Prof. Richard C. Taylor

Simple Index of Course Webpages 2022 Fall MU & KUL

29 September 2022

The Metaphysics of Being and Creation in the Arabic Philosophical Tradition and its Importance for Aquinas

Before class, students should view the six (6) video lectures embedded below on this page. At class we can discuss issues and questions arising to students when viewing the videos.

Recommended Readings:
Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 1.5-6, tr. Marmura 2005
Gutas, D. 2013 Avicenna’s Philosophical Project
Bertolacci, A. 2008 Necessary as a Primary Concept in Avicenna’s Metaphysics
Adamson, P. 2013 From the Necessary Existent to God
Available via Varia: link to selected resources

Also see Oliva, A., Philosophy in the Teaching of Theology by Thomas Aquinas

General Preview:

     In this modest account of being and creation in the Arabic tradition and its importance for the development of the thought of Aquinas I will be for the most part restricting my account to the early Aquinas and those ideas and texts from the Arabic tradition that were central to his thinking.  I should mention, however, that Aquinas was well aware of the discussions of the nature of being and character of eternal creation (ikhtirā‘) found in Averroes who explicitly rejected creatio ex nihilo (ibdā‘) which is found in Avicenna, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the Arabic Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair (Discourse on the Pure Good or in the Latin tradition, Liber de causis). On Averroes see my video lecture on “Conceiving Creation According to Ibn Rushd / Averroes” via this website: http://philosophy.cua.edu/fall2013lectures.cfm. This is simply because for Aquinas on being and creation the key sources from the Arabic tradition were precisely the Metaphysics Avicenna and the Arabic Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair (“Discourse on the Pure Good,” in Latin translation usually called, Liber de causis / Book of Causes) all of which were understood to set out a doctrine of metaphysical efficient causality. As we shall see, this is clearly evident in his early Commentary on the Sentences and in his De ente et essentia. In these early works there are key foundations set in place on which he builds much of his later metaphysical teaching on being and creation.

     The thought of Aquinas, however, was very much influenced by his study with Albert the Great in Cologne. You will recall that earlier I mentioned that Albert had taken the younger Dominican under his wing, so to speak, in Paris and that later Albert was appointed to head “the studium generale that was newly created by the Dominican order in Cologne” where “Thomas continued his studies under Albert . . . and served as magister studium in the school . . . until 1252.” (Markus Führer, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2020: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/albert-great/). Albert was in Paris ca. 1241-42 and in 1245 Thomas met him there in the Dominican convent Saint Jacques, surely also discussing and reading Albert’s writings and projects. The basic account of human intellectual understanding of Thomas first set in writing in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard is the largely same as what Albert set out in his De Homine (1240/42). (See Taylor, “Aquinas and the Arabs: Aquinas’s First Critical Encounter with the Doctrine of Averroes on the Intellect, In 2 Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 1,” in Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, Luis X. López-Farjeat and Jörg Tellkamp, eds. Paris: Vrin (2013), 142-183 & 277-296; and “Remarks on the Importance of Albert the Great’s Analyses and Use of the Thought of Avicenna and Averroes in the De homine for the Development of the Early Natural Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas” in Die Seele im Mittelalter. Von der Substanz zum funktionalen System, Guenther Mensching and Alia Mensching-Estakhr, eds., ed. (Würzburg: Koenigshausen & Neumann, 2018) pp.131-158.) Albert constructed his account in his De Homine from explicit use, citation and quotation of the  writings of Avicenna and Averroes, clearly displaying the value of the Arabic philosophical tradition to the development of Christian theology and European philosophical studies. The influence of Albert can be found regarding the metaphysics of being and creation as discussed by Aquinas through coordinated study of the commentaries on (ps.)Dionysius by Albert at Cologne in the presence of Thomas and of metaphysics of being in Thomas’s 1252-54 Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book 1, distinction 8 question 1 article 1. (This I presented in my draft paper in the previous class.)

            When Albert arrived in Cologne in 1248 with the young Thomas, he initiated a completely novel approach to the training of young Dominicans. Rather than following the tradition at Paris and elsewhere of teaching on the collection of Sentences (Opinions) of Peter Lombard and generating questions and articles, Albert chose to comment on the complete Latin corpus of treatises and letters of (ps.)Dionysius the Areopagite (d. late 5th / early 6th century: see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/ by K. Corrigan 2019) and then in 1250 to write his Super Ethica, the first Latin commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. It is important keep in mind, as we study the earliest writings of Thomas on metaphysics, God and creation, that Albert was among the most learned 13th century theologians in Europe familiar with the translated writings of al-Fārābā (d.950), Ibn Sīnā Avicenna (d.1037), Ibn Rushd / Averroes (d.1198) and the work known to the Latins as Aristotle’s Book of Causes. This latter work — composed in the Circle of al-Kindi in 9th century Baghdad employing of texts the philosophical Elements of Theology of the great Greek Neoplatonist Proclus (d.485) into a novel philosophical framework derived based on the Plotiniana Arabica (see Taylor, “Contextualizing the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair / Liber de causis,” in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes (5th-16th Centuries), vol. 2: Translations and Acculturations, Brill, 2020) — had extraordinary influence on 13th century Latin thinkers with over 250 Latin manuscripts and dozens of commentaries extant today. It was even listed as required for study in the charter documents of the University of Paris. In his 1240/42 De Homine, in his commentaries on (ps.)Dionysius (1248-50) and in his Super Ethica (1250-52), Albert used ideas, reasoning and texts from these sources and more from the Arabic tradition. In light of this, one might reasonably contend that Albert taught or guided and influenced Thomas on how to read philosophy from the Arabic tradition.  This training and also the influence of Albert is reflected in is reflected not only in Thomas’s account of natural human knowing and metaphysics of being but also in his account of ultimate human happiness. (Lectures on this latter topic are available HERE but will not be the primary object of study in this course due to the temporal finitude of human existence. But students are welcome to study those and to discuss them with me by appointment. It may not be impossible to do a suitable course paper on that issue.) Let’s now proceed to a very brief overview of the issue of the influence of Albert’s account of divine being in his Commentary on the treatise of (ps.)Dionysius, On Divine Names on Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book 1, distinction 8 question 1 article 1.

            There were several interpretations of the writings of (ps.)Dionysius who presented himself as the companion of St. Paul in theological works which have been discovered to be crafted under the strong influence of the philosophical writings of the Greek Neoplatonist Proclus. In brief, in the Eastern Greek Orthodox and related traditions, St. Dionysius was read to have taught that above the Deus revelatus (God as revealed through Scriptures, theological writings, and human efforts in philosophy) there is a Deus absconditus (God as transcendent and hidden from all creation). The Deus revelatus can be known through the things that It causes — that is, through the manifestation of the divine energies in relation to caused things in created reality (in Latin causaliter)— though the effects of divine causality do not reveal the divine nature in its completeness. Positive names can be said of Deus revelatus, such as the denomination of God as the “super-” or “hyper-”, “over-”, “pre-” Good (Corrigan, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-dionysius-areopagite/#DivNam) because divine goodness must be complete and perfect since God is the cause of all creaturely goodness. Also negations can be applied to God such as that God is not like creatures but transcendent: God is not many or composite but rather simple unity (so, One), etc. God can also be names by eminence. (For a valuable account of the historical development of the Triplex Via, see O’Rourke, F 2016, The ‘Triplex Via’ of Naming God, Review of Metaphysics.) None of these names properly and fully discloses the full nature of God since the causal essence of God is beyond creaturely comprehension through a propter quid demonstration. The interpretation of (ps.)Dionysius in the Latin West included accounts similar to this but this was difficult because, since Augustine and earlier, the Latin tradition held that God is the unique eternal and unchanging Being without another higher Deus absconditus, this latter never in any way to be known by a creature. Revelation (Corinthians 13:12 and more) that states that God will be seen face-to-face in the next life made for difficulties. In the Latin West in 1241 William of Auvergne. Bishop of Paris, declared for the positive account of seeing God face-to-face (scil. in a vision or knowing of the divine essence) to be the Latin Catholic doctrine and prohibited the teaching that there is a higher hidden Deus absconditus above. (The philosophical and theological concern was that perhaps humans might only see a representation of God, to the Divine Being Itself. This may have developed from discussions of human knowing in Avicenna’s writings.) Shortly thereafter William’s declaration was affirmed by the pope. The writings of Albert largely and the writings of Thomas follow this line of thought.

