This conference is in part made possible by funds from a Marquette University Way Klingler Fellowship.
Topic: “Aristotle and Aristotelians on pre-Aristotelian Theorizing”
What did Aristotle and those who followed in his path think that Aristotle’s predecessors were up to? Aristotle’s discussion of his predecessors in Meta. A, Physics I and GC are of special interest. In addition, possible questions include but are not restricted to the following. Did Aristotle and ancient and medieval Aristotelians understand pre-Aristotelian science as conforming to the Posterior Analytics? How did they understand ancient Greek geometry? How did they understand the explanatory strategy found in Plato’s Timaeus and other Platonic works? How did they understand the methods and principles of the Hippocratic writers? How did Arabic alchemy build on and respond to both Aristotle and Empedocles? How were the varieties of Aristotelian noetics integrated with Platonic ontology?
Opening Date For Submissions: 7 January 2025
Closing Date For Submissions: 15 February 2025
Announcement of Program: Mid-March 2025
Four (4) Special Invited Speakers: Daniel Graham, Brigham Young University (Emeritus); Katja Krause, Technische Universität Berlin; Eugene Garver, St. Johns University (Emeritus); John Walbridge, Indiana University.
Ten Contributed Papers: TBA
Organizing Committee: Owen Goldin, Richard Taylor, David Twetten
Presented by the Marquette Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy & the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group (AAIWG) with the support of the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University
This In-Person Conference is intended to provide a formal occasion and central location for philosophers and scholars of the Midwest region (and anywhere elsewhere) to present and discuss their current work on Aristotle and his interpreters in ancient and medieval philosophy.
Registration: Contact Prof. Owen Goldin (Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu), Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
Beaumier Conference Center B-C
Raynor Memorial Library
PRESENTERS: Established Scholars: send a title and tentative abstract (not exceeding 500 words); Graduate Students: send a title, abstract (not exceeding 500 words) and have your faculty advisor or dissertation director email indicating that you are doing professional level work. (This need not be lengthy but should be strongly supportive.) Send applications to:
The Organizing Committee will select presenters on the basis of promise of quality of proposals (title and abstract) and scholarly record as the primary criteria. Presenters selected will be asked to confirm their participation by registering and paying the conference fee ($50).
ATTENDING ONLY: Send Registration check with name, address, academic affiliation.
CONFERENCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED FOR ALL PRESENTERS AND ATTENDEES
(fees cover light buffet breakfasts, refreshments, picnic dinner one night)
Advance Registration ($50 by check) Deadline: May 1, 2024 (except for presenters who must confirm earlier)
NOTE => After May 1 Registration only at the door: $60 cash.
CHECKS SHOULD BE MADE OUT TO: Marquette University
(Fees are waived for Marquette students, faculty and staff for on-campus events only.)
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For housing options, see the bottom of this webpage.
Conference Schedule 2025
All sessions will be held in the Beaumier Conference Center in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.
For a campus map, click https://www.marquette.edu/campus-map/marquette-map.pdf
Wednesday 25 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
(1) 9-10:15 am: Prof. Brian Reese, Assistant Professor, University of Central Florida, “Aristotle on Protagoras and the Principle of Non-Contradiction”
(2) 10:20 – 11:35 Prof. Daniel W. Graham, Brigham Young University (Emeritus), “Origin Stories: Aristotle and the Presocratics”
12 noon -1:30 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
(3) 1:30-2:45: Peter Haskett, “Seeking “What-It-Is”: The “Socratic” Origins of Aristotle’s Formal Cause in Metaphysics A.6 & M.4”
Coffee 2:45 pm – 3 pm
(4) 2:00-3:15 pm: Professor Eugene Garver, St. John’s University (Emeritus, “Principles and Predecessors in Physics1”
(5) 3:20-4:25 pm: David Reed, Independent Scholar, “’The source of coming-to-be and passing-away of which everyone dreams but no one speaks’: Aristotle, GC Book II Ch ix
6:00 pm Picnic This Evening! Gordon Park, Covered Shelter. Carpooling available.
Thursday 26 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
(6) 9-10:15 am: Dr. Christopher Lutz, Duquesne University, “Aristotle’s Double Reception of Plato’s Phaedo”
(7) 10:20-11:35 : John Walbridge, Indiana University – Bloomington, TBA
12 noon -1:30 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
(8) 1:30-2:45: Thomas Marré, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, “Aristotle’s Pythagoreanism”
Coffee 2:45 pm – 3 pm
(9) 3:00-4:15 pm: Prof. Alredo Watkins, Duke University. ““Aristotle the Pythagorean: The Power of Number in Aristotelian Thought”
(10) 4:20-5:45 pm: Prof. Douglas Campbell, Alma College, “Plato’s Explanation of Respiration (and Criticisms from Aristotle and Galen)”
Evening activities and dinner options forthcoming.
