Topic: Intellect, Divinity, and the Good in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Traditions
This In-Person Conference is intended to provide a formal occasion and central location for philosophers and scholars of the Midwest region (and anywhere elsewhere) to present and discuss their current work on Aristotle and his interpreters in ancient and medieval philosophy.
Please note: Plans are for an in-person conference. We will switch to a hybrid or fully online format only in the event of a significant surge in local Milwaukee area COVID infection rates. If a presenter selected for the conference program is later barred from travel due to COVID infection rates in the home country or region, we will arrange for an online presentation.
Registration: Contact Prof. Owen Goldin (Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu), Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
Presented by the Marquette Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy & the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group (AAIWG) with the support of the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University
Sixteenth Annual Marquette Summer Seminar on Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition
20-22 June 2022
Beaumier Conference Center B-C
Raynor Memorial Library
PRESENTERS: Established Scholars: send a title and tentative abstract (not exceeding 500 words); Graduate Students: send a title, abstract (not exceeding 500 words) and have your faculty advisor or dissertation director email indicating that you are doing professional level work. (This need not be a full recommendation.) Send applications to:
CLOSING DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS: 15 February 2022
The Organizing Committee will select presenters on the basis of promise of quality of proposals (title and abstract) and scholarly record as the primary criteria. Presenters selected will be asked to confirm their participation by registering and paying the conference fee ($45).
PROGRAM ANNOUNCED: March 15, 2022 or earlier
ATTENDING ONLY: Send Registration check with name, address, academic affiliation.
CONFERENCE REGISTRATION REQUIRED FOR ALL PRESENTERS AND ATTENDEES
(fees cover breakfasts, refreshments, picnic dinner one night)
Advance Registration ($40 by check) Deadline: May 1, 2022 (except for presenters who must confirm earlier)
NOTE => After May 1 Registration only at the door: $45 cash.
CHECKS SHOULD BE MADE OUT TO: Marquette University
(Fees are waived for Marquette students, faculty and staff for on campus events only.)
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Owen Goldin
Philosophy Department
Marquette University
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Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
For housing options, see the bottom of this webpage (forthcoming).
Conference Schedule 2022
All sessions will be held in the Beaumier Conference Center in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.
For a campus map, click https://www.marquette.edu/campus-map/marquette-map.pdf
Monday 20 June Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: [1] Emma Irwin, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, “Aristotle’s ‘Active Intellect’ and the ‘God’ of Advaita Vedānta: A Comparative Re-Examination”
10:20-11:35 am [2] Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University, “Understanding Intellect and Distinguishing Ibn Rushd and Averroes“
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch: suggestions: Law School Cafe (very good and convenient), AMU (Student Union), local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: [3] Riza Kalyoncu, Ibn Haldun University, “The Layers of Meaning in Fārābī’s Philosophy”
2:20-3:35 pm [4] Karen Taliaferro, Arizona State University, “Sharʿa and sharīʿa: A study of divine law in a trilogy of Ibn Rushd’s works”
3:40-5:00 pm [5] Hashem Morvarid, University of Illinois-Chicago, “Avicenna on the Ontology of Common Natures”
Dinner suggestions will be provided at the meeting. Restaurants in downtown Milwaukee (click HERE)
TUESDAY 21 June: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: [6] Jean Keller, College of St. Benedict/St. John’s University, “Embodied Wisdom: Neuroscience, Trauma, and Practice of the Virtues”
10:20-11:35 am [7] David Bradshaw, University of Kentucky, “Contingency, Free Choice, and the Prime Mover”
11:40 am-1:00 pm Lunch: suggestions: Law School Cafe, AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.
1:00-2:15 pm: [8] Roy C. Lee, Stanford University, “God’s Authority Over Prudence in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics”
2:20-3:35 pm [9] Bryan Reece, University of Arkansas, “A Theophrastean Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5”
3:40-5:00 pm [10] Hannah Laurens, University of St. Andrews, “Nous in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.9”
6:00 pm Picnic (TBA) Carpooling available.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 22: Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library
9-10:15 am: [11] Matthew Vanderkwaak, University College, Dublin, “The Art of the First Cause: forma fluens and the Image of the Cosmic Artist in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Liber de causis”
10:20-11:35 am [12] Samuel Baker, University of South Alabama, “Should We Honor the Truth More Than Our Friends?: Aristotle’s Reasoning at Nicomachean Ethics I 6, 1096a11-17””
Dinner suggestions will be provided at the meeting. Restaurants in downtown Milwaukee (click HERE)
Abstracts in Alphabetical Order
[12] Samuel Baker, University of South Alabama, “Should We Honor the Truth More Than Our Friends?: Aristotle’s Reasoning at Nicomachean Ethics I 6, 1096a11-17”
Abstract: This paper will consist of a close reading of NE I 6, 1096a11-17. I begin by explaining why Aristotle would have written such lines–namely, because he thinks that ethical discourse is undermined when we do not practice what we preach (NE X I, 1172a34-b1), and it may seem that he is acting in an unfriendly way towards Plato by criticizing the theory of forms. I then explain Aristotle’s reasoning in three steps. First, Aristotle thinks that virtuous self-love consists in loving one’s intellect most of all, and truth is the good of the intellect (cf. NE VI 2). Second, Aristotle thinks that truth is also the goal of philosophy, and that philosophy is not a mere craft but a way of life. And third, Aristotle thinks that true friendship is virtue-friendship which must be based on the love of the truth above any other value. Because honor is due to excellence, and truth is more excellent than our friendship insofar as it is the cause of our friendship being good and excellent, we must honor the truth more than our friends.