            In his Commentary on chapter 5 of On the Divine Names by (ps.)Dionysius, Albert takes up the assertion by (ps.)Dionysius that the most perfect of all names of God is Being or Being Itself (esse, ipsum esse). Albert goes on to explain this in this chapter by citing the metaphysical works of Aristotle (2x), Avicenna (6x), the Liber de causis (Book of Causes. 5x), and Anselm (1x). That is, Albert explicates the assertion by (ps.)Dionysius that God is Being or Being Itself by using the Metaphysics of Aristotle twice but the metaphysical teachings of the Arabic tradition in Avicenna and the Liber de causis 11 times. We cannot here get into the arguments of Albert but he makes it perfectly clear that (ps.)Dionysius must be read in accord with the teachings set out by Avicenna and the Liber de causis (this latter of which draws on the thought of Proclus and Ploitnus as does (ps.)Dionysius).  When we get to Thomas’s account of this issue in Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book 1, distinction 8 question 1 article 1, “Whether being (esse) is proper said of God,” we see that like Albert Thomas draws heavily on Avicenna teaching but modifies it by use of the Liber de causis to yield Thomas’s own doctrine. Further, Thomas also mentions Anselm since the latter’s Monologion is a treatise on divine names, including being. But, as we shall see, in doing this Thomas is using texts from the Arabic tradition of Avicenna and the Liber de causis as some of his primary philosophical sources needed to develop his own doctrine of the metaphysical nature of being. Let me highlight this here by quoting part of Thomas’s account. Thomas quotes Jerome and also John Damascene and then writes about being / esse: “The third reason is taken from the words of Dionysius who says that among all the other divine participations of goodness such as to live, to understand and the like, it (being / esse) is first and <is> as a principle for all the others having in itself all the others mentioned united in a certain way. In this way God is also the Divine principle and all things are one in Him.” Immediately following this he proceeds to Avicenna for the philosophical account. It is important to note, however, that Aquinas does not follow Avicenna in denying essence or quiddity of the Necessary Being (necesse esse, wājib al-wujūd) in the very same way that Avicenna does, but instead later modifies Avicenna’s accounts in accord with the Liber de causis in texts that follow. We will examine those below.

         What should you take from this? (Ps.) Dionysius is an extraordinarily important source for Aquinas, a source which Aquinas — throughout his lifetime — prefers to follow and yet at the same time a source that he freely modifies and reinterprets to be in accord with his own conception of the natures of being and God. Later in his life he wrote a Commentary (date usettled in the scholarship) on the treatise, On Divine Names by (ps.)Dionysius. In the preface he writes that we need to be careful because Dionysius frequently uses a very Platonic mode of writing about his doctrines. Here Aquinas (somewhat as Albert had) is revising and to some degree ‘Aristotelianizing’ the doctrines of (ps.)Dionysius as Aquinas follows and draws on them. Regarding this, see articles of Wayne Hankey and also those by B. Blankenhorn: Blankenhorn 2016, “Aquinas on the Spirit’s Gift of Understanding and Dionysius’s Mystical Theology,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, v.14.4, 1113-1131; and The Mystery of Union with God. Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, Washington DC, CUA Press, 2015.   

Preview Part One: The Arabic Tradition

   Highly influential ninth century translations into Arabic of portions of the Enneads of Plotinus with some substantial doctrinal revisions appear to have been authored by the Christian translator Ibn Na‘ima al-Himsi in the Plotiniana Arabica (PA) which is the source text for the Theology of Aristotle (TA) edited by al-Kindi. These were among the key sources for the emergence of a new approach to the conception of the One as First Cause and pure being (anniyyah maḥḍah), an approach that transformed Plotinian Platonist or Neoplatonist thought into a something that drew on both Plotinus and Aristotle but is identical with neither. In the PA we find that the One does not transcend being but is Itself Pure Being and Only Being as well as completely Simple in its Unity. But its unique being does transcend finite created being. As such it is the ultimate First Cause of all beings by creation ex nihilo (ibdā‘) of one thing directly, scil. Intellect, and of the rest through the mediation of Intellect. This is expressed in a formal way in the opening proposition of the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair (Latin translation: Liber de causis) which draws on texts from the Elements of Theology of Proclus to express the notion that the First Cause is the primary cause that (as indicated in a later proposition) uniquely acts through creation to be responsible for the being in each and every thing. This is a revised presentation of the doctrine of primary and secondary causality set out by Proclus now presented as a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. The unknown author of this work states that the First Cause alone is Creator and that, while all other things are composites of being and form, It is only being (anniyyah faqat = esse tantum) without delimiting form (Chapter 8 (9)).

It is worth pausing here to reflect on just how the causality of the First Cause works. The author states that (i) the First Cause alone gives being to things and as such is the primary cause. (ii) The First Cause is also the cause and Creator of “the first created being” which is Intellect replete with forms. Through this mediating Intellect all things have their quidditative or essential natures or forms such that this Intellect is said to be informing or informative of things. In this way the First Cause makes use of Intellect as a secondary cause through which it acts. (iii) But just how is it possible that the First Cause gives being to every thing first and then things come to be what they are through the informative activity of Intellect? The unknown author of this short work also speaks of begin as the substrate upon which Intellect carries out its activities. In a 2021 article I argue that the causality of the First Cause is paradigmatic causality of participation, not efficient causality. (Taylor 2021, “La Causalité dans le Discours sur le Bien pur, ou Liber de causis arabe,” in Relire les Élement de théologie de Proclus. Réceptions, interprétations antiqus et modernes, pp. 251-276. Paris – Hermann, 2021 In this I follow the work of Cristina D’Ancona.)