Friday 27 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
(11) 9-10:15 am: Prof. David Twetten, Marquette University, “Kahn Corrective: How Existence Does Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy”
(12) 10:20-11:45 Katja Krause, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, TBA
12 noon -1:30 pm Lunch – suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
(13) 1:30-2:45 pm:
Prof. Justin Vlasits, University of Illinois – Chicago “Aristotle on his Predecessors in the Lost Works: Creating a Philosophical Tradition”
Coffee 2:45 pm – 3 pm
(14) 3:00-4:15 pm: Prof. Laurence Bloom, Rhodes University, “Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle on Non-Contradiction”
4:20-4:45 pm: Closing discussion
Friday Evening: Optional Friday ca. 8 pm Dinner (self-pay) at the Fox and Hounds Restaurant 30 miles north of Milwaukee, (*tentative* possibly preceded by a reception at Prof. Taylor’s nearby lakeside home). Carpooling available. Reservation required. The Fox and Hounds can be a bit pricey but they have a 2-dinners-for-the-price-of-1 deal, so once two people pair up, the cost is more modest for each. For information on the restaurant and its prices, see this link: Fox and Hounds Restaurant
Abstracts
Laurence Bloom, Rhodes University, “Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle on Non-Contradiction”
Aristotle’s account of the Principle of Non-contradiction responds to (at least) two important predecessors: Heraclitus and Plato. In one respect, the three provide a comprehensive range of attitudes toward the principle. While Aristotle affirms it as the truest of all axioms, Heraclitus denies it, and Plato hypothesizes it. None of these attitudes are easily justified, and this for the same reason: the inherent reflexivity of any possible justification. How could we possibly justify our attitude to a principle that is already implicit in the very act of justification? The issue seems to be closed even before it has been opened. In this talk, rather than take a side on the issue, I will consider one important consequence that hinges on the three thinker’s respective attitudes. I will rely on a similarity in their accounts: for all three the principle is metaphysically loaded. In short, all three philosophers connect the applicability of the principle to the existence of independent ousiai in the world. Aristotle affirms the existence of such ousiai, Heraclitus denies it, and Plato, in all but one important case, takes their existence to be merely hypothetical. Perhaps unsurprisingly, their respective attitudes to the principle also dictate their attitudes to the very possibility of knowledge of the world. Aristotle’s syllogistic science, which, at least in theory, begins with the identification of the ousia under investigation, is not possible for the other two philosophers. Heraclitus denies any such worldly knowledge while, for Plato, knowledge of the world is rendered hypothetical or, in his semi-technical language, dianoetic.
Douglas Campbell, Alma College
“Plato’s Explanation of Respiration (and Criticisms from Aristotle and Galen)”
In this talk, I argue for a reconstruction of Plato’s account of respiration in the Timaeus. I then argue that Aristotle, in de Respiratione, argues successfully against it, and so does Galenin On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates.
Plato’s account of respiration was enormously influential in antiquity, even if bogged
down by serious criticisms (such as those by Aristotle) almost right away. Its importance is
reflected in the attention that Galen pays to it while criticizing it (and in its staying power,
considering that Galen is writing hundreds of years later). The goal of my talk, however, is not
merely to reconstruct Plato’s account but to infer from it several general features of Plato’s
explanations of physiology in the Timaeus. He makes certain landmark achievements in
physiology (such as the mechanization of key processes, such as respiration and digestion)
despite knowing very little about internal anatomy. The criticisms I cite fill out a picture of
pre-Aristotelian theorizing on the subject.
Aristotle and Galen make steps forward in thinking about physiology on the shoulders of
the Timaeus. For instance, one of Plato’s major achievements is that he explains respiration in
purely mechanical terms: it happens in automatic, regular, and predictable ways that Plato likens
to the turning of a wheel. When air is exhaled, it displaces the air around my torso. The
displaced air enters my body (either through the skin, nostrils, or mouth), and it displaces air in
my torso. This newly displaced air in turn pushes more air out of my torso, and there is thus a
cycle of displaced air displacing more air, since there is no void.
Galen admires Plato’s reliance on mechanics to explain physiology, but he thinks that
Plato went too far. We sometimes do initiate respiration consciously, and we can similarly slow
down or speed up our breathing deliberately, too. Plato’s account does not allow for this. In fact,
as I develop in greater length during the talk, Plato has completely excluded the activities of the
muscles altogether.
Aristotle’s criticism is damning, too. As I shall argue, Aristotle thinks that Plato has failed to explain the final cause of respiration altogether and cannot explain why it is necessary for our survival. Moreover, Aristotle joins Galen in criticizing Plato for overlooking some basic
phenomenology of breathing.
This criticisms round out our view of what the Timaeus’ theorizing about physiology was like: it was overly concerned with explaining things in terms of broad principles (about, e.g.,
what motion is like without a void) and was not so concerned with phenomenological data or
about identifying final causes.
Eugene Garver, TBA
Physics I is mostly a confrontation with his predecessors because itsfunction is to establish principles, since principles can’t be proved within a science. The predecessors reappear, especially in Books IV and VIII where he’s establishing a new principle for physics, first time and magnitude in III.4, and then the unmoved mover in VIII.
So he looks at his predecessors if and only if he’s arguing about principles, stepping back from his physics and thinking outside its limits about its limits. Succinctly, “The physicist is not concerned to argue with someone who denies the existence of motion, for the physicist starts with the datum that nature is the principle of motion” (VIII.3.253b4-6). Once physics has a principle, there’s rarely a reason to consult or refute the predecessors.