[7] David Bradshaw, University of Kentucky, “Contingency, Free Choice, and the Prime Mover” Abstract: Is there contingency in Aristotle’s universe? And if so, does such contingency include the exercise of free choice? Texts can be cited on both sides of these questions. The description of rational potency in Metaphysics IX presents such potency as a capacity for acting in ways that are not otherwise determined. Likewise, the account in the Nicomachean Ethics of what is “up to us” seems to presuppose that at least some choices are undetermined by both external factors and the agent’s current state. On the other hand, the argument for the Prime Mover in Physics VIII explicitly includes acts of the soul within the causal chain the must be traced back to a first unmoved mover. So it seems that, even if human choices are otherwise undetermined, they are in some way be caused by the Prime Mover. The difficulty lies in determining in what way they are caused and whether such causation leaves room for indeterminacy. This paper will attempt to address that question.
[1] Emma Irwin, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, “Aristotle’s ‘Active Intellect’ and the ‘God’ of Advaita Vedānta: A Comparative Re-Examination”.
Abstract: In this paper I engage with interpretive questions surrounding Aristotle’s concept of the ‘active intellect’ in De Anima iii 5 and Śaṇkara’s concept of an omniscient world-designing soul in his commentary on Brahmasūtra #1.1.5. Such cross-cultural examination of notions of a purely active intellect or creative absolute could yield further insights into the relationship between consciousness and nature.
Aristotle holds both that the “psychological affectations of animals are inseparable from their natural matter” (Sheilds 2016, 102), and that the mind is in some sense ‘separate’, ‘unaffected’ and ‘unmixed’. This apparently inconsistent feature of his psychology has provoked enduring controversy. In classical non-dualistic (advaita) Vedānta, there is a distinction drawn between the inner organ (antaḥkaraṇa), which includes the inner sense, the intellect, and the sense of ego, and pure consciousness (Cit), or the Self (Atman). Aristotle’s active intellect bears some resemblance to Advaita’s antaḥkaraṇa as well as with Advaita’s atman. Both are described as ‘unmixed’ and both are likened to light. But the atman, unlike the power of the mind that Aristotle describes as producing all things, is essentially inactive—it is called a witness (sākṣin). And the inner organ, which one is tempted to compare to Aristotle’s passive intellect (since it is distinguished from unmixed, luminous consciousness) is, from an empirical standpoint, active, in the sense that it “exits through an external organ and assumes the form (ākāra) of the perceived object” (Chakrabarti 1999, 193). Regardless of whether the internal organ is understood in Advaita as going out and assuming the form of the object or, on the other hand, as abstracting forms from material content (Gupta 1998, 106), it cannot be understood in Advaita as ‘unmixed’ or ‘unaffected’. So the internal organ seems dissimilar to Aristotle’s active and passive intellects alike. A more apt comparison may obtain between Aristotle’s active intellect and Advaita’s īśvara (God), which is conceived of as the original ground and maker—the material and efficient cause of all things. But again, any straightforward parallelism eludes us. Material nature is unconscious and therefore cannot be consciously creative, according to Śaṇkara. Only a conscious world-soul can be a world-maker.
Yet, in Śaṇkara’s Advaita, īṣvara and jīva (Supreme and individual soul) alike are pure universal consciousness (Brahman) “delimited” by the collective and individual nescience of avidya. So Śaṇkara’s God is not, like Aristotle’s active intellect, transcendentally real. I cautiously and critically explore these and other comparisons further in order to engage with questions about whether Aristotle’s active intellect is better understood as some sort of general or collective human mind, or as the mind of God.
[3] Riza Kalyoncu, Ibn Haldun University, “The Layers of Meaning in Fārābī’s Philosophy”
Abstract: Fārābī’s theory of meaning has been developed in his works such as The Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf), The Epistle on Intellect (Risāla fī l-ʿaql), The Enumeration of the Sciences (Iḥṣāʾ l-ʿulūm), The Utterances Used in Logic (Elfāẓ Mustʿamala fī l-Manṭıq). In this study, by showing the basic layers of Fārābī’s theory of meaning, I will present how Fārābī made these layers functional while constructing the relationship between utterance (Lafẓ) and meaning (maʿnā ).
When Fārābī’s works are reviewed within the framework of this problem, it is seen that he focuses on two issues in the first part of The Book of Letters: (i) how the meaning is formed in the intellect at the intelligible (maʿqūl) level (ii) the relationship of the meaning that occurs in the intellect with the utterances. Fārābī evaluates the basic concepts of philosophy such as existence (vujūd), substance(jawhar) and accident (ʿaraẓ) in The Book of Letters. Likewise, in his various works, he analyzes the meaning of the concept of intellect (aql) and logos (nuṭq) which are other basic concepts of philosophy.
In this framework the main thesis of this study is this: when these determinations of Fārābī are evaluated together, it is seen that he has a triple theory of meaning. According to Fārābī, the meaning formed in three layers is divided into the following parts: (i) Intellectual meaning area (nuṭq) (ii) Verbal (Qavl) area belonging to a certain community or containing a certain terminological use (iii) Purely communicative and practical meaning area. Therefore, in this study, an alternative reading is presented to the interpretations of The Book of Letters and Fārābī’s theory of meaning.
