal” is a noun, “footed” is an adjective and “bi-” (or perhaps “doubled”) can be considered an adverb, all are determinations of the subject, and, ontologically, are all to be understood as substances.
There is however one area in which Aristotle would take adverbs to be irreducible. These are “in actuality” and “in potentiality” – which qualify items in all categories. I explore why and how this pair of terms differs from those like “quickly” and “slowly.” I compare Aristotle’s account of actuality and potentiality with Davidson’s account of adverbs, contrasting the philosophical motivations between the two accounts.
Kreeger, Seth. Marquette University, “The Avicennian Background to William of Auvergne: Anticipating Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Being”
Abstract
Though the thought of Avicenna is often contrasted with that of Aquinas, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the Latin translation of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing (MH) for the 13th century Parisian philosophical context. While noting Avicenna’s original Arabic, a careful examination of the philosophical doctrines and terminology of the Avicenna Latinus shows that in three important regards the metaphysical thought of not only Aquinas, but also his predecessor William of Auvergne, is essentially dependent upon the thought of Avicenna. In particular, both William and Aquinas draw on MH I.5 to distinguish the sense of being as essence from that of existence. Both thinkers, and not merely the young Aquinas, are also influenced by MH V.1 for their understanding of essence in itself. Furthermore, both William and Aquinas adopt Avicenna’s argument in MH VIII.4 that if something’s essence is not its existence, its existence is either caused by its essence – which all three thinkers take to be impossible – or is caused by another, with such a series ultimately terminating in God who has being through his essence and which both Avicenna and William prefer to denominate (although Aquinas at times as well) by the title “Necessary Being.” Thus, not only is Avicenna one of the preeminent sources for Aquinas’ metaphysical thought, but in utilizing certain key aspects of Avicenna’s metaphysics Aquinas is preceded by William of Auvergne.
Liu, Xin. Nanjing University, “A Historical Investigation on Classification of Quantity and Classification of Mathematics: Aristotle, Ammonius, and Avicenna”
Abstract
In Cat. 6 (4b20-5b10), Aristotle makes three divisions of quantity. First, quantity is divided into discrete and continuous. Second, quantity is divided into the compositum whose parts have position in relation to one another and the compositum whose parts do not have position. Third, quantity is divided into per se and per accidens. I shall reveal that the first two divisions are not two unrelated diaireses but constitute a parallel division, since Porphyry, Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius, and Olympiodorus treat them as a whole and regard the whole as a parallel division. The same genus quantity is divided in parallel into the differentiae (διαίρεσις) ‘discrete–continuous’ and the parallel-differentiae (ἐπιδιαίρεσις) ‘the compositum whose parts have position–the compositum whose parts do not have position’.
I shall further argue that the parallel division causes a cross-division to occur, which Porphyry calls chiasmus (χιαστή). A chiasmus requires two pairs crossing each other. The differentiae and the parallel-differentiae are cross-combined, constituting a 2 x 2 chiasmus.
While Aristotle classifies quantity into four kinds using cross-division/chiasmus, Ammonius makes a fourfold division of quantity applying vertical division/diairesis (Ammonii in Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque voces 14.1-26). After dividing the genus quantity into the differentiae ‘discrete–continuous’ (διαίρεσις), Ammonius does not divide the same genus into parallel-differentiae (as Aristotle does) but divides the differentiae into sub-differentiae (ὑποδιαίρεσις). The continuous quantity (magnitude) is subdivided into ‘movable–immovable’; the discrete quantity (multitude) is subdivided into ‘the quantity by itself–the quantity related to number’.
Using diairesis, Ammonius divides quantity into four kinds: celestial bodies (continuous and movable), geometrical figures (continuous and immovable), numbers (discrete quantity by itself), and musical notes (discrete quantity related to number). Music studies notes, arithmetic studies numbers; geometry studies geometrical figures, and astronomy studies celestial bodies. Accompanying the fourfold classification of quantity, mathematics is classified into four sub-disciplines. Ammonius modifies Aristotle’s classification of quantity and corresponds the modified fourfold classification of quantity to Plato’s quarters of mathematics (Theaet. 145c7-d2).