Book I not only establishes the principles of physics but it shows how such principles let him distinguish arguments within the science of physics from those without. Such a distinction leads to the thesis he refers to over and over, that principles can’t be proved. Aristotle’s great originality, relative to the others he talks about, is that he is the first to articulate philosophy into a series of plural and discrete sciences.
The one exception to the absence of discussions of his predecessors in the rest of the Physics is the continuing presence of Zeno because he wants to prove the impossibility of motion with arguments within physical science.
However, the main appearance of his predecessors in Physics I does not mean that once he’s established the principles of physics, the rest of the inquiry is a matter of demonstration based on those principles. That’s not the relation between dialectic and scientific argument that does justice to Aristotle’s own way of arguing. His physical principles in Book I are ways of determining what lies inside and what outside the borders of this science. When Book II starts with nature as an internal principle of motion, it’s not only internal to some things that move, but internal to the science. Form/matter/privation and then nature are not the kind of principles from which deductions can be drawn, but are only principles which delimit and organize this particular science.
Daniel W. Graham, “Origin Stories: Aristotle and the Presocratics”
Looking back at his philosophical predecessors, Aristotle, for the first time, tries to document their progress. He does this in terms of the stepwise discovery of each of the four causes Aristotle has identified. In telling his story, he provides an influential account of how Presocratic philosophy developed. He fails, however, to show how one development led to another.
In the twentieth century, students of philosophy constructed an integrated story of development in which the early Ionians adhered to Material Monism (as Aristotle had asserted). Their theories were challenged by Parmenides of Elea, who defended a strict non-materialist monism. After Parmenides, the Pluralists Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the atomists, tried to rescue cosmology by positing a plurality of changeless elements which interacted to form mixtures or compounds or structures. Their efforts, however, were vain, because they had never refuted Parmenides’ rejection of plurality.
While this story recognizes a dialectical development of philosophical theories, it is flawed. There is evidence against ascribing Material Monism to the early Ionians. Further, the story ignores the fact that Parmenides develops his own elaborate cosmology, based on interactions of two elements; in that cosmology he proposes three empirical breakthroughs in cosmology. Most notably, he advances the doctrine of Heliophotism, according to which the moon shines by reflecting the sun’s light.
The Pluralist philosophers endorse Parmenides’ rejection of coming-to-be and passing-away, but never attempt to refute him. For they see themselves as his disciples and regard his cosmology as a prototype rather than a documented failure. Anaxagoras, for instance, uses Heliophotism to construct the correct theory of eclipses. The predictions of this theory are confirmed by subsequent eclipses, and by a meteor falling to earth in 466 BCE. These theories are accepted by virtually all subsequent cosmologists and astronomers, indeed down to the present day. At some point, then, Parmenides’ cosmology takes on a life of its own and gives rise to a successful empirical science of astronomy.
Peter Haskett, Catholic University of America. “Seeking “What-It-Is”: Socrates and the Origins of Aristotle’s Formal Cause in Metaphysics A.6 & M.4”
Does Aristotle attribute to Socrates the first grasp of οὐσία and the formal cause? Aristotle discusses Socrates’ contributions to the development of the formal cause in Metaph. A.6 and M.4. These accounts seem to disagree. In A.6, Aristotle does not overtly attribute to Socrates any grasp of the causes, nor any meaningful contribution to the development of the formal cause other than influencing Plato. In M.4, by contrast, Aristotle is emphatic that Socrates was the “first” to grasp the universal, since he was seeking the “what-it-is,” the formal cause. But was Socrates the “first” to grasp the formal cause, and what, exactly, did Socrates grasp?
In A.3-10, Aristotle’s outlines his “history” of the causes in Greek philosophy prior to his analysis of οὐσία. At the end of A.5, Aristotle mentions the formal cause for the first time; the Pythagoreans were superficially discussing and defining the “what-it-is” (987a19-21). In A.6, he mentions the formal cause by name only twice, attributing both to Plato: Plato deploys the Forms and One as “what-it-is” (988a9-11). Socrates receives but a passing remark; Socrates was the first to seek the universal and definitions while investigating ethical things, and Plato took him as a mentor (987b1-4). Aristotle does not directly attribute to Socrates any grasp of the causes.
However, Aristotle revisits Socrates’ contribution in Metaph. M.4 (1078b12-34). Aristotle introduces essential details about Socrates absent from A.6. He specifies that Socrates was first to seek to define universally and that his subject matter was the ethical virtues (1078b17-19). He links the universal to the “what-it-is”; Socrates’s inquiry into the “what-it-is” was “reasonable,” since it is a principle of syllogisms (1078b23-25; cf. 987a19-21, 988a9-11). He attributes to Socrates inductive arguments in addition to universal definitions, which are starting points of science (1078b25-30). Finally, Aristotle denies that Socrates separates universals and definitions from particulars. (1078b30-34; 1086a31-b13). Here Socrates is the “first” to grasp the formal cause—not the Pythagoreans, Democritus, or Plato (987a19-21, 988a9-11, 1078b19-23).