The main argument that forms the basis of this reading is Fārābī’s explanations about the concept of logos (nuṭq). According to Fārābī, the concept of logos which constitutes the origin of the concept of logic, has three different meanings: (i) reasoning ability of the soul (ii) inner speech (iii) outer speech. Fārābī also solves the problem of connection between logic and language based on this distinction. Accordingly, while language examines the relationship between the words used in a certain community (outer speech), logic examines the words in their relation to understanding (inner speech). This distinction of Fārābī not only explains the logic and language relationship, but also offers a new approach to the relationship between utterance and meaning.
Within the framework of these arguments, it is argued that Fārābī’s theory of meaning cannot be reduced to a purely Aristotelian theory of meaning and that, contrary to what S. Menn claims, The Book of Letters is the text in which Fārābī’s theory of meaning is developed rather than an interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. On the other hand, contrary to what Jaffray claims, it is emphasized that Fārābī’s theory of logos should be understood within Fārābī’s system of thought.
As a result, in this study I have reached these conclusions: (i) Fārābī’s theory of meaning needs to be divided into three parts (ii) Only with this distinction Fārābī’s approach to the basic concepts of philosophy might be understood.
[6] Jean Keller, College of St. Benedict/St. John’s University, “Embodied Wisdom: Neuroscience, Trauma, and Practice of the Virtues”
Abstract: Research into the neuroscience of trauma complicates Aristotle’s account of the virtues, with important implications for how we understand what is required to act in a virtuous way. This talk explores some of those complications, arguing that this research requires that Aristotle’s virtue ethics be rethought such that it explicitly addresses both top-down and bottom-up practices when finding the mean. In other words, trauma research demonstrates that virtue is best thought of as both “intelligent,” with our passions and desires being receptive to reason’s guidance, and also “embodied”, with reason needing to learn to attend to the messages of the body in order to be able to respond in continent and, eventually, virtuous ways.
Recent research into the neuroscience of trauma (van der Kolk, Porges) teaches us that, when under threat, persons’ higher brain functions go offline, and the reptilian brain takes over in a desperate fight/flight/freeze/appease attempt to keep one safe. When the threat is severe or pervasive enough to be experienced as trauma (researchers define trauma subjectively, as an experience (or experiences) that is more than a particular person’s nervous system can handle), the brain is rewired to be hypervigilant for signs of threat, and situations that are experienced as tolerable for the untraumatized may elicit an “extreme” reaction—of rage or shutdown—by the traumatized. Moreover, if trauma isn’t healed, one passes on changes in gene expression to one’s offspring, with the result that one’s descendants will be predisposed to experiencing and manifesting trauma reactions that seem disproportionate to the situation at hand.
Trauma is widespread in our culture, as the 1994 ACES study and other research shows. The fact that trauma rewires the nervous system such that persons are more likely to respond in “extreme” ways to everyday stressors, poses a major challenge for Aristotelian virtue ethics as it suggests that wide swaths of our population are predisposed towards vice. Moreover, this research shows that efforts to heal from trauma by engaging a person’s prefrontal cortex to modulate responses are largely unsuccessful. (Van der Kolk, Levine) Thus, Aristotle’s model of the passions being responsive to reason’s guidance is inadequate when it comes to understanding how those who have experienced trauma exercise virtue.
Trauma researchers argue that healing from trauma requires that we learn to attend to the wisdom of the body. Engaging in body-based practices allow one to learn/relearn how to attend to one’s body-based cues. It can help persons learn what an emotion feels like in their body and to determine what that emotion is. Such understanding of one’s internal states is necessary for all of us, traumatized and untraumatized alike, to develop the emotional understanding and self-regulation that is central to Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
Trauma research suggests that Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean requires more than learning virtuous habits from our earliest years and more than exercising practical wisdom. It requires, in a variation on Aristotle’s suggestions in the Politics, that we develop embodied practices to cultivate virtue. I address these in this talk.
[10] Hannah Laurens, University of St. Andrews, “Nous in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.9”
Abstract: Discussions of nous in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.9 typically focus on the question of what this ‘most divine’ (θειότατον, 1074b16) nous consists in: is it a thinking purely of itself (e.g. Brunschwig 2000, Beere 2010) or is it a thinking that comprises all essences (e.g. Burnyeat 2008, Judson 2019)?Whichever way this nous – famously described by Aristotle as noēsis noēseōs (1074b34) – is construed, it is generally assumed that this divine nous is exclusive to the Prime Mover or God. In this paper, I challenge that assumption: nous in Meta. Λ.9 does not exclusively concern God’s nous but equally describes nous as it exists in human beings.
Recently, scholars have questioned whether nous in Λ.9 is exclusive to God (e.g. Lang 1993, Frede 2000, Gabriel 2009). For, in Λ.9 Aristotle speaks simply of νοῦς and to consistently render this as ‘divine nous’ or ‘God’s nous’ (e.g. Ross 1924, De Koninck 1994) is unwarranted. However, at the end of Λ.9 (1075a7) Aristotle explicitly mentions ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, human nous, which does seem to suggest an opposition between nous as it belongs to humans and the nous under consideration in Λ.9 (Bradshaw 2001). Hence, so Judson (2019) argues, the nous central to Λ.9 must be God’s nous. The nous that is noēsis noēseōs and ‘most divine’ belongs exclusively to God.
While I acknowledge Λ.9’s explicit opposition between ἀνθρώπινος vs θειότατον nous, I shall maintain that it is incorrect to understand this contrast as an opposition between thought as it belongs to different kinds of beings (humans vs God). Instead, this opposition contrasts kinds of thought, regardless of what being does the thinking. Just as EN X.7 opposes ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος to ὁ θεῖος βίος (1177b30-31), the human life to the divine life, so does Meta. Λ.9 oppose human nous to divine nous. But just as the divine life is not exclusive to the gods – in fact, the whole point of EN X 7-8 is to encourage humans to engage in it – so neither is divine nous exclusive to the PM-God.
