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A text on participation in Proclus (412–485), head of the Platonic Academy (435-485),
Proclus, Elements of Theology, E. R. Dodds, ed. tr. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1963, pp. 26-29:
PROP. 23. All that is unparticipated produces out of itself the participated; and all participated substances are linked by upward tension to existences not participated.
For on the one hand the unparticipated, having the relative status of a monad (as being its own and not another’s, and as transcending the participants), generates terms capable of being participated. For either it must remain fixed in sterility and isolation, and so must lack a place of honour ; or else it will give something of itself, whereof the receiver becomes a participant, whilst the given attains substantial existence as a participated term.
Every participated term, on the other hand, becoming a property of that particular by which it is participated, is secondary to that which in all is equally present and has filled them all out of its own being (aph’ heauton). That which is in one is not in the others ; while that which is present to all alike, that it may illuminate all, is not in any one, but is prior to them all. For either it is in all, or in one out of all, or prior to all. But a principle which was in all would be divided amongst all, and would itself require a further principle to unify the divided ; and further, all the particulars would no longer participate the same principle, but this one and that another, through the diremption of its unity. And if it be in one out of all, it will be a property no longer of all but of one. Inasmuch, then, as it is both common to all that can participate and identical for all, it must be prior to all: that is, it must be unparticipated.
SOPHIST 251A-B:
“We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional descriptions; we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say that he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.”
SOPHIST 253D. Division is part of dialectic:
“Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.”
THEAETETUS
Sophie-Grace Chappell, SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-theaetetus/#Con