Ross (1924), Vlastos (1991), Ferejohn (2013), Moore (2019), and others acknowledge the differences in Aristotle’s presentations of Socrates in A.6 & M.4. Many also note parallels between his attributions to Socrates and Aristotle’s own discussion of the “what-it-is” in APo. However, several features of Aristotle’s account of Socrates’ contributions to the discovery of οὐσία and the formal cause remain underappreciated. In this paper, I discuss three. First, I discuss how Aristotle presents his own version of Socrates in Metaph. and elsewhere that he emphatically distances from Plato and the dialogues. Second, I discuss the significance of Aristotle’s claim in A.6 and M.4 that Socrates was the “first” to seek the universal, the what-it-is, and definitions alongside passages from Phys., Metaph., Cat., Top., and APo. I also discuss how these three concepts relate to οὐσία, and in what sense Socrates was the first to identify οὐσία. Third, drawing from passages in Phys., EN, Pol., and PA, I offer an explanation for why Socrates’ choice of subject matter, namely ethical virtue, led to his identification of universal definition and preliminary grasp of οὐσία while the Presocratic study of nature did not.
Dr. Christopher Lutz, Duquesne University, “Aristotle’s Double Reception of Plato’s Phaedo”
Aristotle refers to the Phaedo by name four times (GC ii.9 335b10; Meta. i.9 991b3, xiii.5 1080a2; Mete. ii.2 355b32). While the Meteorology reference takes aim at Socrates’ mythical description of rivers and the sea (Phd. 111e2–112e3), the other three concern one topic: the account of Forms or Ideas as aitiai of becoming. The relevant passage (Phd. 95e7–107b10) features Socrates’account of how, disappointed by Anaxagoras’ (and others’) material explanations of natural phenomena, he rejected these in favor of what he calls his “safest answer”: the hypothesis that if something is or becomes F, the Form of F is the aitia of its being or becoming F. According to Aristotle, in order to be the aitia of so-and-so’s becoming F, the Form must be an efficient cause. Reasoning that Forms are incapable of initiating motion, Aristotle rejects Socrates’ hypothesis and the Phaedo’s account of the Forms along with it.
The fairness of Aristotle’s criticism has been debated. Largely separate from these debates,
however, others have focused on another aspect of his reception of the Phaedo: his
methodological debt to what Socrates calls his “more sophisticated answer.” The sophisticated
answer builds on the safest answer by including as aitiai items that participate in a certain Form
necessarily, refusing to admit that Form’s opposite. For example, because fever always participates in the Form of Sickness, Socrates can posit fever as the aitia of a body’s becoming sick (Phd. 105c2–4). This sophisticated answer is a clear antecedent of two key ingredients in Aristotle’s account of demonstration: the syllogism as well as the notion of an “accident in virtue of itself” (sumbebêkos kath’ hauto). As a syllogism in Darii, Socrates’ example becomes:
Sickness belongs to every fever.Fever belongs to a certain body. Thus sickness belongs to a certain body. Being intermediate between Sickness and the sick body, the middle term, fever, is a more sophisticated explanation than Sickness, yet it is explanatory due to its own (necessary) participation in the Form. Socrates’ sophisticated answer thus presupposes that the Form of F is the (remoter) aitia of something’s becoming F—the very hypothesis that Aristotle rejects.
My paper examines where Aristotle’s criticism of the Phaedo intersects with—or departs
from?—his debt to it. After section 1 lays out the criticism, section 2 traces a line of influence from Socrates’ sophisticated answer to the account of the demonstrative syllogism in the Posterior Analytics. Informed by all this, section 3 interprets Aristotle’s arguments that the Forms are irrelevant to demonstrations (at Post. An. i.11 77a5–9 and i.22 83a32–35) as if these arguments were direct replies to one puzzling over how he can adopt elements of the Phaedo’s explanatory framework without committing himself to its hypothesis that the Forms are aitiai of being and becoming.
Thomas Marré, The Catholic University of America, Aristotle’s Pythagoreanism
I argue that Aristotle’s debt to Pythagorean thought goes deeper than he himself was willing to admit. This suggestion is not novel. The late antique commentator and head of the Academy, Syrianus, made much the same accusation. In his commentary on book N of the Metaphysics, he criticizes Aristotle for distorting Pythagorean number theory and then says that “Aristotle himself manifests both his admiration for the natural power of numbers and his indebtedness to the knowledge of the Pythagoreans” (192, 16-18). As evidence, he cites Aristotle’s apparent endorsement in the de Caeloof the principle that the number three is the number of the whole and the all (to pan kai ta panta). There Aristotle explicitly attributes the principle to the Pythagoreans—who he says treated it as a law of nature—and then uses it to support his argument that there are no more than three dimensions. If, however, the principle has the kind of generality that Aristotle seems to suggest, we should expect threes to be a regular feature of his thought, and this, I argue, is precisely what we find. I begin with a discussion of Aristotle’s criticisms of Pythagorean number theory in the final chapter of the Metaphysics as well as Syrianus’ commentaries on them. I then turn to the unappreciated pervasiveness of threes in Aristotle’s corpus and argue that it is implausibly attributed to chance. Thus, for example, Aristotle famously identifies three candidates for the happy life and three kinds of friendship in the Ethics, three kinds of constitutions in the Politics, and three theoretical sciences in the Metaphysics (Met. vi.1 1026a18-20). In the de Animathere are, we know, not only three kinds of soul, but also three factors involved in nutrition (ii.4 416b21-25). In de Juventute we learn that “there are three parts into which all complete animals are divided” (468a13-15). In Generation of Animals the student of generation must look to three things: the end, what is for the end, and the agent of generation (ii.6 742a28-30), and in the Posterior Analytics, we learn that “every demonstrative science is concerned with three things: what it posits to exist…the so-called common axioms…and thirdly, the attributes” (i.10 76b11-15). This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does suggest, I argue, that Aristotle’s systematic use of tripartite divisions is motivated in part by a belief in a distinctive fact about the number three, which he recognizes as Pythagorean. I conclude by suggesting that the importance of threes for both Aristotle and for the Pythagoreans may itself be a function of the very ancient importance attributed to threes in Greek (and Roman) thought and religious practice more generally—a fact well documented at the turn of the 20th century, but which seems to have fallen into some neglect.