But if this opposition between human and divine nous concerns kinds of thought, what are these kinds? Aristotle’s postulation of a human kind of thought arises in the context of his aporia whether what is thought of is composite (σύνθετον, 1075a5): one kind of thought concerns composites, another concerns indivisibles (ἀδιαίρετον, 1075a7). This opposition matches Aristotle’s description of two kinds of thought in DA III.6 (σύνθεσις 430a27-28 vs τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις 430a26). Meta. Λ.9 tells us that the former is a kind that is ‘human’ and the latter ‘divine’ – presumably, because the former concerns contingent states of affairs and the latter eternal truths. This interpretation of the ἀνθρώπινος/θειότατον-opposition allows us to move away from understanding the nous central to Λ.9 as exclusively belonging to God, prompting us to enquire how noēsis noēseōs might also apply to divine thought as engaged in by humans. Anyhow, it metaphysically illuminates Aristotle’s consistent connection between man’s nous and divinity (e.g. PA II.10 656a7-8, IV.10 686a25-29, GA II.3 736b28).
[8] Roy C. Lee, Stanford University, “God’s Authority Over Prudence in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics”.
Abstract: In Aristotle’s ethics, contemplation is an ethically significant end that makes us like God. But what exactly is the relation between God and prudence? This paper focuses on a neglected passage in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics 8.3 that clarifies the relationship between God and prudence. The passage offers a principle clarifying the reasoning given by prudence: acquire goods to maximize the contemplation of God, and minimize the soul’s irrational part (1249b16–23). The passage’s argument for this principle hinges on the crucial thought that God is a ruler, not by issuing commands, but by being that-for-the-sake-of-which prudence issues commands.
There is a crucial question, unaddressed by previous interpreters of the passage: what is the nature of God’s authority such that we ought to follow it? One possibility is that God’s authority is like that of a political leader. Aristotle articulates a principle of rulership in Politics 1.5 that gives the ruling element of a composite authority over the subject element. But this reading implies that God is a part of the composite that comprises a human being. While some scholars have suggested that Aristotle conceives of God as internal to the human soul, this consequence is controversial, both textually and psychologically. Additionally, this reading cannot make sense of the claim that “God needs nothing,” since the internal God does seem to be dependent on human needs such as nutrition.
I propose instead that God’s authority is that of a final cause, or function: a perfect object that it is good for us to imitate through our own contemplative activity. My proposal rereads the passage to assign a final cause (archê) to each part of the soul. God is the final cause of the rational part of the soul by being a model of truth we imitate through true contemplation. Following the commands of prudence is the function of the non-rational part of the soul. It is controversial how exactly the commands of prudence may be related to contemplation, but at least one of the upshots of the commands of prudence is to promote the contemplation of God. So, God’s role in Aristotle’s ethics is that of a perfect being whom the rational part of the soul imitates by partaking in human contemplation and by issuing commands to the non-rational part of the soul that promote such contemplation.
The Nicomachean Ethics explains that the contemplative life is most divine, but more than that, on my reading, the Eudemian Ethics gives a psychological explanation of God’s role in ethics, that explains how each part of the human soul is directly or indirectly related to approximating God as a perfect being.
[5] Hashem Morvarid, University of Illinois-Chicago, “Avicenna on the Ontology of Common Natures”s
Abstract: In our scientific as well as everyday discourse, we frequently categorize things. Some things are animate, while others are inanimate. Some things are capable of thinking, while others are not. Some things are green, some are blue, some are red, and so on. According to some philosophers, all categorizations are subjective. For instance, Emmanuel Kant believed that the categories are our conceptual scheme that we apply to our empirical experience to make sense of the noumenal world. More recently, Nelson Goodman has argued that there is nothing in the world which prevents things from being divided into grue and bleen rather than green and blue. On such subjectivist views, there is nothing about the external world which explains our actual categorizations; the categorizations are, rather, mere projections of our mind or language into the world. In contrast, working in the Aristotelian framework, Avicenna maintained that at least some categorizations have their root in the objective reality, that they are not mere projections of our mind or language into the world. In his view, even if no human mind or language existed, things would still be categorized in at least some of the ways they actually are. More specifically, he thought, with Aristotle, that at the most general level (contingent) beings are categorized, independent of our mind and language, into ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, somewhere, sometime, being in a position, having, acting, and being acted upon
Abstract: But how does Avicenna explain the objectivity of a categorization and its categories? What makes it the case that beings are objectively categorized in one way rather than another? He explains the objectivity of a categorization and its categories with appeal to common natures. For him, members of a category are objectively classified in one category because they share a common nature. All human individuals, for example, are objectively classified in one category, the category of human being, because they share rational animality as their common nature. For this explanation to work, natures must be shared in a real sense of the word by their instances. For if natures are shared only in the sense that their mental concepts or linguistic expressions apply to all of their instances, then the categories would turn out to be mere projections of our mind or language into the world. However, it is not clear at all in what real sense Avicenna takes natures to be shared by their instances. For although he says that members of a category share one and the same nature, he repeatedly and emphatically rejects that there is any numerically one and the same entity shared by the members. In my paper, I examine Avicenna’s scattered passages about common natures to determine in what real sense, if any, he takes natures to be shared by their instances.