In the Metaphysics of the Healing I.2, Avicenna uses diairesis and chiasmus to divide quantity into four kinds, two of which can be identified with the subjects of mathematics. Corresponding to the two kinds of subjects, numbers and magnitudes (aʿdād wa maqādīr), mathematics is classified into arithmetic and geometry. Nevertheless, Avicenna is not concerned with the classification of mathematics and the subjects of its sub-disciplines (as Ammonious does) because in his view, mathematics should not study its subjects but should investigate the specific properties of the subjects, given that the subjects have been posited. Avicenna believes that the scientific investigation should follow the model established by Aristotle in Analytica Posterioria, inferring specific properties from the posited subject. Based on demonstration, Avicenna reshapes the theoretical philosophy, shaping mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, into demonstrative sciences.
McCready-Flora, Ian. University of Virginia, “Precision and Security — Aspects of Aristotle’s Epistemic Psychology”
Abstract
According to Aristotle, human cognition can be, or fail to be, precise (akribês), with certain types of cognition inherently more precise than others. This notion, a philosophically rich mixture of functional psychology and normative epistemology, plays a crucial argumentative role throughout the corpus but has not received the right sort of systematic attention. This paper takes up an intriguing pattern in Aristotle’s use of the term: though his range of application includes everything from scientific knowledge to perception, Aristotle never calls belief (doxa) or imagination (phantasia) can be precise, nor more/less precise than other types of cognition, comparisons he does make among nous, epistêmê and perception.
The paper first sets out and briefly defends a proposal about cognitive precision: a cognitive process is precise just in case it (a) provokes no lingering doubt and (b) no mental state acquired or activated during the process imposes any significant likelihood that thought or action based on it will fail, such as by letting some falsehood creep into one’s picture of the world.
The paper turns then to passages from Categories 7, On Dreams 1, and Metaphysics Γ and Μ to explain, like so, why beliefs and imagination cannot be precise: some types of cognition entail an information-preserving causal link to their truth-makers. Call these “connections.” Belief and imagination are part of the causal nexus that connects a creature’s soul to the world, so they can track the truth, but their circumstances of creation and persistence lack this connection to their very truth-makers. Call them “responses” instead. Because responses lack such a connection, only connections produce no lingering doubt and introduce no risk of failure. This reveals the bounds of precision: cognitive precision is only possible through cognitive connection, which explains why sense-perception and knowledge are precise while belief and imagination are not.
Morvarid, Hashem. University of Illinois at Chicago, “Avicenna’s Account of Divine Simplicity Revisited”
Abstract
Divine Simplicity Thesis is one of the central doctrines of classical theism. It was endorsed by almost all great medieval philosophers of the Abrahamic religions, including Avicenna and Maimonides. However, it is far from clear what the thesis amounts to, particularly considering the absurdities that seem to result from the thesis. There have been numerous attempts by contemporary (mostly Christian) philosophers at making sense of the thesis (see, for instance, Stump, E. & Kretzmann, N. (1985) “Absolute Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy, pp. 353-382; Brower, J. (2008) “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy, pp. 3-30). However, most of these attempts have focused on the version of the thesis that was advocated by Christian medieval philosophers, particularly Thomas Aquinas. In this paper, I aim to focus on Avicenna’s version of the thesis, trying to make sense of it. To that end, I first explore different types of complexity that something can have in Avicenna’s system. Then I present and analyze Avicenna’s argument for denying all those complexities of God. After that, I examine the notoriously difficult question of how we should understand divine predications—such as “God is knowing,” “God is powerful,” “God is infinitely good,” etc.—such that they do not introduce complexities in God, and I discuss Avicenna’s response to the question. Finally, I consider some potential objections against Avicenna’ account of divine simplicity and respond to them.
Nathan, Usha. Louisiana State University, “Knowing Particulars”
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against the traditional interpretation of An.Pr.B.21, which takes (1) Aristotle’s distinction between two ways of knowing a proposition about a particular such as, “this mule is infertile,” as “potential” and “actualized” knowledge to be implicit and explicit knowledge respectively, and (2) understands implicit knowledge as knowledge of entailed propositions that are made explicit through deductive, i.e., syllogistic reasoning, involving the relevant universal (“all mules are fertile”). I contend that the traditional interpretation fails to explain why actualising said knowledge requires “perception” by Aristotle’s lights, and that the interpretation is incomplete at best.
In the positive second part of my paper, I propose that one way of knowing such a proposition is through knowing the relevant universal which involves a recognitional capacity. On my account, having “potential knowledge” here is in part having the ability to recognise the particular as falling under the universal and so knowing that “this mule is infertile.” Actualisation, i.e., recognition, occurs in an ongoing act of perception. So, strictly speaking, one can only have occurrent knowledge of propositions about particulars and this happens only when one is aware of the particular in an ongoing act of perception. I further explain this requirement as based in the changeability of the particular.