Brian Reese, “Abstract: Aristotle on Protagoras and the Principle of Non-Contradiction”
At the beginning of Metaphysics IV.5, Aristotle claims that the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) stands and falls with the doctrine of Protagoras—that each individual is the measure of all things (1009a6-9). In this paper, I examine Aristotle’s interpretation of Protagoras’ relativism and its implications for his broader critique of his predecessors. Aristotle presents Protagoras as advancing a view in which truth is subjective, leading to the possibility that contradictory claims may both be true for different individuals. He argues that if Protagoras’ position is accepted, the distinction between truth and falsity collapses, undermining both rational discourse and knowledge itself.
I explore how Aristotle’s critique of Protagoras fits within his larger project of defending first principles. Aristotle treats Protagoras as an extreme example of a broader tendency among earlier thinkers to reject determinate being in favor of flux, contradiction, or subjective perception. By analyzing these views, Aristotle aims to show that they are ultimately self-refuting. If all beliefs are equally true, then the belief that some beliefs are false must also be true, making Protagoras’ position untenable (1009a14-28).
Further, I argue that Aristotle sees Protagoras as engaged in a mistaken but revealing project: an attempt to ground knowledge in human perception while failing to recognize that knowledge presupposes objective distinctions. Aristotle’s response is to reaffirm the necessity of the PNC, demonstrating that without it, reasoning itself collapses (1005b35 ff.). In this way, Aristotle does not merely refute Protagoras but uses his doctrine as a crucial test case for the indispensability of logical first principles.
Looking ahead, I show that the resources Aristotle uncovers in responding to Protagoras also provide powerful tools against Pyrrhonian skepticism. Aristotle’s insight that distinctions (and so reasoning itself) depend on the PNC applies directly to the Pyrrhonist’s ability to generate oppositions and suspend judgment. Just as Protagorean relativism undermines itself by collapsing distinctions, so too does the Pyrrhonist’s method undermine itself, since it must utilize the PNC in generating the oppositions that are essential to the suspension of judgement. Aristotle’s critique of Protagoras thus anticipates and helps dismantle later skeptical challenges, reaffirming the PNC as the firmest of all principles. I conclude that Aristotle’s engagement with Protagoras is not merely a polemic against relativism but a broader effort to clarify the conditions that make knowledge and philosophy possible.
David Reed
In GC Book II, Chs 6 – 11, Aristotle provides a final extended encounter with his predecessors in his texts on Natural Science before he moves on to Biology as there will be little talk of predecessors in Meteorology. The topic here is the relationship between coming-to-and passing-away and the elemental composition of bodies. The reader can be forgiven in wondering why this needs to be discussed again, after similar discussions in Books III and IV of dC and Book I of GC.
In the Chapters under review, Aristotle investigates the ‘sources’ (the usual translation of ‘archei’ here) of coming-to-be and passing-away and makes the remarkable claim that, although his predecessors have identified two of these sources, there is a third source, of which, he says, everyone `dreams,’ but no one puts into words! He goes on to criticize Socrates, on the one hand, for speaking only of the ‘forms’ of things and other, unnamed predecessors, for focusing only on their matter. His solution will bring these two together and add a third. But what can he mean by saying that others only dream of this third ‘source?’
Aristotle’s response to this question proceeds in Ch x by emphasizing that motion and change never stop, and by asking, what can generate such continual change and motion? He has already discussed a prime mover (and a first moved) in Phys Book VIII and the eternally rotating Ouranos in dC Books I & II, is this yet another repetition?
No. The investigation here is not limited to local motion as was the case in Phys and dC, since the questions here pertain to coming-to-be and passing-away. This necessitates a doubling, a source of change that can account for the recurrence of both generation and corruption. In addition, the investigation here is more ‘embodied’ and specific than in either of those places. It takes place after the discussions of bodies and elements as substances and specific things in Books III&IV of dC and Books I&II of GC. Aristotle finds the source of continual change in the ‘inclined circle’ – the motion of the sun on the ecliptic as it approaches and moves away from earth. This is a new sense of principle or ‘source,’ or ‘archei.’