[9] Bryan Reece, University of Arkansas, “A Theophrastean Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5”
Abstract: Aristotle’s De anima 3.5, in which he introduces a new way of talking about intellect as active or productive, has occasioned numerous interpretations. Of particular urgency is the question of how this way of describing intellect relates to that in De anima 3.4, where Aristotle argues that there is no bodily organ for thinking. Interpretations can be divided into three main groups: Theophrastean, Alexandrian, and Themistian. Theophrastus and later followers of his have viewed the chapter as discussing an aspect of individual, particular human intellect. Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose line has been most popular in recent years, thinks that the chapter concerns the intellect of a divine unmoved mover. Themistius, who is followed in at least some important particulars by such commentators as Averroes, takes Aristotle to countenance an intellect that is shared in common between all humans.
I propose a Theophrastean interpretation that differs from familiar varieties, including that of Thomas Aquinas and his more recent followers. I argue that progress can be made by attending to disputes between recent Alexandrians and Themistians about the kind of separability of intellect at issue in De anima 3.4–5. Themistians think that Aristotle describes two kinds of intellect that are existentially separable from human bodies and from each other. Alexandrians have lately argued that while the intellect of the divine unmoved mover, which they take to be at issue in 3.5, is existentially separate from anything to do with humans, the human intellect discussed in 3.4 is separable only in account from human bodies. A Theophrastean can capitalize on this important distinction: Aristotle’s remarks in these chapters can be explained if the two intellects are separable from one another merely in account, such that there is strictly only one intellect for each individual human, and this one intellect is existentially separable from one’s body. I spell out how this separation in account is to be understood, offering an alternative to Aquinas’s proposal that each of the two intellects has a different operation and improving on (ps.-?) Philoponus’s way of understanding Aristotle’s claim in 3.5 that intellect is always active. This has an important implication for how human thinking is, and is not, like that of Aristotle’s divine prime mover, a subject that I have previously considered from another angle in my “Aristotle on Divine and Human Contemplation” and my forthcoming Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom.
[4] Karen Taliaferro, Arizona State University, “Sharʿa and sharīʿa: A study of divine law in a trilogy of Ibn Rushd’s works”
Abstract: To Aquinas, divine law existed in two forms, divine law as a revealed law (e.g., the 10 Commandments) as well as the eternal law, which is the “the totality of things” as they exist in the “divine wisdom’s conception” (Summa Theologica I-II, Q.93, a.1; Freddoso translation). Within Islamic philosophy, no such distinction is typically asserted; sharīʿa simply is divine law, even if its development and jurisprudence admit of plenty of complications. Nevertheless, in two parts of a trilogy of works, the Faṣl al-Maqāl (Decisive Treatise) and Kashf ʿan Manāhij (Exposition of the Methods of Proof), Ibn Rushd consistently moves between sharʿa and sharīʿa as terms for “divine law”, sometimes in the same sentence, suggesting that divine law might have nuanced connotations that are not typically caught in English translation. (To give an example, in the Kashf ʿan Manāhij, Ibn Rushd writes that wisdom/philosophy conforms to the sharʿa but it is the sharīʿa that commands it – فإنه لما كنا قد بينا قبل هذا، في قول أفردنا، مطابقة الحكمة للشرع، و أمرَ الشريعة بها ).
If there is indeed a distinction in meaning, and not in term only, between sharʿa and sharīʿa, it would bear significantly on Ibn Rushd’s purported harmonization of divine Law and wisdom as developed in the Faṣl al-Maqāl (suggested, e.g., by his famed “truth does not contradict truth” dictum). That is, should a similar distinction as that between eternal law and divine law as developed by Aquinas exist in the thought of Ibn Rushd, the non-contradiction between religious truths and philosophical truths might be less complete than is often taken for granted. This paper, then, examines Ibn Rushd’s use of two terms for divine Law, sharʿa and sharīʿa, in the Faṣl al-Maqāl and Kashf ʿan Manāhij, asking whether there is a consistent difference of usage between the two terms. I read the two pieces alongside the first part of the same trilogy, Ibn Rushd’s brief development of God’s knowledge in the Ḍamīma, both because it seems to preface the Faṣl al-Maqāl (and may therefore bear on the latter’s interpretation) and because it creates a typology of God’s knowledge – eternal and generated – that may explain the distinction between Ibn Rushd’s two terms for divine Law.
[2] Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University, “Understanding Intellect and Distinguishing Ibn Rushd and Averroes“
Abstract: In contemporary scholarship it is common, even for those writing in European languages on the Arabic works of the great Cordoban philosopher, jurist and physician Abū Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), to refer to him as Averroes, the name regularly used by the European Latin tradition of philosophical and theological readers of his works as translated by Michael Scot and others ca. 1220. Thanks to Scot’s translations of several major works of Ibn Rushd, particularly his Long Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, Physics, De Caelo and Metaphysics, the Cordoban played a very substantial role in educating the Latins in how to read the works of the Stagirite well into the European era of the Renaissance. This respect and appreciation of his work is reflected in the Latins’ routine use of the name Commentator in referring to the Cordoban’s thought and writings.3 Yet is it a simple matter of the identification of Ibn Rushd with Averroes because of the identity of the philosophical teachings? Or is it perhaps necessary to distinguish Ibn Rushd and the Latins’ Averroes in virtue of teachings differently attributed to them? If it can be established that there are substantial differences in their teachings, then would it not be incumbent upon currently active scholars likewise to distinguish the Arabic writing Cordoban Ibn Rushd from the Latins’ Averroes? In what follows, I will use consideration of interpretations of the nature of intellect to address the question of whether there is more than a mere difference of name between Ibn Rushd of Cordoba and the Latin tradition’s Averroes. Since a comprehensive account of all the teachings and differences is beyond the bounds of this presentation, I will limit myself here to the issues of philosophical teachings on the nature of human intellectual understanding and the afterlife. Here I will show that one of the most influential thinkers of the medieval Latin tradition, Albert the Great, attributed to Averroes teachings radically different from those of Ibn Rushd. The difference between Ibn Rushd and Averroes is, I will show, much more than that of a name; rather, it is a very substantial difference of reasoned philosophical doctrine on intellect.