   It is under some influence of the PA, the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair, the conception of the True Agent in al-Kindi and other sources that Avicenna developed his own reasoning for a conception of creatio ex nihilo (ibdā‘)  by the unique Wājib al-Wujūd or Necessary Being. Beginning (Metaphysics 1.5) with an account of the notions of  “the existent (al-mawjūd),” “thing (al-shai’),” and “the necessary (al-ḍarūriyy),” Avicenna reasons that these are primary notions impressed on the soul and proceeds to argue dialectically that existents are necessary or possible and that all existents must be reduced to a first and unique Necessary Existent which has no potentiality or possibility. In book 6 of his Metaphysics he establishes that this Existent acts as a metaphysical efficient cause (other than Aristotle’s notion a cause of motion which requires a preexistent potentiality) which involves “the giving of existence to a thing after absolute nonexistence” through ibdā‘. Later in books 8 and 9 he provides more detail on the nature of creation and the Creator reasoning that there are two senses of ibdā‘, one an absolute origination without anything presupposed and one that is an origination that is caused by entities themselves caused by the higher (yielding a hierarchy of intelligences or intellects from the first to the lowest which is cause of the sublunar realm). In this regard it is worth highlighting several key notions for Avicenna: (i) mediate creation is an essential part of his account; (ii) Avicenna calls this action by the Necessary Being a willed act, (which is the only act that the Necessary Being can have due to Its Simplicity); and (iii) creation is not temporal but eternal with no beginning or end, that is, its essential nature is not that of temporal novelty but of ontological dependence.

Available Readings: See the Texts Link above for:

Let’s now turn to some key texts.

Some valuable secondary sources:

Amos Bertolacci, Amos Bertolacci, “Arabic and Islamic Metaphysics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012.

—–, “The Distinction of Essence and Existence in Avicenna’s Metaphysics: The Text and Its Context”, in Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, F. Opwis, and D. C. Reisman (eds.), 2012, Leiden: Brill: 257–288.

—–, “Establishing the Science of Metaphysics,” in Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, Richard C. Taylor & Luis X. López-Farjeat, eds. London & New York: Routledge, 2016, 185-196.

Cristina D’Ancona, “The Liber de causis” in Interpreting Proclus, ed. S. Gersh (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 137-161.

—–, “The Origins of Islamic Philosophy,” The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, L. Gerson (ed) 2010. v. 2, 869-893, 1171-1178.

—–, “Proclus, Denys, le Liber de Causis et la science divine,” in Le comtemplatur et les idées. Modèles de la science divine, du néoplatonism au XVIIIe siècle, O. Boulnois, J. Schmutz and J.-L. Solère (eds.) Paris: Vrin, 2002, 19-44.

Olga Lizzini, “Ibn Sina’s Metaphysics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015.

Available video lectures:

The Plotiniana Arabica:

Creation in the Plotiniana Arabica and Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair:

Avicenna, Metaphysics, Book 1.

Creation in Ibn Sina / Avicenna’s Metaphysics. Three video lectures:

     Video lecture on Avicenna, Metaphysics book 6:

     Video lecture on Avicenna, Metaphysics book 8

     Video lecture on Avicenna, Metaphysics book 9

Lecture materials for PART ONE: the Arabic Tradition

The Plotiniana Arabica (PA)

There were highly influential ninth century translations into Arabic of portions of the Enneads of Plotinus with some substantial doctrinal revisions which appear to have been authored by the Christian translator Ibn Na‘ima al-Himsi in the Plotiniana Arabica (PA) which is the source text for the Theology of Aristotle (TA) edited by al-Kindi. These were among the key sources for the emergence of a new approach to the conception of the One as First Cause and pure being (anniyyah maḥḍah), an approach that transformed Plotinian Platonist or Neoplatonist thought into a something that drew on both Plotinus and Aristotle but is identical with neither. In the PA we find that the One is does and does not transcend being but is itself Pure Being and Only Being as well as completely Simple in its Unity. Properly speaking it is above all names. The being it transcends is finite created being. As such it is the ultimate First Cause of all beings by creatio ex nihilo (ibdā‘) of one thing directly, scil. Intellect, and of the rest through the mediation of Intellect.

The Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair

(Discourse on the Pure Good; Latin Book of Causes / Liber de causis)

         This is expressed in a formal way in the opening proposition of the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair which draws on texts from the Elements of Theology of Proclus to express the notion that the First Cause is the primary cause that (as indicated in a later proposition) uniquely acts through creation to be responsible for the being in each and every thing. This is a revised presentation of the doctrine of primary and secondary causality set out by Proclus now presented as a doctrine of creation ex nihilo.

         Proposition 8 (Latin 8/9):

   The stability and the subsistence of every intelligence are only through the Pure Good which is the First Cause.

   The power of the intelligence is stronger in unity than the second things which are after it because they do not attain to its <level of> knowledge. This came to be so only because it is a cause of what is below it. The proof of that is what we say: the intelligence governs over all the things which are below it through the divine power which is in it, and by <that divine power> it sustains the things because by < the divine power> it is the cause of the things. And it sustains and encompasses all the things which are below it. For every thing which is primary for things and a cause of them is what sustains and governs over those things and none of them escapes it due to its exalted power. The intelligence, therefore, is the leader of all the things which are below it, and <also> their sustainer and governor. Likewise, the intelligence governs over nature through divine power. And the intelligence came to sustain and to govern over the things which are after it and its power is exalted over them, only because they are not a substantial power belonging it, but rather it is the power of the substantial powers because it is a cause of them. The intelligence encompasses <the realm of things> coming-into-being and nature and what is above nature, namely soul, since it is  above nature. For nature encompasses coming-into-being and soul encompasses nature and the intelligence encompasses soul. The intelligence, then, encompasses all things.

   The intelligence came to be so only due to the First Cause which is exalted over all things because it is the cause of intelligence, soul, nature and all other things. And the First Cause is not an intelligence nor a soul nor a nature, but rather it is above intelligence, soul and nature because it is the Originator of all things. However, it is Originator of the intelligence without mediation and the Originator of soul, nature and all other things through the mediation of the intelligence. And Divine Knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge nor like the knowledge of soul, but rather <Divine Knowledge> is above the knowledge of the intelligence and the knowledge of soul because <Divine Knowledge> is the Originator of all types of knowledge. And Divine Power is above every intellectual, soul-based, or natural power because <Divine Power> is cause of every power. And the intelligence possesses form (ḥilyah) because it is being and form (ṣurah), and likewise soul possesses form and nature possesses form, but the First Cause does not have form because it is only being. So if someone says: It must have form, we say: Its form is infinite and its distinctive nature (shakhṣ) is the Pure Good pouring forth all excellences on the intelligence and on all other things through the mediation of the intelligence.

al-Kindi On the True Agent

Al-Kindi: THE AGENT IN  THE PROPER SENSE, BEING FIRST AND PERFECT, AND THE AGENT IN  THE METAPHORICAL SENSE, BEING IMPERFECT. 

We  must explain what is action (fi’l) and in which senses it is used.

The first kind of action in the  proper sense is making existent existences from the  non-existent (ta’yis al-aysat’an lays). It is clear that this  kind of action belongs properly to God, who is the  end of every cause, because making existent existences from the non-existent does not  belong to anybody except Him. To  this  kind of action belongs properly the  name of ‘innovation’ (ibdā’).

The second kind of action in the  proper sense, coming immediately after the  preceding, is the  influence (athar) of one who influences the  thing that is influenced. The true Agent is one who influences without being influenced by  any kind of influence; the  true Agent is therefore one who makes what he  makes without being acted upon in any way. One who is acted upon is one who receives some influence, i.e.  who is acted upon by  an  agent.