The eternally moving prime mover was a necessary consequence of eternal motion in Phys. The eternally rotating Ouranos in dC moves of necessity by its nature as a simple body. The sun’s motion on a tilted ecliptic cannot be deduced through a necessary chain of reasoning. It’s a phenomenon, something that appears, something that could have been otherwise. At this crucial juncture, Aristotle’s science provides a place for contingency.
Then why does he say that his predecessors dream? Because they do not conduct investigations that enable them and require them to explore the world as it is – as actuality, with both necessity and contingency. Their science involves either necessary conclusions or motions governed by chance. For Aristotle, the science of his predecessors is an exercise in sleepwalking.
David Twetten, Marquette University, “Kahn Corrective: How Existence Does Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy”
In this paper I announce the discovery of existence as a distinct concept in Greek philosophy: discoverable in Alexander of Aphrodisias. I explain why Alexander thinks he needs this concept: his analysis of hylomorphism seems to require it, and he invents special language to express the point. At the same time, Kahn appears to be justified in maintaining that a distinct concept does not emerge prior to Alexander. I explain Kahn’s thesis and review the evidence for existence in Parmenides and Plato. In short, they arguably sometimes use the verb “is” in an existential way (as does Aristotle, though rarely). But they do not clearly distinguish “is” and “what is.” Of course, that is the whole point of the Parmenides dilemma as traditionally conceived. Recently Michael Chase has defended, in the line of Pierre Hadot, an essence-existence distinction in Porphyry’s Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. The text is evocative, but the evidence is not decisive, and, in any case, Alexander precedes Porphyry. It is not clear that Alexander’s discussion has any influence on subsequent Greek thought, but it is rather clear that it picked up somehow by Avicenna, and through Avicenna by Aquinas.
Justin Vlasits, University of Illinois-Chicago
“Aristotle on his Predecessors in the Lost Works: Creating a Philosophical Tradition”
In this talk, I present the evidence concerning Aristotle’s treatment of earlier philosophers in his lost works. These works cover a wide variety of philosophical, literary, historical, and scientific topics in different genres: dialogues, collections, speeches, letters, and poetry. Although only preserved in fragments, over the last two centuries, scholars have spent significant effort collecting, authenticating, and interpreting these texts. While much of this literature has focused on the question of whether these works are genuinely Aristotelian and whether they provide evidence for philosophical development, I am here interested primarily in treating them philosophically.
I make a negative and positive point about the discussion of the predecessors in the lost works. First, in the hundreds of fragments we possess, Aristotle does not criticize any philosophers unless they were involved with Plato’s Academy, with the sole exception of the technical treatise On the Flooding of the Nile. The other predecessors otherwise receive no negative philosophical treatment comparable to that faced by Plato in On Philosophy, On Ideas, or On Poets. This practice constitutes a major difference with Aristotle’s extant corpus, where Platonists and ‘Presocratics’ are equally subject to criticism.
Positively, Aristotle makes two uses of non-Platonist philosophers. First, he uses them as authoritative witnesses for important philosophical positions being defended. For example, Hermotimus and Anaxagoras are cited in the Protrepticus for their view that nous is the god in us. Second, Aristotle places different thinkers in the context of major developments in philosophy or culture more broadly (a project that perhaps can be seen as a continuation of the work of the sophist Hippias). This includes speculating on the origin of philosophy, the Delphic inscription Know Thyself, the dialogue form, and dialectic. It also includes a number of works which aimed to clearly articulate philosophical theories without either endorsing or criticizing them, such as On the Pythagoreans, On Democritus, and Excerpts from Plato’s Republic.
Together, these observations point to a broader project in Aristotle’s lost works: the construction of a philosophical tradition that leads inexorably to Aristotle rather than the other current contenders to the title of philosophy: Plato. Aristotle’s strategy here is different from that in the extant corpus. Instead of dwelling on what all his predecessors, Academics included, got wrong, he emphasizes what they importantly got right. This is significant when we consider the public-facing nature of many of the lost writings. In the esoteric works, Aristotle can assume his audience sees the value of the philosophical tradition. But with the critiques of Isocrates, the very pursuit of philosophy is controversial. By explaining and pointing out the important advances made by his predecessors, Aristotle can motivate the importance of the philosophical life. Likewise, by criticizing the Platonists, he can show that his version of philosophy is the true inheritor of this philosophical tradition. I close by arguing that On the Flooding of the Nile is not a counterexample to this account because it was likely not directed at such a broad audience.
Alredo Watkins, Duke University. ““Aristotle the Pythagorean: The Power of Number in Aristotelian Thought”
Aristotle’s discussion of his predecessors in the Metaphysics constitutes one of our richest and oldest sources of reliable information about the Pythagorean tradition. At the same time, his assessment of that tradition is largely critical. Aristotle seems to view Pythagoreans as at worst patently incoherent, at best conceptually muddled – guilty of mistaking categories of reality by illegitimately treating mathematica as concrete, physical principles.