[11] Matthew Vanderkwaak, University College, Dublin, “The Art of the First Cause: forma fluens and the Image of the Cosmic Artist in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Liber de causis”
Abstract: This paper endeavours to discuss the sources, meaning, and purpose of the image of the artist in Albert the Great’s doctrine of forma fluens from his commentary on the Book of Causes (On the Causes and Procession of the Universe). In that work, Albert offers an account of processional creation in which being emanates universally from the First Cause, flowing and over-flowing into all of creation. A difficult aspect of this doctrine is that the primary form which flows into all things must be from the First Cause alone, but nevertheless flows through subsequent causes that are necessary to the work of creation. Three such causes are, as Albert calls them (using the language of the Book of Causes), Intelligence, Noble Soul, and Nature. These correspond, respectively, in Albert’s understanding, to the unmoved intelligible paradigm of all motion and change, to the psychic cause which mediates that paradigm by moving the heavenly bodies through its desire for intelligence, and to the power of the celestial motions themselves which infuse and order the sub-lunar world. Necessary to Albert’s account is the fact that the primary form which both creates these primary causes and flows through them is the very same form from the beginning to the end of the emanation. There must be no diminution to the divine power as it is multiplied in the diversity of creation.
Albert turns to the image of the artist to express how the form which governs the motions of generation and corruption on earth are, in the end, the very same form which inhabits eternity with intelligence; it has only been obscured and shadowed by its participants. According to Albert’s metaphor, Nature, or the power of the heavenly bodies is compared to the hand or instrument of an artist, Noble Soul is compared to the artist’s spirit, which mediates between her mind and organs, Intelligence is compared to the form which the artist contemplates in her mind, and the First Cause is compared to artist’s active intellect. By means of this image, it becomes clear that just as the form which flows from the artist’s intellect, through her spirit, hands, and into the artifact is the same form from the beginning to end which is diversified and occluded by the various faculties and organs it must flow through, so too, in the creation of the universe, it is a single form that flows from the First Cause, through intelligence, to the souls of the spheres, into the heavens, and upon earth.
[12] Hashem Moravid, University of Illinois-Chicago, “Avicenna on the Ontology of Common Natures”
Abstract: In our scientific as well as everyday discourse, we frequently categorize things. Some things are animate, while others are inanimate. Some things are capable of thinking, while others are not. Some things are green, some are blue, some are red, and so on. According to some philosophers, all categorizations are subjective. For instance, Emmanuel Kant believed that the categories are our conceptual scheme that we apply to our empirical experience to make sense of the noumenal world. More recently, Nelson Goodman has argued that there is nothing in the world which prevents things from being divided into grue and bleen rather than green and blue. On such subjectivist views, there is nothing about the external world which explains our actual categorizations; the categorizations are, rather, mere projections of our mind or language into the world. In contrast, working in the Aristotelian framework, Avicenna maintained that at least some categorizations have their root in the objective reality, that they are not mere projections of our mind or language into the world. In his view, even if no human mind or language existed, things would still be categorized in at least some of the ways they actually are. More specifically, he thought, with Aristotle, that at the most general level (contingent) beings are categorized, independent of our mind and language, into ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, somewhere, sometime, being in a position, having, acting, and being acted upon.
But how does Avicenna explain the objectivity of a categorization and its categories? What makes it the case that beings are objectively categorized in one way rather than another? He explains the objectivity of a categorization and its categories with appeal to common natures. For him, members of a category are objectively classified in one category because they share a common nature. All human individuals, for example, are objectively classified in one category, the category of human being, because they share rational animality as their common nature.
For this explanation to work, natures must be shared in a real sense of the word by their instances. For if natures are shared only in the sense that their mental concepts or linguistic expressions apply to all of their instances, then the categories would turn out to be mere projections of our mind or language into the world. However, it is not clear at all in what real sense Avicenna takes natures to be shared by their instances. For although he says that members of a category share one and the same nature, he repeatedly and emphatically rejects that there is any numerically one and the same entity shared by the members. In my paper, I examine Avicenna’s scattered passages about common natures to determine in what real sense, if any, he takes natures to be shared by their instances.