Perl, Eric D. Loyola Marymount University, “Aristotle the Eleatic”
Abstract
Aristotle is usually regarded as fundamentally opposed to Eleatic philosophy, due to its denial of motion and its failure to recognize that “being is said in many ways,” which he sees as the central error underlying Eleatic monism. But the many senses of ‘being’ are unified in relation to one focal meaning, which coincides with that of Parmenides; and all motion is caused by a first principle which perfectly satisfies that meaning, and which therefore matches Parmenides’ description of being. Nonetheless, the most insightful treatments of Aristotle’s metaphysics—De Koninck, Frede, Gerson, Kahn, Kosman, Lear—mention Parmenides only in passing or not at all. Hence the manifest affinity of Aristotle’s unmoved mover to Parmenides’ one being demands to be showcased and highlighted.
Parmenides establishes ‘intelligible’ as the only possible meaning of ‘being.’ This principle underlies Plato’s doctrine of being as form: forms are “completely being” in that they are perfectly intelligible, while sensible things have being to the extent that they have some share of form. Here Aristotle follows Plato: the focal meaning of being is οὐσία (“substance”), which signifies what a thing is and so constitutes its intelligibility. Sensible things are beings just insofar as they exhibit some form or οὐσία, which Aristotle reinterprets as act. Insofar as they involve an element of potency or matter, they are less than perfectly intelligible. Like Plato, Aristotle understands their partial unintelligibility as a deficiency of being.
Conversely, separate substance, as pure act, purely intelligible, perfectly satisfies the focal meaning of ‘being’ and so is being itself in the primary sense. As such it matches Parmenides’ description of being: just as purely intelligible and as such perfectly being, separate substance is unmoved, identically thinking and being, simple and indivisible. It is scarcely too much to say that Aristotle’s prime mover just is Parmenides’ one being, purged of any suggestion of spatiality. Aristotle says as much in De caelo, observing that the Eleatics’ account of being is true of divine separate substance, and that they erred not in their understanding of being itself, but rather in attributing its characteristics to nature, thereby obliterating the natural realm of motion and change.
The difference between Aristotle and the Eleatics therefore lies not in his understanding of being but in his account of nature. Natural things have some being just in that they have some share of what the unmoved mover purely is, that is, some substance, some act, some intelligibility. The actuality of all things, from the rotation of the heavens down to the motions of the elements, is their imperfect share and imitation of the self-reflexive intellection of intellection which is being itself. That “being is said in many ways” should therefore be taken not as a repudiation but as a refinement of Parmenides’ account of being, enabling Aristotle to ascribe some share of being to natural things while preserving the truth of Parmenides’ understanding of being itself in the full, focal, and primary sense.
Quesnel, Paul-Hervé. Marquette University, “And the Wisdom to Know the Difference: Grace and Nature in Aquinas’s Epistemology”
Abstract
The 20th century debate concerning the grace-nature distinction in Aquinas has left its mark on Thomistic philosophical theology. Among its many connected issues and implications, one which has received greater attention this past decade is the distinction between natural and supernatural epistemology. This paper combines the arguments of Taylor & Herrera 2005 with Murdoch 2014, to conclude that Thomas’s thought not only leaves room for, but in fact encourages, a role for grace in both supernatural and natural epistemology. The paper will also clarify the distinction between natural and supernatural epistemology by drawing from some of the work of Bernard Blankenhorn, O.P., alongside many other treatments of Aquinas’s teaching on grace and human nature. I insist that Thomas’s work is ineluctably theological when taken as a whole, and that our best access to the fulness of his teaching on the role of grace in epistemology, natural and supernatural, requires us to take his work as a whole.
Sadler, Gregory. Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design, “Logos, Moral Qualities, and Human Nature: Apprehension, Communication, Community, and Conflict”
Abstract
Aristotle notes in Politics book 1 that possession of logos opens up significantly expanded ranges of apprehension (aisthēsis) for human beings by comparison to other animals. Other animals register and signal the painful and the pleasurable. Human beings do as well, but also apprehend the useful and harmful, just and unjust, the good and the bad generally, and “all the others”, which would include the beautiful (or noble) and the ugly (or base). These are not simply qualities we register and communicate, but are also the bases for community or sharing (koinonia). In Rhetoric book 1, these opposed qualities are also what we human beings differ over and argue about. These paired opposites are also referenced as modalities of goodness or badness at multiple points in the Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotle is not unique in noting the importance of these moral qualities in human motivation, communication, community, argumentation, and conflict. References to, and distinctions between, the just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, useful and harmful, pleasant and painful, and good and bad are discussed in a number of Platonic dialogues. These paired moral qualities show up in the much later Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ works as “preconceptions” (proleipseis). Clarifying and properly applying these is one of philosophy’s main tasks and functions in his view.