Therefore, the  Agent in the  proper sense of the  word, who is not acted upon, is the  Creator, the  maker of the  universe, may He  be praised. On  the  other hand everything beneath Him, i.e.  all His creations, are  only called agent in a metaphorical, not  in the  proper, sense; because in the  proper sense they are  all acted upon. The first of them is acted upon by  the  Creator, the  rest by  each other: the first is acted upon, and through this  passiveness the  next is acted upon, from the  passiveness of the  latter another is acted upon, until we  reach the  last  thing which is acted upon. The first among these is called ‘agent in a metaphorical sense’ of the  first thing which is acted upon, and is the  near cause of its passiveness; similarly, the second is the  near cause of the  passiveness of the  third, until we reach the  last  thing which is acted upon. The Creator, however, is in the  proper sense the  first cause of all things that are  acted upon, both those that are  acted upon through an  intermediary and those without an  intermediary, because He  is active, never passive; only He is the  near cause of the  first passive thing, and a cause through intermediaries to those things that He  acted upon after the  first.

This kind of action, viz.  that belonging to a thing which is acted upon – which is action in a metaphorical sense, not  in the proper sense (as  none of the  agents which are  also acted upon is exclusively active but  exclusively passive, as  its passivity is the cause of the  others’ passivity) – can be  divided into two kinds. One is that kind to which this  general name, viz.  action, belongs in the proper sense, to wit  those things in which the  influence ceases simultaneously with the  passiveness caused by  its agent. For instance, the  walking of a man, which ceases when the  man ceases to walk, as  the  passiveness of the  walker ceases and no  influence remains to be  perceived by  sensation. The second kind is where the  influence remains in the  thing acted upon even after the  source of the  influence remains in the  thing acted upon even after the  source of the  influence ceases to cause passiveness; for  instance, the  impression of a seal, or an  edifice, and similar products of the  crafts. This kind of action is more particularly known by  the  name of ‘work’ (‘amal).

This is sufficient answer to your question. End of the  epistle, praise be  to God.

Translated by  A. Altman and S. M.  Stern in ISAAC ISRAELI (OXFORD 1958) pp.68-69.

Ibn Sīnā / Avicenna on Creation

In addition to reflection on Qur’anic texts since his childhood, Avicenna also had available to him the Plotiniana Arabica, possibly the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair or Liber de causis, works of al-Kindī, works of al-Fārābī, works of Greek commentators, works of Aristotle, and many other resources for his investigations and reasoning on creation. The Arabic root b-d-‘ is extremely important for philosophical discussion of creation, particularly in its fourth form as ibdā‘, origination or creation, and eighth form as ibtidā‘ with the passive participle as mubtada‘ (that which has been originated or created) or in the active participle, mubtadi‘, (that which originates or creates). These terms and related forms appear prominently in the Plotiniana Arabica and the closely related Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair. The sense of the term in these works is that of the bringing about something from no preexisting potency by way of an emanative hierarchy. The One or First Cause brings things about in a way described by the use of the metaphor of emanation. As with Plotinus, this emanation is first of intellect and then through intellect of the rest of reality as a plurality is eventually poured forth into existence. In the Liber de causis special emphasis is put on the First Cause as sole mubdi‘ or Creator since it alone acts without any dependence or connection with anything above itself.

          Other things are said to share in its making of things to be by way of providing form to things, while the Creator alone provides the actuality of being in reality to all things after or below it, doing this through intellect and through lower things such as soul and nature. Note the importance of mediation here insofar as the First Cause requires the mediation of intellect for its action, although the First Cause is said alone to be Creator. God or the First Cause has just one and only one act, the creation of the first created intellect through which the rest of the universe exists.  In the Plotiniana Arabica and the Liber de causis there is only one act because a plurality of acts by the First Cause would abolish the perfect unity and simplicity of God as The True One. Al-Kindi takes this notion of ibdā‘ from the Plotiniana Arabica (which he himself edited to create the work called The Theology of Aristotle) and uses it as one of the ways to express creation ex nihilo. His treatise On the True Agent4 sets out a clear account of primary causality in accord with what is found in the Liber de causis, tracing all actuality-of-being-in-reality back to a first unique agent cause. But al-Kindi’s understanding of Divine creation as willed and as creation in time separates him from these works which deny will and choice of the First Cause. In the Plotiniana Arabica and the Liber de causis the Divinity is said in creation to act eternally and immediately in accord with its goodness and so to emanate and sustain all reality outside itself. With these metaphysical issues in his sources, let’s now proceed to consider Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Shifā’ books 6, 8 & 9.

Avicenna’s Metaphysics book 8 is about the existence and attributes (including unity and uniqueness) of the First Principle. In the opening paragraphs of 8.1 he gives a précis of what is to come later, particularly in 8.3. At 8.1(6) he reasons that there cannot be an infinity of intermediate causes: if the series of causes “is ordered as an infinite plurality and the extreme is not realized, then the entire infinite extreme would share in the special characteristic of intermediacy. . . . Hence, it is impossible for an aggregate of causes to exist without including an uncaused cause and a first cause.” After reasoning in 8.1.(7) that there cannot be an infinity of intermediate causes, he then concludes in (8) “Thus, it has become evident from all these statements that there is here a first cause. For, [even] if that which is between the two extremes were not finite and the extreme exists, then that extreme would be a first for what is infinite and a cause that is not caused.” He later explains,

“We are not speaking here about what in its individuality (not in its specificity) is a principle and what is accidentally (not essentially) a principle. For we allow that there are infinite causes in the past and future. But it is incumbent on us to show finitude in the things that are causes in their essences. This is the state of affairs in the second of the two divisions — [this] after we also seek assistance from what has been said in the Physics.”

At 8.3(5) Avicenna begins his argument for a first efficient cause by drawing on his discussion from Book 1 on the Necessary Existent and at (6) he explicitly references it writing,

“we have previously explained that the Necessary Existent is numerically one . . . [E]verything, with the exception of the One who is in His essence one and the existent who is in His essence an existent, acquires existence from another . . . .” He then writes, “This is the meaning of a thing’s being created — that is, attaining existence from another. It has absolute nonexistence which it deserves in terms of itself; it is deserving of nonexistence not only in terms of its form without its matter, or in terms of its matter without its form, but in its entirety. Hence, if its entirety is not connected with the necessitation of the being that brings about its existence, and it is reckoned as being dissociated from it, then in its entirety its nonexistence becomes necessary. Hence, its coming into being at the hands of what brings about its existence is in its entirety. No part of it, in relation to this meaning, is prior in existence — neither its matter nor its form, if it possesses matter and form.”

That is Avicenna’s third definition of creation. The other two are in 6.2.  He writes at 6.2 (9):

“[I]f something by virtue of its essence is a cause for the existence of something else that is permanent, then it is its permanent cause as long as its essence exists. If [the cause] exists permanently, then its effect exists permanently. Such a thing among causes would then have the higher claim to causality because it prevents the absolute nonexistence of the thing. It is the one that gives complete existence to the thing. This, then, is the meaning that, for the philosophers, is termed ‘creation (ibdā‘).’ It is the giving of existence to a thing after absolute nonexistence. For it belongs to the effect in itself to be nonexistent and [then] to be, by its cause, existing. That which belongs in the thing intrinsically is more prior in essence for the mind ([though] not in time) than that which belongs to it from another.”

Avicenna goes on at 6.2 (11), “If its existence were after absolute nonexistence, then its proceeding from the cause in this manner would be ‘creation (ibdā‘an),’ and it would represent the highest mode of the giving of existence, because nonexistence would have been utterly prevented, existence being fully empowered over it. . . .”  And in 6.3 (7) he adds,

“Hence, the whole, in relation to the first cause, is created. Its act of bringing into being that which comes to be from it would entirely rule out nonexistence in the substances of things. Rather, it is an act of bringing into existence that absolutely prevents nonexistence in things that bear perpetualness. This, then, is absolute creation. Bringing into existence [in the] absolute [sense] is not any kind of bringing into existence. And everything is originated from that One, that One being the originator of it, since the originated is that which comes into being after not having been.”