[13] Darby Vickers, University of San Diego, “Eudaimо̄nia, Makaria, and the Life of Study: A Solution to the Book 10 Problem”
Abstract: In books 1-9 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes how one can cultivate virtue and achieve a eudaimо̄n (happy) life. This eudaimо̄n life is one surrounded by people and filled with political activity. Yet, in book 10, Aristotle demotes this political life to second-best (δευτέρως; 1178a9); he claims the ideal life is one of philosophical contemplation. In doing this, he specifies what complete happiness (ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία) entails, narrowing rational activity (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια) to study (θεωρητική; 1177a17). This life of study, which he equates with a life of philosophy (1177a17-27), seems to be a primarily intellectual pursuit, rather than a life focused on the character virtues, which are the primary focus of the majority of the Nicomachean Ethics.[1]
I argue that the key to understanding the difference between the two lives touted as best is the adjective “τελεία” (“complete” or “perfect”). Indeed, “ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία” requires something beyond the political eudaimо̄n life, a life that is even better. This may be hard to accept, since the eudaimо̄n life is exceptional in and of itself; it seems unlikely that we may ever meet a eudaimо̄n person during our lifetimes. Yet, the textual evidence demonstrates that may be a figure even rarer than the eudaimо̄n person: the person who possesses “ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία”. This sort of eudaimо̄n life is characterized by plenty of leisure time that is devoted to study rather than politics or other practical matters (Broadie & Rowe 2002: 440). I posit that Aristotle indicates that the rare person who lives a life of complete eudaimо̄nia is the makarios person.
I argue there is a difference between these two terms; eudaimо̄nia requires rational activity in accordance with virtue, while makaria requires this in addition to sustained good fortune.[4] I argue that the virtuous life– the eudaimо̄n life– is the life that Aristotle primarily describes in books 1-9; this life is second best to the makarios life– the life of contemplation– that he describes in book 10. The reason that Aristotle focuses on the eudaimо̄n life (rather than the makarios life), is because achieving the eudaimо̄n life is, at least to some extent, within our control. By contrast, the makarios life requires the elements of the eudaimо̄n life with additional sustained good luck for divine favor, which is not within the scope of human control. I argue that he explicitly applies the label “makarios” to the life of study and characterizes it as both a eudaimо̄n life characterized by extended good fortune and the most divine life a human can have. The reason that he uses the term “makarios” for this life is that it is most similar to the life of the divine (1177b26-31). In this paper, I provide a definition of “makarios” that accounts for its narrow use in book 1 and its expanded uses in books 8-10. I use this definition, in conjunction with textual evidence from book 10, to explain why Aristotle relegates the eudaimо̄n political life to the second best life in book 10, solving a long-standing puzzle. The difficulty of achieving the conditions for the makarios life– because the circumstances for the makarios life are not in our control– explain why Aristotle focuses the majority of the NE on the eudaimо̄n political life.
Housing on the Marquette Campus and local hotel and other information
Among the most convenient local hotels is the four star Ambassador Hotel at 2308 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233, tel. 414-345-5008. Searching for the best rates online yields these:
Sunday 6/19 – Wednesday 6/22:
Queen (Q) = $189 per night
King (K) – $189 per night
Queen / Queen (QQ) = $209 per night
King Whirlpool Suite (KW) = $289 per night
Do check http://www.ambassadormilwaukee.com. But rates are dynamic and change with demand, especially when there are many other summertime events ongoing in Milwaukee.
Some rooms are available at Marquette University
Room Commitment: 8 two-bedroom units. Each unit has two private bedrooms, each furnished with two extra-long twin beds.
Residence Facility:
Humphrey Hall, located at 1716 W. Wisconsin Ave., features air-conditioned sleeping rooms with private bathrooms. Rooms are furnished with extra-long twin-sized bed(s), dresser(s), closet space, and desk(s) and chair(s). Bed and bath linens are also provided. Additional Humphrey Hall amenities include a secured 24-hour front desk, complimentary Wi-Fi, coin-operated laundry on each sleeping floor, vending machines and a common area to watch television or just relax for a while. We regret that we are not able to provide wake up calls or personal toiletry items.
The Desk Receptionist (DR) will provide each guest with a room key at check-in. To expedite the check-out process, please return the room key in the provided key envelope prior to departure.
Room Block Dates: Arriving on June 19, 2022, departing on June 23, 2022
Sleeping Room Summary
Nights of June 19, 2022 through departure on June 23, 2022
Eight 2-bedroom suite-style units. Each shared unit will accommodate 2 people, one guest per private bedroom.
Nightly Room Rates
Humphrey Hall
Two-bedroom suite $79 ($39.50/person)
Cut-Off Date
Cut-off date: May 19, 2022. Rooms requested after the cut-off date are subject to availability.
Standard check in time: After 3 p.m.*
Standard check out time: Prior to 10:30 a.m.*
*These times are based upon Central Standard Time.
Reservation Procedures
Method of reservation is Individual/Direct. Individuals are requested to email donna.wells@marquette.edu to secure a room reservation. Individuals should let the reservations assistant know they are associated with the Aristotle and Aristotelian Traditions Conference. Due to a limited number of rooms, it is highly recommended that a room reservation be made as soon as possible. Reservation deadline is no later than two weeks prior to arrival date.
Note that all quad rooms are shared occupancy with each guest occupying a private bedroom. Please let the reservations assistant know if you have a suite-mate preference.
Guaranteed Reservations
Guests must confirm their room reservation with receipt of a check payable to Marquette University for the entire stay. Full payment must be received no later than one week prior to arrival date. Please provide an email address for invoicing purposes. Submit payment to:
Donna Wells
Alumni Memorial Union 213
1442 W. Wisconsin Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53233
No refunds, including instances involving early departures, will be issued after check payment has been submitted except in the case of illness, injury, medical or family emergency, or other extenuating circumstances and must be approved by the Director of Conference Services.
Linen Service
Basic bed and bath linens are provided in guest rooms. Linen service includes one pillow, sheets/pillowcase, and one bath towel/washcloth per guest. Soiled towel/washcloth may be exchanged for fresh bath linens at the front desk.