My paper will bring together and interpret relevant passages from Aristotle’s works to develop a picture of the interconnected activities centered by moral qualities humans engage in, unfolding from our nature as rational and communicative animals (i.e. animals possessing logos). Plato’s and Epictetus’ viewpoints on the importance of these moral qualities to human life, motivation, community, culture, and conflict will also be discussed, providing points of comparison and contrast between Platonist, Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions. I will also examine several examples of how human beings come to differ over meaning and application of these moral qualities, getting them more or less right or wrong, and practical consequences that result.
Taliaferro, Karen. Arizona State University, “Averroes on Human and Divine Intellect: A Window into his Islamic Writings”
Abstract
Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is known equally, if differently, as a philosopher in the Aristotelian tradition and as one of the greatest thinkers in Islamic intellectual history. This bifurcated reception is due not least to the fact that his religious writings, such as the famous Incoherence of the Incoherence addressed to al-Ghazali, do not constitute philosophical writing, even if they sprinkle Aristotelian thought into their dialectic argumentation; Averroes, known to medieval Europe as “the Commentator” wrote on Aristotle, but “Ibn Rushd” wrote on matters of Islamic jurisprudence and divine law.
Nevertheless, there is conceptual overlap between both genres of his works, such as his treatment of the distinction between human and divine intellect, which is closely related to his philosophical treatments of the material intellect and the active intellect. Ibn Rushd begins his trilogy that includes the famous Decisive Treatise with a brief and often bemusing Epistle Dedicatory (traditionally known as “Appendix,” ḍamīma) that addresses God’s knowledge of particulars, which Ibn Rushd frames in the following terms: “If all of these [things] are in God’s knowledge…before they come about, are they in His knowledge the same before their coming about, or are they in His knowledge at the moment of their existence other than the way they are in His knowledge before they exist?”(Charles Butterworth, trans. and ed., and Averroes, Averroës: Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory [Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2008], 38.) The answer to this question distinguishes God’s knowledge from human knowledge; to Ibn Rushd, this is a necessary distinction if one is to avoid a faith-crippling dilemma.
Students of Ibn Rushd have heard a similar song, of course; his commentaries on the De Anima and on book lām of the Metaphysics deal extensively with human knowledge as it relates to the active intellect and material intellect. What is curious, though, is why he might foreground this issue in opening the much more substantial works of his trilogy on matters of Islamic law, theology and human wisdom (viz., the Decisive Treatise and the Uncovering of the Methods of Proof). In other words, why open a trilogy that essentially distinguishes different forms of human knowledge (whether through reason or revelation) with a statement on the distinction between divine and human knowledge?
I attempt to answer this question by reading the trilogy alongside Ibn Rushd’s philosophical treatment of the material and active intellects, relying principally on his long commentary on Metaphysics book Lām (Tafsīr mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa), and his commentaries on the De Anima. Ultimately, the effort is also intended supplement our understanding of how Ibn Rushd’s more popular writings on matters of religion and reason cohere with his philosophical writings.
Taylor, Richard. Marquette University, “Ibn Sina / Avicenna and the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas: Foundations and Critical Innovations”
Abstract
This paper examines key points of the metaphysical thought of Ibn Sina / Avicenna accepted by Thomas Aquinas in the foundations of his metaphysical thought and also critical innovative adaptations made by Aquinas in crafting his own very distinctive teachings formed in his rejection of central portions of the reasoning of Ibn Sina / Avicenna.
Housing on the Marquette Campus and local hotel and other information 2023
Among the most convenient local hotels is the four-star Ambassador Hotel at 2308 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233, tel. 414-345-5008. Search for the best rates online
Do check http://www.ambassadormilwaukee.com. But rates are dynamic and change with demand, especially when there are many other summertime events ongoing in Milwaukee.
Some rooms are available at Marquette University
Room Commitment: Seven 2-bedroom suite-style units featuring two private bedrooms, each furnished with two extra-long twin beds.