And in 6.3(8) he concludes chapter three writing,

“[T]he state of affairs that a thing possesses from itself precedes that which it has from another. If it has existence and necessity from another, then from itself it has nonexistence and possibility. Its nonexistence was prior to its existence, and its existence is posterior to nonexistence, [involving] a priority and posteriority in essence. Hence, in the case of everything other than the First, the One, its existence comes about after not having been [a nonbeing] that it itself deserves.”

Book 9 is on emanation from God and the return to God, and Ch. 1 is entitled, “On the attribute of the efficacy (or agency, fā‘ilīyah) of the First Principle.” For our concerns here, the key teachings are in chapter 1, paragraphs (19) and following which constitute a critique of the notion of a creation in time. Avicenna writes at the beginning of (19),

“Moreover, by what does the First precede His created acts? By His essence or by time? If only by His essence, as one is to two (even though both are simultaneous) and as the movement of the thing in motion in that it moves by the motion of that which moves it (even though both are simultaneous), then it follows necessarily that both are temporally originated — [that is,] the eternal First and the acts generated from Him.”

The issue is one of conceptual and real coherence: was there a time before the creation of time and motion? To this Avicenna responds in (21):

“[Now,] if He did not precede by some past thing the first temporal moment of the origination of creation, then He would have come into being in time with its temporal coming to being. How, according to the [things] they had posited, would He not have preceded the first moment of creation by some state when He “was” and there was no creation, and [then] He “was” and there was creation?”

At 9.4 (11) Avicenna provides an account of the necessary and the possible which finds emanation as the installation of plurality in the world by God. He then goes on in (12) to assert that origination or creation as ibdā‘ —  which was reserved by the earlier tradition of the Plotinina Arabica and Liber de causis to God alone — as creation can appropriately be asserted in the description of the activity of the mediate intellects in the Avicennian emanative hierarchy. That is, Avicenna teaches mediate creation though he also continues to hold the doctrine of primary causality tracing every entity back to the First. He does so by allowing that creation as ibdā‘ is the origination of something by an efficient cause without any pre-existing external substrate in which that origination takes place. This sense of ibdā‘ suits both God and the hierarchy of emanated intellects. However, a more strict sense of ibdā‘ denotes Divine creation which depends on nothing prior and presupposes nothing prior to its act. In contrast, the created and emanated intellects presuppose something prior to its existence, a higher intellect or the Deity Itself. In this way Avicenna presents a distinction between Divine creation ex nihilo and mediate creation ex nihilo.

What we see in the preceding texts of Avicenna is a clear insistence that creation necessarily requires efficient causality even if that efficient causality is eternal. There is nothing outside of the First Cause or God as prior either as a cause above God or as a material substrate in which the Divine action of creation comes to be. While Avicenna certainly holds for a final causality that draws all things to perfection, his understanding of creation is that of a procession of all created things from God by efficient causality. Creation cannot take place without Divine efficient causality. No activity can properly be denominated creation in the absence of efficient causality.

On the issue of Divine Will, Avicenna absolutely contradicts the Plotinian Arabic texts which denied will of the Creator when he writes,

“If [someone] says of Him “willer,” he would mean only that the Necessary Existent’s being with His intellectuality — that is, the negation of matter in Him — is the principle of the entire order of the good, and that He intellectually apprehends this. This would, hence, be composed of a relation and a negation.” (8.7, M 296)

Now in Metaphysics 8, c.4, Ibn Sīnā speaks of certain necessary concomitants (lawāzim) that proceed from the Divine essence. He writes,

“The first and essential act of the First Truth, however, is to intellectually apprehend His [own] essence, which in itself is the principle of the order of the good in existence. He thus intellectually apprehends the order of the good in existence and how this ought to be-not [however] through an intellectual apprehension that moves from potentiality to actuality, nor [through] an intellectual apprehension that moves from one intelligible to another (for His essence is free from what is potential in all respects, as we have previously made clear), but by one act of intellection.” (9.4, M 327)

He then adds,

“It becomes a necessary concomitant of what He intellectually apprehends of the order of the good in existence that He apprehends intellectually how [this order] is possible and how the best thing to take place is for the existence of the whole to come about in accordance with what He intellectually apprehends. For the reality that is intellectually apprehended with Him is itself, as you have known, knowledge, power, and will.” (9.4, M 327)

In this way the bringing about of good in existence is a necessary concomitant of the Divine essence just as is will and this is brought about by the Divine essence itself.

         Finally, let me mention that the teaching of Ibn Sina on the unitary and  singular action of the First or God as a manifestation of the good of God which can be described as willing God’s first action of creating the first created intellect and all else through that interestingly reflects what is found in Plotinus Enneads 6.8. There Plotinus discusses the freedom of the One as pure actuality (energeia) denying that its action is through an external cause or through an internal necessity of its nature. In that section of the Enneads Plotinus goes on to reason in his post-Stoic context that the action of the One unburdened by external or internal necessity can suitably be described as an actions of boulēsis or will. The account of Ibn Sina is remarkably similar in several respects to what is found in Enneads 6.8. This is quite interesting since at present we have evidence of parts of Enneads 6.7 and 6.9 in extant Arabic texts though not of Enneads 6.8. I am inclined to think that Ibn Sina had access to the thinking found in Enneads 6.8 because of the similarities of discussion and doctrine but this remains a matter of further research. Plotinus himself initiates the discussion with a consideration of human freedom and willing and proceeds to reason that will should not be denied of the One though that willing is not an action distinct from the unitary and single action of the One. Avicenna reasons in a like manner.

Preview Part Two: Aquinas

   Aquinas drew deeply on the Arabic tradition for the insights of Avicenna and the author of the text he knew as the Liber de causis for key parts of his doctrine of being and creation. Nevertheless, he used those sources in a critical way revising and rethinking for himself the reasoning coming from the Arabic tradition. Treating these as philosophical materials and restructuring their arguments, he used religious sources such as Scripture, the writings of (ps.)Dionysius and also the analyses of Anselm on the perfections of God to craft his own distinctive doctrines. Through the review of key texts we will uncover much of this to the extent that our time allows.

Lecture materials for PART TWO: Aquinas

Citing Aquinas’s Commentary on the Liber de causis (ca. 1272), prop. 18, Rudi te Velde (Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Leiden: Brill, 1995, p.256) writes,

“That God, who is being itself and the essence of goodness, enjoys the perfections of life and understanding in an essential way, so that he may be called “life itself’ and “understanding itself,” is because the perfection of being virtually includes every other perfection  This seems to me the crucial point in Thomas’s defence of monotheism. God can be understood to be one only if it can be shown that his simple being includes all the diverse perfections of things, i.e. that God possesses the fullness of perfection in virtue of his being alone. This means that the Neoplatonic concept of participation undergoes a fundamental transformation in Aquinas. In his own concept of participation it can no longer be a matter of reducing the complex and the concrete reality to its formal and abstract principles. In spite of his frequent use of a Platonic vocabulary there is one central tenet of Platonism Thomas cannot accept, namely the rule that what is common in a thing must be reduced to one principle and what is more proper to that thing must be reduced to another, inferior principle.”