Parking
Overnight campus parking is available to residential guests at an estimated 2022 summer rate of $12 per vehicle per night. An additional one-time $10 charge is incurred for a swipe card allowing unlimited in-out access to assigned campus lot for the duration of the stay. Parking must be requested in advance with all charges included in the room reservation payment and received no later than one week prior to arrival. The desk receptionist will provide individual drivers with a university-issued parking permit and swipe card at check-in.
Guest Identification
Additional Policies
Rooms reserved under room blocks are not guaranteed to be located in the same area of the residence hall. It is our policy to attempt to keep groups together, but at times circumstances prohibit this from happening.
Each guest is expected to leave his/her guest room in the same condition in which it was found at check-in. Any damages sustained to the room during the guest’s stay will be billed directly to the guest. Any damages noticed by a guest should be brought to the immediate attention of the desk staff.
Key Lockout and Replacement
Each guest must sign for her/her room key prior to check-in. There is a $10 lockout policy enforced for any guest who requires use of a lock-out key to access his/her room. There is a $75 key replacement fee that is billed to the guest for any key that is lost or not returned at checkout. Rooms are re-keyed immediately for security reasons; therefore, we cannot issue refunds for guests who send in or return keys after checkout time.
Force Majeure
Neither party will be considered in default in the performance of its obligation under this Agreement if such performance is prevented or delayed by any cause which is beyond the reasonable control of the party affected, including severe weather, war, hostilities, revolution, civil commotion, acts of terrorism, zombie apocalypse, alien invasions, strike, lockout, epidemic, pandemic, accident, fire, wind, or flood or because of any law, order, proclamation, ruling, regulation, or ordinance of any government or subdivision of government or because of any act of God (“Force Majeure”).
Indemnification
Group agrees that it will defend and fully indemnify University against any loss, cost, damage, injury, or expense (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) that may be sustained or incurred by University, its trustees, officers, employees, students, agents, and guests as a result of the Group, its employees, agents, or invitees use of, or presence at, the University Housing or Other Facilities. Neither party will be liable to the other for any indirect, incidental, special, or consequential damages of any kind whatsoever, including lost profits, even if advised of the possibility thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Group will not be responsible to indemnify University against any loss caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the University, its trustees, officers, employees, agents, or contractors.
Compliance
All visitors to campus are required to comply with all University policies, procedures, and health and safety measures in effect.This may include following campus procedures related to the COVID-19 pandemic or other community-wide epidemic or pandemic.
Conduct
All UNIVERSITY visitors are expected to show respect for order, personal and public property, and the rights of all individuals. UNIVERSITY is a community that consists of people of different backgrounds and beliefs. Conduct in violation of the rights of others will not be tolerated. Misconduct will be sufficient cause for removal from the UNIVERSITY. All guests staying in University Housing Facilities must comply with all University policies and procedures and health and safety measures in effect as well as any guidelines for University Facilities.
Smoking/Gambling
UNIVERSITY is a tobacco-free campus. This includes all indoor and outdoor campus spaces including campus buildings, grounds, exterior open spaces, green spaces, parking lots (including inside a vehicle if parked in a University lot), on-campus sidewalks (not bordering a city street), on-campus driveways and other paved areas, athletic facilities, practice facilities, and recreational spaces. Gambling of any nature is strictly prohibited on UNIVERSITY property.
Alcoholic Beverages
The possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by anyone under the age of twenty-one (21) is prohibited by Wisconsin law. Participants over the age of 21 may privately consume alcoholic beverages within their own rooms.
Drugs
The use, possession, distribution or sale of illegal drugs or narcotics is strictly prohibited. Non-compliance by any participant will result in immediate removal from the residence hall, dismissal from participation in activities on UNIVERSITY property and to prosecution.
Pets
No pets of any kind may be brought into or kept in a UNIVERSITYfacility, except for service animals. The Director of Conference Services must be advised in advance if accommodations are required for a service animal.
Reassignment
University reserves the right to reassign Group to alternate housing, dining hall, and conference space based on maintenance, safety, or other needs of University.
Weapons Policy
The GROUP and its members are not permitted to:
– Carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property except as expressly permitted by applicable state law.
– Openly carry any weapons on UNIVERSITY property.
– Carry any weapons in any UNIVERSITY building or leased space or at any University special event marked with signage specifying “WEAPONS ARE PROHIBITED IN THIS BUILDING.”
– Store any weapons in a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property except in the vehicle’s glove compartment or trunk or encased such that the existence of the weapon is concealed. – Encased means completely zipped, snapped, buckled, tied or otherwise fastened, with no part of the weapon exposed. – Fail to lock a personally owned vehicle on UNIVERSITY property that contains any weapon when the GROUP member is not present in the vehicle.
– Possess unloaded ammunition on UNIVERSITY property.
– Imply possession of, threaten to use, display, brandish, use, or discharge a weapon on University property for any purpose or reason except lawful self-defense or lawful defense of others. – Fail to report timely to the UNIVERSITY Department of Public Safety the presence on University property of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy, unless doing so would subject the GROUP member or others to the threat of physical harm, or take other action in response to the presence of any person whom the GROUP member has reason to believe is in possession of or carrying a weapon in violation of UNIVERSITY policy except for reporting the presence of the weapon to the University Department of Public Safety.
The GROUP members whose actions violate applicable State law with respect to the possession of weapons on UNIVERSITY property may be subject to criminal prosecution. GROUP members whose actions violate this provision will be asked to leave UNIVERSITY property immediately and may be subject to no-trespassing directives in the future. UNIVERSITY reserves the right to terminate this Rooms Agreement for one or more violations of this provision.