Residence Facility:
Humphrey Hall, located at 1716 W. Wisconsin Ave., features air-conditioned sleeping rooms with a private bathroom. Rooms are furnished with extra-long twin bed(s), dresser(s), closet space, and desk(s)/chair(s). Bed and bath linens are provided. Additional Humphrey Hall amenities include a secured 24-hour front desk, complimentary internet, coin-operated laundry on each sleeping floor, vending machines and a common area to watch television or just relax. We regret that we are not able to provide wake-up calls or personal toiletry items.
The Desk Receptionist (DR) will provide each guest with a room key at check-in. To expedite the check-out process, please return the room key in the provided key envelope prior to departure.
Room Block Dates/Sleeping Room Summary:
Arriving June 18, 2023, departing June 22, 2023
Each shared 2-bedroom suite will accommodate 2 people, one guest per private bedroom.
Nightly Room Rates
Humphrey Hall
Two-bedroom suite
$84/night ($42 per person shared occupancy – one person occupying each bedroom)
Cut-Off Date
Cut-off date: May 18, 2023. Rooms requested after the cut-off date are subject to availability.
Standard check-in time: After 3 p.m.*
Standard check-out time: Prior to 10:30 a.m.*
*These times are based upon Central Standard Time.
Reservation Procedures
The method of reservation is Individual/Direct. Individuals are requested to email donna.wells@marquette.edu to secure a room reservation. Individuals should let the reservations assistant know they are associated with the Summer Seminar on Aristotle and The Aristotelian Traditions. Due to limited rooms in the conference block, it is highly recommended that a room reservation be made as soon as possible. The reservation deadline is no later than two weeks prior to arrival date.
Note that all suite-style, 2-bedroom units are shared occupancy with each guest occupying a private bedroom. The suite has one private bathroom. Please let the reservations assistant know if you have a suite-mate preference.
Guaranteed Reservations
Guests must confirm their room reservation with receipt of a check payable to Marquette University for the entire stay. Full payment must be received no later than 10 days prior to arrival date. Please provide an email address for invoicing purposes. Submit payment to:
Donna Wells
Alumni Memorial Union 407
1442 W. Wisconsin Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53233
No refunds, including instances involving early departures, will be issued after check payment has been submitted except in the case of illness, injury, medical or family emergency, or other extenuating circumstances and must be approved by the Director of Conference Services. Failure to check out at the posted time on the date of departure may result in a penalty fee.
Linen Service
Basic bed and bath linens are provided in guest rooms. Linen service includes one pillow, sheets/pillowcase, and one bath towel/washcloth per guest. Soiled towels/washcloths may be exchanged for fresh bath linens at the front desk.
Parking
Campus parking is available in the 16th Street Parking Lot (Structure 1) located at 749 N. 16th Street at a daily rate of $10 for every 24-hour period. Visitors enter the lot at 16th Street (northbound traffic) and exit at 17th Street (southbound traffic). Visitors pull a ticket when entering and paying for parking at the pay-on-foot station in the structure lobby or when exiting at 17th Street.Credit card payment (via MasterCard or Visa) is required. Cash is not accepted.
Guest Identification
For security purposes, each guest must be easily identified by the front desk attendant when entering the residence facility. The group should supply a lanyard/name badge (First Name/Last Name, Name of Conference or Program, Arrival Date to Departure Date must be indicated on the name badge) for all individuals in the Group.
Additional Policies
Rooms reserved under room blocks are not guaranteed to be in the same area of the residence hall. We will attempt to keep groups together, but at times circumstances prohibit this from happening.
Each guest is expected to leave his/her guest room in the same condition in which it was found at check-in. Any damage sustained to the room during the guest’s stay will be billed directly to the guest. Any damages noticed by a guest should be brought to the immediate attention of the desk staff.
Key Lockout and Replacement
Each guest must sign for her/her room key prior to check-in. There is a $10 lockout policy enforced for any guest who requires use of a lockout key to access his/her room. There is a $75 key replacement fee that is billed to the guest for any key that is lost or not returned at check-out. Rooms are re-keyed immediately for security reasons; therefore, we cannot issue refunds for guests who send in or return keys after check-out time.