In spite of Aristotle’s negative assessment, I argue that Aristotle’s own conception of numbers cannot sustain his central critique of Pythagoreanism. Therefore, however Aristotle may have personally situated himself in relation to Pythagoreanism, as some ancient commentators perceived, the disagreements between Aristotle and Pythagoreanism are less deep than they appear. I therefore advance a “harmonization thesis” for Aristotle and Pythagoreanism, using roughly the same criteria for “harmony” as the Neoplatonist commentators did for Aristotle and Platonism.
I begin by reconstructing Aristotle’s anti-Pythagorean arguments. I focus especially on his critique of the role Pythagoreans give numbers in natural philosophy as fundamental ontological principles or archai. I identify two critical assumptions in Aristotle’s arguments: (1) numbers do not have causal power, and (2) they cannot compose material objects. Next, I describe Aristotle’s own conception of numbers and other mathematical objects as structural properties intrinsic to physical systems. I explain why, on Aristotle’s account of mathematical objects, numbers can indeed be characterized as causally effective in a robust sense, and are also capable of entering into a salient type of composition relation in physical systems. I argue that in light of this, Aristotle’s own views on mathematica would be sufficient to secure the most essential Pythagorean claims.
Finally, I use this Pythagorized Aristotelianism to explain some of the more difficult modes of Pythagorean reasoning. I show how Aristotle’s views on number illuminate the discussion in Politics VIII of music’s power to affect the soul. A surprising result is that Aristotle’s understanding of mimesis in music commits him to an iconic resemblance relation between abstract quantities and the world. This leaves him in no position to reject Pythagorean views on musical harmony, and should have softened him considerably to the recognition of patterns between numbers and physical phenomena so characteristic of Pythagorean practice. In short, although Aristotle chooses to position himself as an anti-Pythagorean, the disharmony is shallow, and this is illustrated by the unintended confluences between the two on music, quantity, and the mathematical intelligibility of nature.
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Housing on the Marquette Campus and local hotel information 2024
Among the most convenient local hotels is the four-star Ambassador Hotel at 2308 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233, tel. 414-345-5008. Search for the best rates online Do check http://www.ambassadormilwaukee.com. But rates are dynamic and change with demand, especially when there are many other summertime events ongoing in Milwaukee.
Some rooms are available at Marquette University
Room Commitment: Five 2-bedroom suite-style units featuring two private bedrooms, each furnished with two twin XL beds.
Residence Facility:
Humphrey Hall, located at 1716 W. Wisconsin Ave., features air-conditioned sleeping rooms with a private bathroom. All rooms are furnished with twin XL beds, dressers, closet space, and desks/desk chairs. Bed and bath linens are provided. Additional Humphrey Hall amenities include a secured 24-hour front desk, complimentary Wi-Fi, coin-operated laundry on each sleeping floor, vending machines and a community lounge. Guests will need to bring their personal toiletry items.
The Desk Receptionist will provide each guest with a room key at check-in. To expedite the check-out process, please return the room key in the provided key envelope prior to departure. There is a $75 charge for any key not returned at final check-out.
Room Block Dates/Sleeping Room Summary:
Arriving June 24, 2025, departing June 27 or 28, 2025
Each shared 2-bedroom suite will accommodate two people, one guest per private bedroom. Minimum 3-night stay is required.
Nightly Room Rate
Humphrey Hall
Two-bedroom suite
$100/night ($50/person shared occupancy with one guest per bedroom)
Cut-Off Date
Cut-off date: May 24, 2025. Rooms requested after the cut-off date are subject to availability.
Standard check in time: After 3 p.m.*
Standard check out time: Prior to 11 a.m.*
*These times are based upon Central Standard Time.
Reservation Procedures
Method of reservation is Individual/Direct. Individuals should email donna.wells@marquette.edu to secure a room reservation associated with the Summer Conference on Aristotle and The Aristotelian Traditions. A Reservation Form will be sent as a follow-up to the email request.
Due to limited availability in the room block, it is highly recommended that a room reservation be made as soon as possible. Reservation deadline is no later than three weeks prior to arrival date.
Note that all suite-style, 2-bedroom units are shared occupancy with each guest occupying a private bedroom. The suite has a private bathroom. Please let the reservationist know if you have a suite-mate preference.
Guaranteed Reservations
Guests must confirm their room reservation with receipt of a check payable to Marquette University for the entire stay. Full payment must be received no later than 10 days prior to arrival date. Please submit the completed Reservation Form and payment to:
Donna Wells
Alumni Memorial Union 407
1442 W. Wisconsin Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53233
No refunds, including instances involving early departures, will be issued after check payment has been submitted except in the case of illness, injury, medical or family emergency, or other extenuating circumstances and must be approved by the Director of Conference Services. Failure to check out at the posted time on date of departure may result in a penalty fee.
Linen Service
Basic bed and bath linens (one pillow/pillowcase, one fitted/flat bed sheet, and one bath towel/washcloth per guest) are provided in guest rooms. Soiled towel/washcloth may be exchanged for fresh bath linens at the front desk.
Payment can be made at the pay-on-foot station in the structure lobby or when exiting at 17th Street. Credit card payment (via MasterCard or Visa) is required. Cash is not accepted.
Guest Identification
Additional Policies
Rooms reserved under room blocks are not guaranteed to be in the same area of the residence hall. We will attempt to keep groups together, but at times circumstances prohibit this from happening.