Aquinas, In 1 Sent d. 8 q. 1 a. 1, Mandonnet v. 1, pp. 194-197. 

Whether being (esse) is properly said of God, (R. E. Houser, tr., R. Taylor rev.)

         To the first we proceed as follows. 1. It seems that being is not properly said of God. For what is proper to something is what belongs to it alone.  But being belongs not to God alone but rather also to creatures.  Therefore it seems that being does not belong properly to God.

         2. Furthermore, we can name God only insofar as we know Him. Hence the Damascene [lib. 1, Fid. orth., cap. xiii, col. 858, t.1] <writes that> “The word is an angel, that is, an messenger of intellect.” But we cannot know God in an immediate way in this life but <rather> only from creatures.  Therefore neither <can we> name <Him>.  Since, therefore, “He who is” does not indicate a relation to creatures, it seems that it does not properly name God.

         3. Furthermore, just as created wisdom is deficient in reference to uncreated wisdom, so too created being <is deficient> in reference to uncreated being.  But for this reason the name of wisdom is said to be deficient in relation to the perfect signification of divine wisdom, because it is imposed by us in accord with the apprehension of created wisdom. Therefore it seems that by the same reasoning neither does this name “He who is” properly signify divine being.  And in this way it is not necessary that it be called a more proper name of Him than other names.

         4. Again, the Damascene [lib. I Fid. orth., cap. IX, col. 834, t. 1] says that “He who is” does not signify what God is but rather a certain infinite sea of substance.  But the infinite is incomprehensible and consequently not able to be named but <rather is> unknown. Therefore it seems that “He who is” is not a divine name.

To the contrary is Exodus 3, 14, “The Lord said to Moses, ‘If they ask my name, say the following to the sons of Israel: He who is sent me to you.” The same is seen in the Damascene, as indicated above [cap. 9], who says that “He who is” is the name of God proper in the highest degree. <This is also indicated by> Rabbi Moses <Maimonides> who says that this name is the ineffable name of God which has been held to be most worthy.

Solution. I respond that it should be said that of all the other names “He who is” is the name of God proper in the highest degree. The reason for this can be fourfold: the first is taken from the text of the words of Jerome regarding the perfection of Divine being.  For the perfect is that which has nothing outside it.  Our being, however, has something of itself outside itself, for it lacks something which has already passed by for it and something which is yet to come. But in Divine being nothing has passed by nor is there anything to come.  For this reason His whole being is perfect and on account of this being properly befits Him with reference to all other things.  The second reason is taken from the words of the Damascene [lib. I Fid. orth., cap. IX] who says that “He who is” signifies indeterminate being and not what He is.  <This is> because in this life we know of Him only that He is and not what He is, except through negation and we are able to name <something> only insofar as we know <it>. For this reason He is most properly named by us “He who is.” The third reason is taken from the words of Dionysius who says that among all the other divine participations of goodness such as to live, to understand and the like, it is first and <is> as a principle for all the others having in itself all the others mentioned united in a certain way. In this way God is also the Divine principle and all things are one in Him.  The fourth reason can be taken from the words of Avicenna [tract. 8 Metaphysics, cap. 1] in the sense that, since in everything which is there can be considered its quiddity through which it subsists in a determinate nature and its being in virtue of which it is said of it that it is in act, then this name “thing” is imposed on the thing from its quiddity, <and> according to Avicenna [tract II Metaphysics, cap. 1] this name “who is” or “being” is imposed from its act of being. Since, however, it is the case that in any created being its essence differs from its being, that thing is properly denominated by its quiddity and not by the act of being, as human being by humanity. However, in God His very being is His quiddity. And for this reason the name taken from being names Him properly and is His proper name, just as the proper name of a human being which is taken from its quiddity.

         To the first, therefore, it should be said that when something is said properly to belong to something, this can be understood in two ways. (1) <It can be understood> that in virtue of what it means to be proper to something everything extraneous to the nature of the subject is excluded, as when it is said that it is property of a human being to be able to laugh, because it belongs to nothing extraneous to the nature of a human being.  In this way being is not said to be a property of God because it also belongs to creatures.  Or (2) <it can be understood> insofar as everything extraneous to the nature of what is predicated is excluded, as when it is said that this thing is properly gold because it does not have the admixture of another metal, and in this way being is called a property belonging to God because Divine being does not have some privation or potentiality as does the being of a creature.  For this reason propriety and truth are taken for the same in the text, for we say that true gold is what is unmixed with what is extraneous.

         To the second it should be said that God comes to be named from creatures in three ways.  <This occurs> in one way when the name itself actually connotes an effect in the creature owing to a relation to the creature implied in the name, as Creator and Lord. <It occurs> in another way when the name itself in virtue of its notion names the principle of some divine act in creatures, such as wisdom, power and will.  <It occurs> in another way when the name itself indicates something represented in creatures, such as living, for every <sort of> life is exemplified by Divine life.  Likewise this name “He who is” names God through being found in creatures which has been derived from him in the way of exemplar.

         To the third it should be said that, since the being of a creature imperfectly represents Divine being, this name, “He who is,” also imperfectly signifies it because it signifies in the manner of a certain concretion and composition.  But it signifies still imperfectly through other names, for when I say, God is wise, then, when being is included in this statement, a twofold imperfection is signified there.  One is on the part of concrete being itself, as in this name, “He who is,” and another is added from the proper notion of wisdom.  For created wisdom is deficient in reference to the notion of divine wisdom.  On account of this the imperfection is greater in the other names than in this name, “He who is,” and for this reason this is a more worthy and more proper of God.

         To the fourth it should be said that all other names indicate being according to some determined notion (ratio), as wise indicates some being. But this name, “He who is,” indicates being absolute and undetermined by something added. For this reason the Damascene says that it does not signify what God is but rather it signifies a certain infinite sea of substance, as if undetermined.  Hence, when we proceed to God by way of remotion, we first deny of Him corporeal things; second <we deny of him> also intellectual things, insofar as they are found in creatures, such as goodness and wisdom. Then there remains in our intellect only that He is and nothing more. Consequently it is as in a certain confusion.  Finally, however, we even remove from Him being itself insofar as it is in creatures.  And then He remains in a certain darkness of ignorance <and> according to this ignorance, to the extent that it pertains to the present life, we are conjoined to God in the the best way, as Dionysius says, and this is a certain obscurity in which God is said to dwell.

Aquinas, In 2 Sent d.1, q.1, a.2

(Translated from the uncorrected Latin text received from Dr. Adriano Oliva, O.P.)

Whether anything can go forth from Him by creation

To the second we proceed as follows.

1. It  seems that in creation nothing can go forth from God into being. For everything that comes to be was possible before coming to be. <This is> because, if not, it was equally impossible for it to come to be and necessary that it not come to be, and so this would not be right.  But for whatever is possible to come to be or to be moved is possible through a passive potency.  Since this <potency> is not a being existing per se, it must be that it is in some being which is in potency.  But nothing is a being in potency in relation to something unless it is also something in act. Therefore, everything which comes to be, comes to be from some being preexisting in act.  But no such thing is created, because to create is to make something from nothing, as is said in the Text <of Lombard>.  Therefore, nothing can be created by God.