Force Majeure
Neither party will be considered in default in the performance of its obligation under this Agreement if such performance is prevented or delayed by any cause which is beyond the reasonable control of the party affected. This includes severe weather, war, hostilities, revolution, civil commotion, acts of terrorism, zombie apocalypse, alien invasions, strikes, lockout, epidemic, pandemic, accident, fire, wind, or flood or because of any law, order, proclamation, ruling, regulation, or ordinance of any government or subdivision of government or because of any act of God (“Force Majeure”).
Indemnification
Group agrees that it will defend and fully indemnify UNIVERSITY against any loss, cost, damage, injury, or expense (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) that may be sustained or incurred by UNIVERSITY, its trustees, officers, employees, students or agents as a result of the Group, its employees, participants, agents or guests use of, or presence at, the licensed space. Neither party will be liable to the other for any indirect, incidental, special, or consequential damages of any kind whatsoever, including lost profits, even if advised of the possibility thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Group will not be responsible for indemnifying University against any loss caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the University, its trustees, officers, employees, agents, or contractors.
Compliance
All visitors to campus are required to comply with all UNIVERSITY policies, procedures, and health and safety measures in effect.This may include following campus procedures related to the COVID-19 pandemic or other community-wide epidemics or pandemics.
Conduct
All UNIVERSITY visitors are expected to show respect for order, personal and public property, and the rights of all individuals. UNIVERSITY is a community that consists of people of different backgrounds and beliefs. Conduct in violation of the rights of others will not be tolerated. Misconduct will be sufficient cause for removal from the UNIVERSITY. All guests staying in University Housing Facilities must comply with all University policies and procedures and health and safety measures in effect as well as any guidelines for University Facilities.
Smoking/Gambling
UNIVERSITY is a tobacco-free campus. This includes all indoor and outdoor campus spaces including campus buildings, grounds, exterior open spaces, green spaces, parking lots (including inside a vehicle if parked in a University lot), on-campus sidewalks (not bordering a city street), on-campus driveways and other paved areas, athletic facilities, practice facilities, and recreational spaces. Gambling of any nature is strictly prohibited on UNIVERSITY property.
Alcoholic Beverages
The possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by anyone under the age of twenty-one (21) is prohibited by Wisconsin law. Participants over the age of 21 may privately consume alcoholic beverages within their own rooms.
Drugs
The use, possession, distribution or sale of illegal drugs or narcotics is strictly prohibited. Non-compliance by any participant will result in immediate removal from the residence hall, dismissal from participation in activities on UNIVERSITY property and to prosecution.
Pets
No pets of any kind may be brought into or kept in a UNIVERSITY facility, except for service animals. If accommodations are required for a service animal, the Director of Conference Services must be advised in advance and approval granted.
Exclusivity
Many campus buildings are open to the public and serve a variety of functions. Though GROUP may have reserved space within a campus building, other space and access to the building will often be available to UNIVERSITY members or other program or camp guests. Special arrangements must be scheduled in advance and approved by the Director of Conference Services.
Reassignment
University reserves the right to reassign Group to alternate housing, dining hall, and conference space based on maintenance, safety, or other needs of UNIVERSITY.
Weapons Policy
The GROUP and its members are not permitted to: – Carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property except as expressly permitted by applicable state law.
– Openly carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property.
– Carry any weapons in any UNIVERSITY building or leased space or at any University special event marked with signage specifying “WEAPONS ARE PROHIBITED IN THIS BUILDING.”
– Store any weapons in a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property except in the vehicle’s glove compartment or trunk or encased such that the existence of the weapon is concealed. – Encased means completely zipped, snapped, buckled, tied or otherwise fastened, with no part of the weapon exposed. – Fail to lock a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property that contains any weapon when the GROUP member is not present in the vehicle.
– Possess unloaded ammunition on UNIVERSITY property.
– Imply possession of, threaten to use, display, brandish, use, or discharge a weapon on University property for any purpose or reason except lawful self-defense or lawful defense of others. – Fail to report timely to the UNIVERSITY Department of Public Safety the presence on University property of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy, unless doing so would subject the GROUP member or others to the threat of physical harm, or take other action in response to the presence of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy except for reporting the presence of the weapon to the University Department of Public Safety.
The GROUP members whose actions violate applicable State law with respect to the possession of weapons on UNIVERSITY property may be subject to criminal prosecution. GROUP members whose actions violate this provision will be asked to leave UNIVERSITY property immediately and may be subject to no-trespassing directives in the future. UNIVERSITY reserves the right to terminate this Rooms Agreement for one or more violations of this provision.