Each guest is expected to leave his/her guest room in the same condition in which it was found at check-in. Any damage sustained to the room during the guest’s stay will be billed directly to the guest. Any damages noticed by a guest should be reported immediately to the desk staff.
Key Lockout and Replacement
Each guest must sign for his/her room key prior to check-in. There is a $10 lockout policy enforced for any guest who requires repeated use of a lock-out key to access the sleeping room. There is a $75 key replacement fee that is billed to the guest for any key that is lost or not returned at final checkout. Rooms are re-keyed immediately for security reasons; therefore, we cannot issue refunds for guests who send in or return keys after checkout time.
Force Majeure
Neither party will be considered in default in the performance of its obligation under this Agreement if such performance is prevented or delayed by any cause which is beyond the reasonable control of the party affected, including severe weather, war, hostilities, revolution, civil commotion, acts of terrorism, zombie apocalypse, alien invasions, strike, lockout, epidemic, pandemic, accident, fire, wind, or flood or because of any law, order, proclamation, ruling, regulation, or ordinance of any government or subdivision of government or because of any act of God (“Force Majeure”).
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Group agrees that it will defend and fully indemnify UNIVERSITY against any loss, cost, damage, injury, or expense (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) that may be sustained or incurred by UNIVERSITY, its trustees, officers, employees, students or agents as a result of the Group, its employees, participants, agents or guests use of, or presence at, the licensed space. Neither party will be liable to the other for any indirect, incidental, special, or consequential damages of any kind whatsoever, including lost profits, even if advised of the possibility thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Group will not be responsible to indemnify University against any loss caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the University, its trustees, officers, employees, agents, or contractors.
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All visitors to campus are required to comply with all UNIVERSITY policies, procedures, and health and safety measures in effect. This may include following campus procedures related to the COVID-19 pandemic or other community-wide epidemic or pandemic.
Conduct
All UNIVERSITY visitors are expected to show respect for order, personal and public property, and the rights of all individuals. UNIVERSITY is a community that consists of people of different backgrounds and beliefs. Conduct in violation of the rights of others will not be tolerated. Misconduct will be sufficient cause for removal from the UNIVERSITY. All guests staying in University Housing Facilities must comply with all University policies and procedures and health and safety measures in effect as well as any guidelines for University Facilities.
Smoking/Gambling
UNIVERSITY is a tobacco-free campus. This includes all indoor and outdoor campus spaces including campus buildings, grounds, exterior open spaces, green spaces, parking lots (including inside a vehicle if parked in a University lot), on-campus sidewalks (not bordering a city street), on-campus driveways and other paved areas, athletic facilities, practice facilities, and recreational spaces. Gambling of any nature is strictly prohibited on UNIVERSITY property.
Alcoholic Beverages
The possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by anyone under the age of twenty-one (21) is prohibited by Wisconsin law. Participants over the age of 21 may privately consume alcoholic beverages within their own rooms.
Drugs
The use, possession, distribution or sale of illegal drugs or narcotics is strictly prohibited. Non-compliance by any participant will result in immediate removal from the residence hall, dismissal from participation in activities on UNIVERSITY property and to prosecution.
Pets
No pets of any kind may be brought into or kept in a UNIVERSITY facility, except for service animals. If accommodations are required for a service animal, the Director of Conference Services must be advised in advance and approval granted.
Exclusivity
Many campus buildings are open to the public and serve a variety of functions. Though GROUP may have reserved space within a campus building, other space and access to the building will often be available to UNIVERSITY members or other program or camp guests. Special arrangements must be scheduled in advance and approved by the Director of Conference Services.
Reassignment
University reserves the right to reassign Group to alternate housing, dining hall, and conference space based on maintenance, safety, or other needs of UNIVERSITY.
Weapons Policy
The GROUP and its members are not permitted to: – Carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property except as expressly permitted by applicable state law.
– Openly carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property.
– Carry any weapons in any UNIVERSITY building or leased space or at any University special event marked with signage specifying “WEAPONS ARE PROHIBITED IN THIS BUILDING.”
– Store any weapons in a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property except in the vehicle’s glove compartment or trunk or encased such that the existence of the weapon is concealed. – Encased means completely zipped, snapped, buckled, tied or otherwise fastened, with no part of the weapon exposed. – Fail to lock a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property that contains any weapon when the GROUP member is not present in the vehicle.
– Possess unloaded ammunition on UNIVERSITY property.
– Imply possession of, threaten to use, display, brandish, use, or discharge a weapon on University property for any purpose or reason except lawful self-defense or lawful defense of others. – Fail to report timely to the UNIVERSITY Department of Public Safety the presence on University property of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy, unless doing so would subject the GROUP member or others to the threat of physical harm, or take other action in response to the presence of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy except for reporting the presence of the weapon to the University Department of Public Safety.
The GROUP members whose actions violate applicable State law with respect to the possession of weapons on UNIVERSITY property may be subject to criminal prosecution. GROUP members whose actions violate this provision will be asked to leave UNIVERSITY property immediately and may be subject to no-trespassing directives in the future. UNIVERSITY reserves the right to terminate this Rooms Agreement for one or more violations of this provision.