2. Furthermore, in every change there is something from which there is change per se, because every change is between two termini. But that from which something comes to be per se must remain in what comes to be, either wholly if it is from it as from matter, as the knife from iron; or according to some part of it, namely, according to matter, as if it is said that a whole comes to be from a whole, as flesh comes to be from food.  For from whiteness blackness is not said to come to be except per accidens, that is, after whiteness, as also it is said that the day comes to be from night. If, therefore, something is said to come to be from non-being, it is necessary that non-being — or some part of it, even though it nevertheless has no part — remain in being, and that it be at once being and non-being, which is impossible. Therefore, everything that comes to be comes from some being. Therefore, it seems impossible that something be created by God.

3. Furthermore, nothing permanent at once comes to be and has come to be. <This is> because, while it comes to be it is not, and while it has come to be it is, it is not the case that at once is and is not. If, therefore, some permanent thing comes to be from God, it is necessary that there be a coming-to-be be before its being. But, since becoming is an accident, it cannot be without a subject. Therefore, it is necessary that everything that comes to be come to be from something in which there is a coming-to-be as in a subject. But no such thing is created. Therefore, nothing can come to be through creation.

4. Furthermore, if creation is something, since it is not a substance, it must be an accident. However, every accident is in some subject. But it cannot be in the very thing created as in a subject, because this is its terminus.  For in this way the thing created by creation would be prior insofar as it is its subject and posterior insofar as it is the terminus.  Therefore, it is necessary that it be in some matter from which the created thing comes to be. And this is contrary to the very notion (ratio) of creation.  Therefore, creation is nothing.

5. Furthermore, if creation is something, it is either the creator or the creature. But it is not the creator, because in that way it would be from eternity and in this way creatures <would exist> from eternity. Therefore, it is the creature. But every creature is created by some creation, and in this way there would be creation of creation into infinity. That is impossible, as is evident from Physics 5, where it is shown that there is no action of action into infinity. Therefore, it is impossible that there be creation.

1. But on the contrary is what is said in Genesis 1, « In the beginning God created, etc. »

2. Furthermore, every agent acts insofar as it is in act. But that which is partially in act and partially in potency, brings about a thing according to something of itself, namely by introducing the form into matter. Therefore, since the first being — namely God — is act without admixture of potency, it seems that He can bring about the entire thing according to its entire substance. This is to create. Therefore, it seems that God is able to create. Nevertheless, it should be known that, since creation of its own notion implies a precedent negation because what is created which is such that nothing preexists its production, then that precedence can be taken according to nature alone so that it is understood that what is created <is such that> it has in it nothing taken as preexisting and as acting as a subject for what is created.  It is in this way that creation can be demonstrated and has been conceded by the philosophers. Or it can be taken according to duration so that it is understood that what is created before had no being and afterwards has being. We accept creation in this way and not in the way that it has been asserted by the philosophers.  Nor can it be demonstrated but rather it is held by faith.

I respond that it should be said that faith holds not only that there is creation but also that reason demonstrates <it>. For, it is the case that everything which is in some genus comes forth as imperfect from that in which the nature of the genus is found primarily and perfectly, as it clear concerning heat in hot things <which come> from fire. However, since any given thing and whatever is in the thing participates being in some way, even if mixed with the imperfect, it is necessary that every thing according to the whole of what is in it arise from the first and perfect entity. But we call this to create, namely produce a thing in being according to its whole substance. Hence, it is necessary that all things proceed from the first principle through creation.

Nevertheless, it should be known that the notion of creation involves two things. The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing which is said to be created. Hence, in this it differs from all other changes, because generation presupposes matter which is not generated but through generation is made complete as transformed into the act of a form, while for the other <kinds of> changes a subject which is a complete being is presupposed. Hence, the causality of what generates or changes does not extend itself to everything found in the thing but [only] to the form which is educed from potency into act.  But the causality of creating extends itself to all that is in the thing.  For this reason creation is said to be from nothing because there is nothing which preexists creation as if uncreated.   The second is that in the thing which is said to be created non being is prior to being, not by a priority of time or duration so that earlier it was not and afterwards it is, but by a priority of nature in such a way that if the created thing is left to itself non being would result. For it has being only from the influence of a superior cause.  For what does not have being from another is prior to what has being from another.  On the basis of this creation differs from eternal generation, for it cannot be said that, if left to himself the Son of God does not have being, since he receives from the Father that very same being which belongs to the Father, which is unqualified being not dependent on anything. 

For those two reasons creation is said to be from nothing in two ways. One is such that the negation negates the order of creation in regard to something preexisting implied by the preposition from, so that being is said to be from nothing because it is not from something preexisting. That is with respect to the first. The other is such that the order of creation in regard to nothing preexisting remains affirmed with respect to nature so that creation is said to be from nothing because the thing created naturally has non being prior to being. If these two suffice for the notion (ratio) of creation, then creation can be demonstrated in this way and in this way the philosophers have asserted creation.  However, if we take a third [consideration] to be required for the meaning of creation so that the thing created has non being in duration before being so that it is said to be from nothing because it is temporally after nothing, creation cannot be demonstrated in this way nor is this conceded by the philosophers, but is supposed by faith.

To the first it should be said that according to Avicenna agent (agens)has two senses, one natural which is agent through motion and another divine which is the giving of being, as was said. Similarly, it is necessary to take brought about (actum) or made (factum) in two ways. One [is] through the motion of a natural agent. Everything such as this must come to be because not only an active but also passive potency precedes <it> in time, because motion is the act of what exists in potency. The other <is such that> it is made insofar as it receives being from a divine agent without motion.  If that thing made is new, it is necessary that an active and not passive potency precede its being and such a <newly> made thing is said to be possible to come-to-be by an active potency. However, if it is not new, then an active potency does not precede <it> by duration but rather by nature.

To the second it should be said that creation is not a <kind of> making which is a change properly speaking but rather is a certain reception of being. Hence, it is not necessary that it have an essential order except to what gives being. In this way it is not from non being except insofar as it is after non being, as night is from day.

To the third it should be said that no permanent thing can at once come to be and have been made <to come to be>, if coming into being is taken in the proper sense. But there are some things which signify that proper (rectum) being through the mode of becoming, as when motion is said to be terminated.  For, as <something> is at once terminated and has been terminated, so likewise <something> is illuminated and has been illuminated at once, as the Commentator says in [his commentary] on Physics 4. Similarly too substantial form is at once received and has been received and similarly [too] something is at once created and has been created. If it is objected that before every being that has been made to come to be there is a coming into being properly understood, I say that it is true in regard to all things which come to be through motion, as generation follows the motion of change and illumination <follows> local motion. However, it is not so in regard to creation, as was said.

To the fourth it should be said that creation can be taken actively or passively. If it is taken actively, when creation signifies a divine operation which is its essence with a certain relation, in this way creation is the divine substance. However, if it is taken passively, in this way <creation> is a certain accident in the creature and it signifies a certain thing, not what is in the category of passion properly speaking but what is in the genus of relation.  It is a certain disposition of what has being from another following upon a divine operation. In this way it is not inappropriate that it be in the created thing which is educed through creation as in a subject.  As sonship is in Peter insofar as he receives human nature from his father, nor is it prior to Peter himself. But it follows upon an action and a motion, which are prior. However, the relation of creation does not follow motion but rather only a divine action which is prior to the creature.

To the fifth it should be said, as was said earlier in the first [article of this Question], whenever a creature is referred to the creator, a relation is really founded in the creature and in God <a relation> is only according to reason. Hence, the very relation implied in the name of creation does not assert <the existence of> something uncreated but rather only something created.  Nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be created by another creation, because that which is a relation essentially is not referred to something else by another mediate relation, as was said in the first [article of this Question], except by reason. It is not impossible that relations of this sort which are according to reason alone to be multiplied into infinity.

In 2 Sent d.1 q.1 a.4 Resp.

Whether To Create Belongs to Things Other than God

Response:

“I respond that it should be said that there is a threefold opinion regarding this. (i) For some have asserted that from the First Cause there is immediately one first effect from which are the rest of things afterward and so forth; hence, they asserted that one intellect is caused by the mediation of another, soul by the mediation of intellect, and natural bodies by a spiritual mediation. This is condemned as heresy because this opinion attributes to a creature the honor owed to God. So it is close to drawing one into idolatry. (ii) Others said that creation belongs to no creature nor is it even communicable [to any creature] as to be of infinite power which the work of creation requires is not communicable [to any creature]. (iii) Others have said that creation is communicated to no creation, although it could have been communicated. This the Master (Peter Lombard) asserts [at Book 4, distinction 5, at the end]. However, both of these last opinions seem to me to be true in a sense. For since the notion of creation involves that there not pre-exist anything prior (to the created thing), at least according to the order of nature, this can be taken either from the perspective of the one creating or from the perspective of the thing created. If taken from the perspective of the one creating, in this way that action is said to be a creation which is not founded on the action of some preceding cause. In this way the action is characteristic only of the First Cause. This is because every action of a second cause is founded on the action of the First Cause. Hence, just as it cannot be communicated to some creature that it be the First Cause, so too it cannot be communicated to it that it be a creator. If taken from the perspective of the created thing, there is in this way a creation properly for that of something not pre-existing in it, and this is being (esse). Hence, it is said in the Book of Causes [= Latin translation of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair] that being is through creation; and elsewhere in the same book it is said that being is through creation and other perfections are superadded through information, and chiefly in composite things that being which belongs to the first part, namely matter. Accepting creation from that perspective, it could have been communicated to a creature, as through the power of the First Cause operating in it some simple being or matter may be produced. In this way the philosophers asserted that the intelligences create, although it is heretical.”

Hints from the Quaestio de attributis: In 1 Sent d.2 q.1 a. 3.

         Aquinas originally wrote Commentary on the Sentences, d. 2, q. 1 with just four articles. The first on the unity of divine essence and the second on unity in the context of a diversity of attributes followed by an article on unity and the divine persons and another on whether the plurality of divine persons is real or only conceptual. But some years later he took up what has been called the Quaestio de attributisand inserted between the second and third article a new article considerably longer than the others. This inserted article he labelled, “Whether the plurality of rationes according to which the <divine> attributes  differ is in some way in God or only in the intellect of someone reasoning <about them>.

         Aquinas here is dealing with the challenges raised by Mose Maimonides regarding whether human beings can properly name God such that they understand what God is. He rejected the idea that humans can form proper names or attributes for God simply because they know God only through negations or through causality, neither of which penetrate to the divine essence in its very nature. Aquinas seems to be the first in the history of the issue to note that this is something Maimonides derives from Avicenna who said precisely that God is only known through negation and causality. But Aquinas, whom we have already seen to rely on the metaphysical reasoning of Avicenna for a philosophical account of the very essence of God, has to find another way of explanation since he firmly holds that God’s essence is knowable by human being even if that knowledge is weak. For assistance in his reasoning Aquinas draws on three additional sources: (i) Anselm’s discussion of perfections in the Monologion, (ii) the characterization in Dionysius of God as pre-possessing all perfections, and (iii) the Liber de causis. The first two are theological sources important to Aquinas that affirm the unity of God and the fullness of perfections in God. His third source, however, takes him back to the conception of God spelled out by Avicenna but allows him to provide a different interpretation. For Avicenna God is the Necessary Being and an absolute unity whose willing act of creating the world eternally is also consequent upon Its Necessary Being. But Aquinas declined to speak of God as the Necessary Being trandscending essence and naming in the De ente et essentia. Instead he chose to interpret Avicenna through the work he knew as the Liber de causis, that is, the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair we discussed earlier. 

         Providing his own understanding of the Latin Liber de causis in De ente et essentia, Aquinas considers Divine Being as what is uniquely the fullness of being in its infinite perfections and in Its very nature and essence as the referent and source of all perfections found in creatures. In this way attributes are not derived from creatures but rather derived to creatures from the First Cause where they are found in their perfection. In Arabic proposition 8 (Latin 8 or 9) of the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khayr / Liber de causis, the author explains that all things except for the First Cause — which is “only being” (anniyyatun faqat / esse tantum) — are composed of being and form (ḥilya), as we have seen. The author then goes on to state that “if someone says: He must have form (ḥilya), we say: His form is infinite and His essential nature is the Pure Good pouring forth all goods on the intelligence and on all other things through the mediation of the intelligence.” Aquinas

Let’s look at the text of the De ente et essentia where Aquinas uses Avicenna’s reasoning but turns to the Liber de causis for a proper conception of God:

“From what has been said we can see how essence is found in different things. There are in fact three ways in which substances have essence. There is a reality, God, whose essence is his very being. This explains why we find some philosophers who claim that God does not have a quiddity or essence, because his essence is not other than his being. From this it follows that he is not in a genus, for everything in a genus must have a quiddity in addition to its being. The reason for this is that the quiddity or nature of a genus or species does not differ, as regards the notion of the nature, in the individuals in the genus or species, whereas being is diverse in these different individuals.

“If we say that God is pure being, we need not fall into the mistake of those who held that God is that universal being by which everything formally exists. The being that is God is such that no addition can be made to it. Because of its purity, therefore, it is being distinct from all other being. That is why the commentary on the Book of Causes says that the first cause, which is pure being, is individuated through its pure goodness. But even though the notion of universal being does not include any addition, it implies no prescinding from an addition. If it did, we could not conceive anything existing in which there would be an addition to being.

“Furthermore, although God is pure being, it is not necessary that he lack other perfections or excellences. On the contrary, he possesses all the ‘perfections of every kind of thing, so that he is called absolutely perfect, as the Philosopher and Commentator say. In fact, he possesses these perfections in a more excellent way than other things, because in him they are one, whereas in other things they are diversified. This is because all these perfections belong to him in virtue of his simple being. In the same way if someone could produce the operations of all the qualities through one quality alone, in that one quality he would possess every quality. Similarly, God possesses all perfections in his being itself.” (tr. Maurer, corrected; Leonine v.43, pp. 378a-b)

         This brings us back to the quotation from Prof. te Velde and the issue of just how the nature of being is to be conceived. While adopting much from Avicenna, Aquinas could not accept that God is the Necessary Existent as conceived by Avicenna and that the Necessary Being is without essence.

Instead, for Aquinas the fullness of being in its primary instance of God as ipsum esse per se subsistens could not be anything but a uniquely simple singular entity full with infinite perfections and altogether free. And God as existence (esse) and essence (essentia) is knowable so as to be seen in ultimate human fulfillment.

But let me add a caveat: In the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair / Liber de causis in Proposition 5(6) the author says that the First Cause transcends attributes and in Proposition 21 (22) that It is above every name. Is this compatible with Aquinas’s view that “God possesses all perfections in his being itself”?